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ABSTRACT
THE CATHOLIC LOBBY: THE PERIPHERY DOMINATED CENTER,

PUBLIC OPINION AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 1932-1962
MAY 1996

THOMAS M. MORIARTY, B.A., AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL COLLEGE
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST

Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST

Directed by: Professor Milton Cantor

This work examines the origins of the Cold War from
the perspective of domestic American politics. Specifically,

the role of the so-called "Catholic vote" in the New Deal

coalition built by President Franklin

D.

Roosevelt in the

1930s. Catholics comprised roughly one-quarter of the

population and were concentrated in the major urban and
industrial areas of the country. These were the same areas
that dominated the electoral college and thus were of

primary importance to anyone seeking national office or
proposing national policy.
FDR frequently modified his position on national
issues if it appeared this "Catholic vote" might be

jeopardized. Throughout the 1930s, as charges of Communist

influence on FDR and the New Deal increased in intensity,
the official position of the Catholic Church was hardening

iv

into a strict ant i -Communism. The potential, then, existed
for widespread defections of Catholic voters from the New

Deal coalition over the issue of Communism.

Using a variety of primary sources but especially the

presidential papers located at the Roosevelt Library at Hyde
Park, New York, and the archives of the Archdiocese of

Boston in Brighton, Massachusetts, this work will

demonstrate the impact of Catholic opinion on national
policy, especially foreign policy, as it was reflected in
the attempt to keep the Catholic vote in the Democratic

Party. The response of first FDR and then Presidents Truman
and Eisenhower to Soviet domination of largely Catholic

Eastern Europe following the war suggests that religion,

especially Catholicism,

is

the overlooked paradigm of the

Cold War.
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CHAPTER

1

"SATAN AND LUCIFER"

When Franklin Roosevelt met with Winston Churchill
at Quebec in August of 1943,

the conference was publicly

billed as dealing with military matters affecting both the

Pacific and European theaters of war. By this time the

military situation had turned decidedly
Allies. The

in favor of the

Soviets were delivering smashing blows to the

Germans on the eastern front, the North African campaign

against Rommel had been successful and Anglo-American forces
were completing operations in Sicily. However, the presence
of American Secretary of State Cordell Hull and British

Foreign Minister Anthony Eden led to press speculation that
postwar political issues were also on the agenda. As the

military situation became more favorable the wartime
political alliance seemed to deteriorate.
Postwar political issues began taking on greater

significance in early 1943, and would occupy more and more
of FDR's thinking as the year progressed.

William

C.

Union wrote

Bullitt,
a

In January,

former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet

lengthy memorandum to Roosevelt in which he

outlined his fears that Stalin would attempt to dominate

Europe at the end of the war. Bullitt, in

a

speech at New

York in July 1941, shortly after the Nazi invasion of

Russia,

likened the struggle between the two totalitarian

1

powers as "a war between Satan and Lucifer." He concluded
the best course of action for the U.S. would be to let
the

Germans and Russians fight

it

out among themselves in the

belief that the winner would be so weakened as to no longer

threaten Europe.

[1]

The very military successes which prompted the

decision to meet at Quebec were at the heart of Bullitt's

memorandum to FDR. It was now apparent that the Soviets not
only stopped Hitler's Wehrmacht in 1942, but, with the

encirclement and destruction of Paulus' Sixth Army at
Stalingrad, were poised to begin throwing the Germans back
in 1943.

Bullitt's current concern seems to have been that

Satan [or Lucifer, he did not designate which country

represented whom] was about to emerge from the struggle, but
not in the weakened condition originally forecast.

FDR seems to have been impressed with Bullitt's

argument, which was that the closer the Allies came to

defeating Germany the less influence they would have on
getting Stalin to agree on any postwar settlements

.

Now was

the time to apply pressure while "Your club would have lead
in

it,

not cotton." He suggested that FDR threaten a Pacific

first strategy, reduction in aid to the Soviets, possible
di

f f

iculty in providing postwar aid to rebuild the Soviet

Union, and expressing full opposition to '^predatory Soviet

policy in Europe and Asia." He also advocated striking

2

]

.

against Germany through the Balkans rather than France,
but

only

that decision were based on sound military

if

considerations. FDR met with Bullitt to discuss the memo and
asked him to continue to keep him informed on his thinking

regarding the political situation as he saw

it.

[2]

The President also raised the issues contained in

Bullitt's memo with British Foreign Minister Eden in March.
He asked if Eden believed that Stalin's ultimate aim was to

dominate and communize Europe. Eden responded there was no
way to know for sure, but that even

if

that were his

intention the Allies should continue to work with him and

assume he intended to honor his treaty obligations. Eden
added he was surprised by Roosevelt's belief that Poland
would not prove to be
end of the war

.

a

difficult question to resolve at the

FDR felt territorial cone ess ions of East

Pr uss ia and parts of Silesia would make Poland a net gainer
if the Cur z on Line were accepted as

its eastern border

According to Eden, FDR was also prepared to accept Russian
demands on Finland and the Baltic States, but hoped the
Russians would conduct plebiscites to ratify their
actions

.

[

3

Further complicating the political situation was the

German announcement in April of the discovery of

a

mass

grave in the Katyn Forest of eastern Poland. The grave

contained the remains of some 10,000 Polish army officers.

3

The Germans claimed the Russians massacred the Polish

officers after occupying eastern Poland in 1939. Stalin

immediately denied the charge, claiming instead that the
Germans themselves had killed the Poles. FDR and Churchill

supported Stalin's position, arguing the Germans were

attempting to sow dissension among the Allies and to
distract worldwide attention from their own massacre then

underway of Jews in the Warsaw ghetto. However, in London,
the Polish government-in-exile requested an investigation of
the charge by the International Red Cross. Stalin

immediately severed relations with the London Poles, further

complicating the situation.
While the Allies were struggling to maintain

a

semblance of unity in the face of the Katyn accusations, FDR
began making plans to meet with Stalin one-on-one. While

Churchill had already held face-to-face meetings with the
Soviet Premier, the President had yet to meet his Russian

counterpart. In early May, as FDR and Churchill were

preparing for the Trident Conference, to be held in
Washington, the President sent former Ambassador to the
Soviet Union Joseph Davies to Moscow. Davies was to relay to
Stalin the President's desire to meet sometime in July,

without the presence of the British. Stalin initially agreed
to the meeting but expressed doubts to Davies that such a

4

]

meeting could take place in the absence of the opening
of
second front in Europe.

a

Davies reported to FDR that failure to open the

promised second front would have far-reaching consequences
on Soviet attitudes on the prosecution of the war and their

participation in the peace. Stalin's trust in his allies was

obviously diminishing. Whether he believed the Allies were

deliberately holding back and letting the Germans and
Russians slug it out, as Bullitt had publicly suggested,

is

uncertain. He did believe that the Soviets were carrying the
brunt of the fighting and expected another major German

offensive in the summer. He also believed the successful
North African campaign and the Allied air offensive against

Germany were insufficient substitutes for the promised
cross-Channel attack

.

[

4

The results of the Trident Conference were exactly

what Stalin feared. Churchill persuaded FDR to postpone the

cross-Channel attack in favor of securing the Mediterranean
and possibly driving Italy out of the war. Stalin sent an

angry reply to Roosevelt's cable informing him of the
Trident decisions. The Soviets could not consent to these
agreements, again reached without Soviet participation, "and

without any attempt at

a

joint discussion of this highly

important matter and which may gravely affect the subsequent

course of the war." Churchill, now aware that FDR was

5

]

]

'

planning to meet with Stalin without him, began pressing
for
a Big

Three meeting. Stalin refused, citing pressing needs

on the eastern front which required his presence, although

the Germans had not mounted a major summer offensive as

expected

.

t

5

So as FDR and Churchill came together at Quebec for

their sixth meeting of the war the political alliance seemed
to be coming apart.

Stalin's reaction to this meeting was as

acrimonious as his earlier cable to FDR: "To date

it has

been like this: the U.S.A. and Britain reach agreement

between themselves while the U.S.S.R,

agreement between the two powers as
pass i vely on

.

"

[

6

is

informed of the

a third

party looking

]

The Soviet Premier cont inued to express

growing

distrust of his allies. Quebec demonstrated his allies
growing distrust of him. The conference produced

agreement regarding the Tube Alloys Project

-

a

secret

the atomic

bomb. The agreement stipulated that the weapon would never
be used by either partner against the other or against a

third party without the consent of the other. It also

stipulated that information about the project could not be
passed to a third party except by mutual consent. This in
effect gave both FDR and Churchill

a

veto over informing

Stalin about the development of the bomb or sharing

information about it

.

[

7

6

]

FDR did press the British about committing to the

cross-Channel attack in the Spring of 1944 at Quebec. They
also agreed to pursue

a

meeting of the Big Three later that

fall. When the meeting broke up, both men took short

vacations before returning to Washington for further
discussions.

Historians have repeatedly attempted to

determine just what Roosevelt's thinking was at this
cr itical juncture,

as preparations began for the first

meeting of the Big Three later that year at Teheran. The

controversy seems to revolve around just how much FDR's
conversations with Bullitt and Eden earlier in the year
reflected his real thinking and how much may have been pure

speculation

Herbert Feis contends these early discussions

.

were an "exercise in imagination" and that "the record of

these discuss ions leaves the impress ion that they were

conducted in a vacuum." Gaddis Smith, on the other hand,
argues that policy was being based on

a

combination of

naivete and stereotypes held by FDR and his advisors. This

resulted in
and

i 1

a

formulation of policy "on the basis of hopes

lus ion rather than ascertainable

f act

.

"

Robert Dallek

presents yet another position, contend ing that Roosevelt was
indeed influenced by Bullitt's arguments and that "he was

uncertain about postwar relations with Russia, he wished to
assure against the possibility that Stalin aimed at
extens i ve European control

.

"

[

8

7

By the time Churchill arrived in Washington on

September

Italy had accepted the surrender terms of the

1,

Allies. The President invited Archbishop Francis

J.

Spellman

of New York to dine at the White House along with the Prime

Minister. The following morning FDR met privately with

Spellman for more than an hour. The Archbishop recorded his
impressions of what the President said in

a

two-page memo

that he sent to the Vatican to his longtime friend and

mentor Pope Pius XII. This document presents

a

very

different picture regarding the firmness of FDR's views on
the postwar world. According to Spellman, FDR forecast a

postwar world dominated by "spheres of influence" among the
"big four." China would have the dominant interest in the
Far East; the U.S.

in the Pacific;

Britain and Russia in

Europe and Africa. However, Spellman said FDR believed
Russia would dominate Europe because of Britain's

"predominately colonial interests." While Chiang Kai-shek
would be consulted on "the great decisions concerning

Europe," he would have no influence on them. Moreover, the
U.S. would be in much the same position as Chiang on

European matters, "although to

a

lesser degree." FDR hoped

the Russian domination of Europe "would not be too harsh,"

according to Spellman, "[ajlthough that might be wishful
thinking. "[9

]

8

It is

interesting to note from this portion of

Spellman's memo that FDR did not foresee
the U.S.

in Europe after the war.

a

major role for

Much of what the President

did in the remaining months of the war takes on new meaning

when seen from this perspective.

Spellman restated the President's desire to establish
a

personal relationship with Stalin. He would seek a meeting

with Stalin as soon as possible in the belief that he was

better able to reach an accommodation with the Soviet leader
than Churchill. Stalin's postwar territorial aims were

outlined: "He would certainly receive; Finland, the Baltic
States, the Eastern half of Poland, Bessarabia." The

President had decided, according to Spellman, that there was
no sense in opposing these territorial desires of Stalin's

because he had the power to get them anyway. In essence FDR

acknowledged that he would accept the Soviet front iers

in

existence on June 21, 1941, the date of the German invasion
of Russia.

Stalin had been pressing for the recognition of

these borders si nee December of 19 41. He had proposed

a

secret protocol to Foreign Minister Eden to the treaty of

alliance between Russia and Britain. Both the British and
the U.S. had opposed the recognition of these borders. FDR

outlined for Spellman the same position he took in his

discussions with Eden in March; the Baltics would be
absorbed by Russia, eastern Poland would be taken as well.

9

FDR then went on to outline for Spellman more far-

reaching consequences of the changing military and political
situation, far more than he revealed to Eden. According to
Spellman, FDR confirmed to him the probability that Stalin

would attempt to set up communist governments in the areas
not incorporated directly into the Soviet Union. The

President conceded that Austria, Hungary and Croatia would
"fall under some sort of Russian protectorate

archbishop asked

if

.

"

When the

the Allies intended to support

noncommunist elements

in

those countries to help prevent

communist takeovers, FDR replied, "no such move was

contemplated." The President seemed to be agreeing with the
most pessimistic evaluation of Soviet aims outlined by

Bullitt in January. [10]
The picture presented here contrasts sharply with

those of an undecided, naive President about to embark on an

attempt to prevent Soviet power from expanding in Europe.
Rather

,

he has a firm grasp of the postwar realities created

by the increasing military strength of the Soviet Union. He

believes the Soviets will be the dominant power in Europe
He believes the Soviets will attempt to install communist

governments in several eastern European countries and
making no plans to counter such

a

is

development. FDR told the

archbishop, and through him the Vatican, that all of Eastern

Europe from the Baltic States to the Balkans would be either

10

incorporated into the Soviet Union or fall under
Soviet
domination. Furthermore, he will do nothing to assist
or

support elements within those countries which might
resist
such a development, and the United States and Britain
cannot
fight the Russians to prevent their takeover of Eastern

Europe. The arguments put forth by Bullitt to prevent the

expansion of Soviet power have been rejected.
The fact that Spellman swiftly notified the Vatican of
the President's postwar outlook is clear evidence of his

concern over what FDR had confided to him. The prospect of
Poland, the Baltic States, Hungary, Austria and

Czechoslovakia -- all predominantly Catholic countries -coming under communist influence was not something the

Vatican would take lightly. The question remains why FDR
would be telling the archbishop of New York all this in the
first place? Surely he knew Spellman would inform the

Vatican of this discussion. He also risked the possibility
the information would leak to the press and create a storm
of protest.

The answer seems to lie in the fact that this

was not a new initiative on FDR's part but rather a

confirmation to the Vatican of an already established trend
of thinking on postwar problems.

The evidence seems to

suggest that FDR had reached decisions on the need to

accommodate the extension of Soviet power

11

in

Europe as early

as mid-1942 and conveyed this to the Vatican
through his

personal representative Myron C. Taylor.
In August of 1942,

while Italy was still an active

member of the Axis alliance, Taylor was spirited into Rome
for meetings with the Pope and his top advisors. Sumner

Welles, Assistant Secretary of State and FDR's man in the

State Department, initiated the idea to send Taylor back to
Rome in the midst of hostilities. FDR agreed "that it would
be useful for Myron Taylor to go back to the Vatican

But

how can we get him there." Arrangements were apparently made

through the Italian government in the belief that Taylor
would transmit to the Pope conditions under which the

Italians could withdraw from the war. The records of

Taylor's meetings with the Pope, however, reveal that much
more was being discussed, and the Italian situation was

rarely ment ioned

.

[

11

Taylor seemed intent on conveying to Pius XII, and his

Secretary of State Cardinal Luigi Maglione, the nature of
postwar Europe, and in particular the role of Russia. Taylor

stressed the Russian signature to the Atlantic Charter,
"which, among other things, asserts adherence to the

principle of religious freedom, and by its expressed

attitude toward Poland, the Baltic and Balkan States, in the

discussion of postwar settlements," had led the
administration to believe "the field

12

is

open for

collaboration

-

and generous compromise." Taylor impressed

upon the Pope and his advisors the need for Russian

cooperation at the end of the war without which "the
future

stability of Europe" would be endangered. Russia would
gain
security through an effective international organization
dedicated to the prevention of German rearmament and in
return would be asked only to "cease her ideological

propaganda in other countries, and to make religion really
free within her borders." According to Taylor, the Pope and
his advisors were very impressed with the fact that

consideration of postwar matters was already well under way.
[121

Taylor met privately the following day with Cardinal

Secretary of State Maglione and again brought up the
question of Russia and her postwar attitude "which

is

very

much in the minds of everyone here." He raised the

possibility of establishing

a

"buffer organization of states

...between Germany and Russia" to ensure Russian security
and reducing her need "to gain territory in the less rich

areas surrounding her on the west." Taylor did not spell out
just how this "buffer organization of states" was to be

created, only that the matter was under consideration

.[

13

The evidence seems to suggest that FDR developed a

postwar strategy very early in the war, much earlier than

historians have commonly thought. He communicated important

13

elements of that plan to the Vatican as early as September
1942, while the Allies were still on the defensive (the

battle of Stalingrad was just beginning). Historians have

largely overlooked FDR's wartime communications with the

Vatican as

a

source for providing

a

clear indication of what

he planned to accomplish. For example,

British Foreign

Minister Eden was taken by surprise in March of 1943 when
FDR suggested that Poland would not present a difficult

problem to resolve at the end of the war.

FDR suggested to

him that East Prussia and parts of Silesia would more than

compensate Poland for possible loss of territory to Russia
in the east.

Prior to Taylor's departure for discussions

with the Pope the State Department prepared "a special map
of Germany"

for Taylor based on "[t]he instruct ion ... to show

the Germanized Slav sandy plain of Brandenburg." The

commentary accompanying the map states: "Practically all of
Pomerania, Brandenburg, Silesia and the Kingdom of Saxony
are still inhabited by a stock whose anthropological

characteristics are basically Slav." The document goes on to
state that "Polish sovereignty at no time extended over so
wide an area, but stopped at the western frontier of
Silesia, some miles west of the Oder River" and concluded

with the comment that "[f]or purposes of the present map,
the Oder has been selected as the western limit of the

Germanized Slav area" and that it approximated the

14

westernmost extension of Polish rule. As Taylor left for
Rome in September of 1942 he carried with him the outline
of

possible future borders of Poland which Roosevelt would
allude to six months later to Foreign Minister Eden. [14]
Yet another element of Roosevelt's postwar thinking is

revealed in the Taylor documents. Upon leaving Rome, Taylor
went to London where he held conversations with Averell

Harriman and Soviet Ambassador Ivan Maisky on the subject of

developing "a brief formula that would be the basis for

a

declaration by Stalin that would encourage the thought that
religion in Russia would actually be free." While in London
he sought the opinion of one of the leading authorities on

the Soviet Union concerning the question of religion in

Russia and what effect that might have within territories
occupied by the Soviets after the war. George Kennan, then

temporarily assigned to the embassy in Lisbon, outlined
three-page memorandum dated October

2,

1942, the Soviets'

hostility to the Russian Orthodox Church and religion
general. Kennan related

a

in a

number of instances of

a

in

"great

resurgence" of religious life in German occupied areas of
Russia. While acknowledging the accounts may have been

exaggerated by the Germans for their own propaganda
purposes, he concluded they "are naturally not without their

effects on the religious populations of the other eastern

European countries," and "[t]hey doubtless tend to increase

15

the horror with which these people view the prospect
of

Russian occupation after the war." [15]
As a result of these wartime experiences, Kennan said
it should

"be evident to anyone that a greater real

tolerance of religious life in Soviet controlled territories
would be in the interests of the Soviet Government itself
both now and in the future." Kennan acknowledged the

difficulty of "achieving such cooperation and
understanding." The problem, as he saw

lay not so much

it,

with the concept of religious freedom itself, but with the

potential of foreign influence. He compared the Communist
rulers of Russia with the Czars of the 15th and 16th

centuries who "fought Roman religious influence, not so much
out of convict ions of dogma as out of fear of foreign

influence on a backward and credulous people, so the present
rulers tend to feel that any foreign influence, religious or
otherwise, challenges the security of their rule." Kennan's

memorandum concluded, "If these preoccupations could be
overcome and

i f

the Kr eml in could be induced to tolerate

religion at home and to receive the proffered cooperation of

western religious movements in the spirit of friendliness
and confidence,

I

believe one of the greatest barriers to a

sound future peace would have been removed

.

"

[

16

Upon returning to the U.S. Taylor resumed

correspondence with Archbishop Edward Mooney of Detroit,

16

taking up with him the question of what type of
statement
would be necessary from Stalin. Mooney told Taylor,

profoundly convinced that

a

"I

am

reliable, authoritative

statement on religious freedom in Russia

is a

'sine qua non

of sincere cooperation between America and Russia in post

war problems." Mooney,

like Roosevelt,

felt that Stalin was

an "utter realist" and that such a statement could be

obtained "if we insist." However, the bishop also believed
that "an ambiguous or evidently insincere declaration would
be fatal to the prestige of the President and to the

confidence which people must have in him

if his high

ideals

for the post war settlement are to be realized

substantially." The President's reputation, and acceptance
of his postwar settlements,

ultimately hinged on their

acceptance by the American public.
Writing in 1969, Norman Graebner asked the fundamental

question historians had been trying to answer: "After more
than twenty years of Cold War, the quest for understanding

raises one fundamental and still unanswered question: Why
did the Untied States after 1939 permit the conquest of

eastern Europe by Nazi forces, presumably forever, with

scarcely a stir, but refused after 1944 to acknowledge any
primary Russian interest or right of hegemony in the same
region on the heels of a closely-won Russian victory against
the German invader?" Graebner concluded that "when scholars

17

have answered that question fully the historical
debate over
the Cold War origins will be largely resolved."
Graebner was

writing at the conclusion of the second round of work
on the
origins of the Cold War conducted by the so-called

"revisionist" historians such as William Appleman Williams,
Gabriel Kolko, David Horowitz and Gar Alperovitz. They put
forth their theories based on economic interpretations of

global American interests. But after another quarter century
and the end of the Cold War that question Graebner asked

remained elusive.

[17]

This work will attempt to resolve the question posited
by Graebner in terms of a new Cold War paradigm

More specifically,

it will

-

religion.

focus on the reaction of American

Catholicism, and the domestic political repercussions
inherent in the postwar settlement FDR envisioned and

outlined to Pius XII as early as 1942 and Archbishop

Spellman

a

year later. FDR was about to embark on an

ambitious plan to make the postwar political realities he
outlined to Archbishop Spellman more palatable to the

Vatican and thereby to American Catholics. In doing so he
was acknowledging the importance of the religious periphery,

American Catholics, in terms of their ability to dominate
the discussion of anti-Communism in America. Ronald

Formisano formulated

a

political "core" and "periphery" in

relationship to the development of political parties

18

in

antebellum Massachusetts. According to Formisano,
"core"
groups should be "considered as culturally or
religiously
dominant groups seeking to maintain or extend their

values

over out-groups or minorities which the paternalist
core

usually regard as subordinate or inferior." In like manner
the "out-groups resisting the political, economic, cultural

hegemony of the Center/Core" groups were considered the
periphery.

[

18

]

Formisano was detailing the struggle of separatist
religious groups such as Baptists and Methodists competing
with the Center/Core orthodox Congregationalists in

antebellum Massachusetts. By the 1930s the periphery was
made up of Catholics and Jews, especially the huge influx of

so-called "new immigrants" from southern and eastern Europe,
the very area FDR was conf irming would come under Russ ian

hegemony following the war. That

is

why FDR seemed so

concerned about keeping the Vatican well informed about
potential postwar territorial settlements

.

In fact,

FDR was

so concerned that he appears to have informed the Pope and

his advisors of his thinking some six months before mak ing
s imi

lar thoughts known to his pr incipal wartime ally. What

could the Vatican do? If, as Roosevelt told Spellman, the

combined strength of Britain and the United States could not
prevent Stalin from doing what he wanted; the Vatican would

surely be helpless.

19

The answer was that the Vatican was not
entirely

helpless.

It could

sway worldwide Catholic public opinion,

and Roosevelt, the consununate politician, knew
this. Public

opinion, particularly Catholic opinion, might not have

counted for much in the Soviet Union under Stalin, but
counted for

a

it

great deal in the United States under FDR,

Obviously, Roosevelt was well aware of the importance of the

Catholic vote to his national coalition. He had risen to
political prominence in New York State, where the large,

well-organized Catholic minority was important. On the
national level the same was true in several key industrial
states of the Northeast and Midwest, such as Massachusetts,

Michigan and Illinois with their large bloc of electoral
votes. FDR always had at least one Catholic in his cabinet;

James Farley through the first two administrations in the

traditionally political position of postmaster general. When

Farley broke with Roosevelt over the third term issue, he
was replaced with another Catholic, Frank Walker.

American Catholic opinion on the wartime alliance with
the Soviet Union was ambivalent at best. The German attack
on Russia in June of 1941 suddenly turned one of the

European aggressor nations into an ally. Even the staunch
ant i -Communist Winston Churchill was willing to put the past

"with its crimes,

its

follies, and its tragedies" behind in

the hope that Russia could hold out long enough to let
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England catch its breath. When the U.S. entered the
war in
December, American Catholics found themselves allied
with an

ideological enemy of longer standing than Nazism.

Although Catholics were willing to fight Nazis

alongside Russians, they, along with other Americans,
remained skeptical of any long-range alliance with the
Soviets. Catholic newspapers and periodicals continued to

remind readers of the nature of the Soviet dictatorship.

Commonweal,

a

liberal Catholic journal, reminded readers in

September of 1942, while Myron Taylor was discussing postwar
issues with the Pope, that the record on Soviet occupation
of Poland was much the same as that of Nazi Germany.

"What's

the difference between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia?"

asked Polish refugee Marta Wankowicz:

colder," she answered.

"In Russia it's

[19]

Now, a year later, FDR had confirmed to the most

powerful American Catholic prelate, and through him the
Vatican, a vision of postwar Europe that confirmed Catholics

worst fears.

What was he willing to do? The answer to this

question would unfold over the course of the remainder of
the war. The story has never been fully told, but beginning

with Taylor's mission to Rome in 1942 and continuing through
the Yalta conference, FDR attempted to mediate a

rapprochement between the Vatican and the Soviet Union. He

knew the domestic political risk of failure was great and
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might result in the loss of the large Catholic vote
to the

Democratic Party.
Events moved rapidly in late 1943, and the

long-awaited meeting of the Big Three took place

in

November. Teheran, more so than any of the other conferences
of the war,

illustrated the basic interrelationship of

domestic political realities with the President's
formulation of foreign policy. Shortly after the first
official meeting adjourned, Stalin visited Roosevelt
privately. The President outlined for Stalin his concerns
about the 1944 presidential election. In March FDR had told

Eden that reaching a settlement on Poland would not present
a

problem. But in November FDR told Stalin there were six to

seven million voters in the United States of Polish

extraction (virtually all of them Catholic), and as

a

practical man he did not want to lose their votes. He told
Stalin he agreed with him on the need to restore the Polish
state, but he could not participate in any decision on the

subject. When Stalin replied that he understood the

President's position now that matters had been explained to
him, Roosevelt brought up the similar problem he faced with

American voters of Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian heritage
(also mostly Catholic). FDR told Stalin the United States

would not go to war over the issue when the Soviets

reoccupied the Baltic Republics, but the issue for Americans
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would be the right of self-determination.
FDR raised the

possibility of holding

a

plebiscite, as he had with Eden and

Spellman, and told Stalin he believed the people
of the

Baltics would vote to join the Soviet Union. Stalin
replied
that the Baltic States had no autonomy under the czars,
and
he saw no reason why the issue was being raised now.

When

the President said the public "neither knows nor

understands," Stalin told him, "They should be informed and
some propaganda work done." [20]
The "realism" the President spoke of to Spellman in

September was manifesting itself in terms of American

presidential politics in November. The reality was that FDR
did not want to risk losing the Polish Catholic vote, and

possibly the entire Catholic vote, over the Polish border
issue. FDR was well aware of the impact a president's

foreign policy decisions could have on domestic political

alignments. As

a

vice presidential candidate in 1920 he had

seen the mass desertion of Irish Catholics from the

Democratic party in the Northeast that resulted from
Wilson's pro-British foreign policy and the crushing of the
Easter Rebellion. Roosevelt wrote to a British Friend
Colonel Arthur Murray, M.P.:

"I

wish to goodness you could

find some way of taking it (the Irish Question) out of our

campaign over here." The impact of the Irish question on

American domestic politics, the involvement of the Catholic
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hierarchy, the reDection ot the Treaty of
Versailles and the
ability of domestic politics to impinge on
international

agreements and create

a

potential breakdown of wartime

alliances was not lost on FDR as he was facing

a

similar

situation 25 years later over Poland. The evidence presented
from the Taylor mission of 1942 clearly suggests that FDR
was thinking in much larger terms than simple ethnic

considerations.

[211

This work will attempt to analyze FDR's postwar policy

within the context of his relationship with American
Catholics. Throughout his Presidency, he confronted many
issues, both domestic and international, which hinged on

finding

a

political solution acceptable to Catholic voters

and the Catholic hierarchy. Virtually all of these involved

accusations of Communist sympathies on his part or within
his administration. To fully appreciate the perspective from

which FDR was operating during these critical war years
is

it

necessary to review these incidents and the impact they

had on his decision to attempt the seemingly impossible:

rapprochement between the Vatican and the Kremlin.
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CHAPTER

2

"HE HASN'T TALKED ABOUT ANYTHING BUT RELIGIOUS FREEDOM"

John Adams once remarked that "papists" were as rare
in his hometown of Braintree as comets and earthquakes.

The

scarcity of Catholics in the new American Republic did not
prevent the founders from worrying about the provisions

contained in Article Six of the proposed new constitution.
This article prohibited a religious test to hold office in
the new federal government. Major Rusk of Massachusetts

"shuddered at the idea that Roman Catholics, Papists, and

Pagans might be introduced to office." A delegate to the

North Carolina ratifying convention took

a

more long-range

view, arguing that he "did not suppose that the Pope could

occupy the President's chair," but that in "four or five
hundred years," it was possible "that Papists may occupy"
the presidency,
In fact,

tl]

it would take only 140 years for a Catholic

to seek the highest office in the land. By 1928, when Alfred
E.

Smith left Houston with the Democratic Party nomination,

the face of America had changed. The great waves of

immigration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth

century transformed the nation. As

if the sheer

size of the

new immigration were not enough to provide native Americans
with a sense of being overwhelmed, the origin of the new

immigrants was even more frightening. Prior to the 1880's,
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95 percent of new immigrants came from northwestern
Europe.

The new wave was coming from southern and eastern
Europe:

Poles,

Italians, Russians, Lithuanians, Czechs, Rumanians,

Spanish and Portuguese. As one historian has noted, "most
spoke no English," and, perhaps more importantly,

"Protestantism was foreign to most." The bulk of the new
immigrants were Catholics, Jews and Eastern Orthodox.

[2]

Such huge numbers of Catholics seemed to many to

present

a

clear and present danger to the American way of

life. A midwestern scholar expressed his fear of the new

immigrants' religion:

"The church to which he [the southern

immigrant] gives allegiance is the Roman Catholic, and,

however much the Catholic Church may do for the ignorant
peasant in his European home, such instruction as the priest
gives is likely to tend toward acceptance of their

subservient position on the part of the working man." The

American ideal of the rugged individual as the basis for
American democracy was clearly challenged by the traditional

paternalism of the Catholic church.

[3]

The great waves of immigration also transformed the

nation from predominantly rural to predominantly urban. The
census of 1920 marked the first time a majority of Americans
were found to be living in cities. By 1900 the population of

seven of America's largest cities: New York, Boston,
Buffalo, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit and Milwaukee, was over
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seventy percent comprised of foreign-born stock. Along with
the demographic shift came a shift in political power.

Smith's nomination was a harbinger of that change. Political
power was shifting from rural to urban America, and urban

America was where Catholics were primarily concentrated.
This is dramatically demonstrated by figures released in
1936 which showed that of the fifty largest cities in the
U.S.

forty-one listed Roman Catholics as the largest single

segment of the population, including Providence with 52
percent, Newark with 45, Boston 40, Pittsburgh 35, Cleveland
32,

and Milwaukee and St. Paul with 29.

[4]

Smith's nomination revived all the old fears of papal

conspiracies and ant i -Cathol ic sentiment previously

manifested in the nativist movement of the 1840's and the

Know Nothing Party of the 1850's. The political resurgence
of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920's was associated with the

anti-urban, anti-foreign, ant i -Cathol ic and anti-Semitic

response to the great immigration in addition to the

anti-black orientation of the original Klan. The crushing
defeat suffered by Smith cannot be attributed solely to his
Catholicism. Rather, as historian Richard Hofstadter has

pointed out, no Democrat could have defeated Hoover in 1928.
The combination of prosperity, prohibition and

anti-Catholicism combined to make Hoover's victory
overwhelming. Smith's candidacy represented to most
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Americans all the evils associated with the immigrants:
Catholicism, corrupt big city political machines,
saloons,
cr ime and vice

The importance of Smith's candidacy, however, lies not
so much in his defeat, but in his ability to obtain the

nomination in the first place. Smith's nomination secured
the urban ascendancy within the Democratic party, and that

ascendancy assured Catholics

a

of any nominee of the party.

A Catholic might not be able to

be elected president,

major role in the selection

but no Democrat could hope to be

elected without the support of the major urban political

machines , which were predominantly Catholic.
Franklin

D.

Roosevelt understood this political shift

in power perhaps better than anyone.

leadership reflected

it.

His campaigns and

He rose to political prominence in

New York state where the large, well-organized Catholic
minor ity was important

while at the same

t ime

.

He stayed on good terms with Tammany

not becoming identified with its

practices. He nomi nated Smith for the presidency in 1928
with his famous "Happy Warr ior " speech

.

Campaigning

vigorously for Smith, he criticized both the Klan and the
religious bigotry of the campaign

.

This resulted in

a

residue of support for FDR among Catholics as the 1932

campaign opened

.
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large

As the depression deepened and the response
of the

Hoover administration continued to rely on the
traditional

American value of individual responsibility and the
ability
of business to eventually correct the situation,

Americans

began questioning the very basis of American culture. The

cultural clash between the "rugged individualism" of native

Protestant America and the "paternalism" of the huge numbers
of Catholic immigrants seemed to collapse in the face of

millions of unemployed, hungry and hopeless workers. In May
of 1931,

Pope Pius XI issued the encyclical Quadraoesimo

Anno marking the fortieth anniversary of Pope Leo XIII

's

encyclical Rerum Novarum ("On the Condition of Labor"). Pius

reaffirmed the teaching of his predecessor affirming the
right of private property and condemning the socialistic

concept of communal ownership. However, Leo also condemned
the concentration of wealth and the evils resulting from the

modern industrial process. He asserted the obligation of
owners and employers to provide their workers with

"reasonable and frugal comfort."

[5]

More importantly, both pontiffs asserted that if

employers failed to recognize their obligations to provide
for their employees,

"the public authority must step in to

meet them." In October of 1932, with unemployment

approaching 13 million, FDR made

approvingly from Pius

XI 's

a

speech at Detroit quoting

Ouadraaesimo Anno
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,

calling it

"one of the greatest documents of all time" and
"just as

radical as

I

am." Was the candidate hinting at the need for

government intervention in the economy on

a

broader scale

than his previous campaign statements suggested? [6]

While FDR generally received support from American

Catholics on New Deal issues, which affected them directly,
he soon found himself embroiled in a host of foreign-policy

questions which would place him in conflict with one of his
most important constituencies. The new President had been

Assistant Secretary of the Navy in the Wilson administration
when the U.S. broke off relations with Russia following the

Bolshevik Revolution

.

Three succeeding Republ ican

administrations continued the nonrecognition policy, in
spite of the fact that most major world powers had come

around to the reality of dealing with the Soviet government

During the campaign FDR sidestepped the question of

recognition, but early in the new administration it became
obvious he was seriously considering the possibility. The

Catholic press and members of the church hierarchy openly

questioned the wisdom of such

a move.

Many Catholics were shocked when Al Smith testified in
favor of Russ ian

r

ecogni t ion before the Senate Finance

Committee. He favored more trade with the Soviets and

dismissed their repudiation of World War
He noted that the U.S.

I

debts to the U.S.

sent troops to Russia to help put
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down the revolution, although both countries were

technically at peace. Reverend Edmund

A.

president of Georgetown University and

a

Walsh, vice

leading Catholic

authority on Communism, opposed recognition. Father Walsh
headed the Vatican Relief Mission to the Soviet Union from
1919 through 1924, during which there had been much

speculation that the mission signaled
Vatican to enter into

a

a

willingness of the

concordat with the Soviets. This

Vatican mission was affiliated with the American Relief

Administration headed by Herbert Hoover. The Russian
experience left Walsh

a

rabid anti-Communist. In 1950, at

a

dinner in Washington, he would counsel the junior Senator
from Wisconsin, Joseph

R.

McCarthy, to make ant i -Communism

the focus of his reelection campaign, advice McCarthy would

follow wholeheartedly.

[7]

FDR sent a letter to Russian President Kalinin in

October 1933 requesting

a

representative of the Soviet

government be sent to discuss outstanding issues between the
two countries in the hope of reaching a settlement. Foreign

Commissar Maxim Litvinov was given the assignment. On the
same day Roosevelt met with Father Walsh to review the
issues. The President asked Walsh to prepare a report on the

state of religion in Russia which he said would be used when

serious negotiations began. Walsh quoted the President as

saying "leave it to me Father;
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I

am a good horse dealer." At

the same time the Vatican was expressing its
concern about
the possibility America would recognize the Soviet

government. Cardinal Hayes of New York was asked to express
to FDR the Vatican's hope that he would raise the issue
of

religious persecution in Russia during his talks with
Litvinov. Hayes submitted
to discuss.

a

list of proposals for Roosevelt

These included: freedom of conscience for

Russians and foreigners; freedom of worship, public and
private;

liberation of persons imprisoned for their faith;

and cessation of propaganda against God.

[8]

Catholics were not the only Americans opposed to the

recognition of Russia. This division was reflected within
the administration where Secretary of State Cordell Hull and

Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace, both Protestants,
joined with Postmaster General James Farley,

a

Catholic,

in

opposition, although Hull's opposition was based largely on
the potential political consequences of alienating large

segments of Catholic Democrats. Hull proposed negotiating
with the Soviets to permit freedom of religion for American

nationals living in the Soviet Union. At this stage

Auxiliary Bishop of Boston Francis Spellman was brought into
the negotiations. While a student at the American College in

Rome, Spellman became the protege of Cardinal Secretary of

State Eugenio Pacelli. Spellman received a letter from Count

Enrico Galeazzi, a financial advisor to the Vatican, asking
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him to convey to Roosevelt the Pope's desire
to insist upon
religious freedom in Russia as a prerequisite to
U.S.

recognition. Spellman appears to have communicated
the
Pope's wishes through FDR's son James.

[9]

When Litvinov finally arrived in Washington for the
talks which would lead to U.S. recognition, he was
surprised

by the President's insistence on including the issue of

religious freedom in the discussions. Years later, in 1938,

Spellman recounted in a letter to his brother the

astonishment Litvinov expressed to William Bullitt.

According to Bullitt, after three days of talks Litvinov
exclaimed,

"I

can't understand the President; he hasn't

talked about anything but religious freedom to me, and

I

want to talk about important things like trade relations."
[10]

After nine days of discussions FDR and Litvinov

exchanged formal notes which extended recognition to the
Soviet Union. In the notes the Soviets agreed to cease

subversive activity in the United States, to permit American
citizens in the Soviet Union free exercise of religion and
to negotiate a final settlement on financial claims. The

agreement seems to bear the imprint of Secretary Hull's
position in that it recognized the right of Americans to

worship freely in Russia. At the same time the agreement
seems to have satisfied American Catholics. Monsignor Keegan
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of New York congratulated Roosevelt on the
manner

in which

he upheld "the vitally sacred principles which
we Americans

hold so dear." Bishop Spellman recorded in his diary,

"Jack

Kelly and Mr. Galeazzi, whose names will never appear in

history did much to get President Roosevelt to insist that
American citizens at least should worship God as they wished
in Russia."

[11]

The resolution of the recognition of Russ ia question

established

a

precedent which would play an important part

in the future relationship between FDR and American

Catholics. First, Catholics did not get exactly what they
wanted. They had sought virtually total recognition of

freedom of religion in Russia. The recognition agreement
provided only for the right of Americans in Russia to

worship freely, which amounted to the right of the embassy
staff to worship, as there were virtually no other Amer icans
in Russia.

At the same time the president did raise the

issue of religious freedom repeatedly and vigorously, as

testified to by the comments of Willi am Bullitt. The fact
that FDR even took into account Catholic sensitivities was

major departure from previous American administrations

ability to reach
become

a

a

.

a

His

compromise they found acceptable would

feature of his administration. Finally, the issue

of religious freedom in the Soviet Union would continue to

be a central

feature of Roosevelt's future dealings with the
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Soviet Union and an important element of his
thinking on the
future postwar settlement.
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CHAPTER

3

"MARX AMONG THE AZTECS"
As the issue of Russian recognition was being

favorably resolved another, more perplexing, problem
arose
which would haunt the administration throughout FDR's first
term. American Catholics had been concerned about the fate
of their co-religionists

in Mexico since 1913.

The church in

Mexico was closely aligned with the regime which was

overthrown in the revolution that year. The new

revolutionary government wrote

a

constitution in 1917

containing several anti-Catholic provisions. The hostility
of the Mexican government expressed itself in repeated

instances of ant icier ical ism. Several priests were murdered
and churches burned
The election of General Plutarco Elias Calles as

Pres ident intens i f ied the problem and injected the issue of

anti-Communism into the fray. Calles was arguably the most
radical in

a

series of revolutionary Mexican Presidents. A

true believer in the social and economic aspects of the

Mexican Revolution,

in

1925 he called for enactment of new

laws to enforce the land reform provisions of the 1917

constitution. One such law allowed foreigners to purchase
land but only if they renounced all rights of protection by

their own government. The second law, called the petroleum
law, declared subsoil deposits,
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such as oil, the

"inalienable and impr escr ibable" property of the nation.
Several American oil companies, used to having their own
way
in Mexico,

refused to comply with the new laws. Calls for

American military intervention in Mexico increased, and the
press picked up on the charges of the need to prevent the

spread of Bolshevism. The oil companies argued that Mexico
was going the way of the Soviet Union and would soon provide
a

base for the spread of Communism throughout Latin America.

American Catholics were just as upset as the American
oil companies. Calles began enforcing the ant i -Cathol ic

provisions of the 1917 constitution which had been largely
ignored by his predecessors Carranza and Obregon:
nat ional izing church property, expel ling foreign priests and
nuns, prohibiting religious instruction in private primary

schools and limiting the number of priests allowed to

perform religious functions in the various Mexican states.
When Calles refused to compromise on these issues, the Pope
took the extraordinary measure of authorizing an interdict

against Mexico, prohibiting the performance of public
rel igious

r

i

tes

.

When FDR took office in March 1933, he appointed his
old friend and boss from his days in the Navy Department,

Josephus Daniels, ambassador to Mexico. The appointment was

initially well received by both the Catholic press and

spokesmen who viewed the appointment of such
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a close

friend

as an indication that FDR would use the ambassador
to exert

his influence in Mexican affairs.

In late July 1934,

Daniels

gave a speech in Mexico City, before a seminar on education,
in which he quoted President Calles on the

importance of

education in Mexico's future: "We must enter and take

possession of the mind of childhood, the mind of youth." To
this Daniels added his own thoughts: "To the carrying out of
that aim, which alone can give Mexico the high place

envisioned by its statesmen, the government
rural school

a

making the

is

social institution." [1]

What Daniels thought an innocent phrase comparing

Mexican efforts in education to the widely-respected

American public school system provoked

a

furor among

American Catholics. Many immediately called for his

resignation

.

Father Coughlin told his huge radio audience

that the U.S. government "from Wilson down to our President

Roosevelt, has aided and abetted the rape of Mexico." The
issue was quickly transformed from a question of the rights
of private schools to the question of whether Mexico was

following in the footsteps of Russian Communism. The issue
would not go away, and in November, Commonweal

,

in an

editorial entitled "Mexico follows Russia" stated that, "the
rul ing powers of Mexico are seemingly determined to

f

ol low

Russia's example to the last and most bitter degree." The
editors argued that Americans were witnessing just across
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the border "a full demonstration of the most

anti-democratic, ant i - 1 i ber tar i an

,

ant i -r el ig i ous tyranny

known in the modern world outside Russia itself."

[2]

Unlike the recognition of Russia question, which

centered almost exclusively around the official position of
the church hierarchy. Catholic lay organizations became

actively involved

in

the Mexican issue.

In New York,

Catholic students picketed the Mexican consulate. The
Catholic Evidence Guild, Ancient Order of Hibernians,
Catholic Daughters of America, Holy Name Societies, the
National Council of Catholic Women and even the

Massachusetts League of Catholic Foresters sent letters to
the White House. The group which took the lead in

criticizing the President, however, and which refused to let
go of the issue, was the Knights of Columbus. [3]

Throughout 1934, 1935, and into the election year of
1936,

the 500,000 member organization kept up

a

steady

stream of criticism of the Roosevelt administration. Michael
H.

Carmody of New Haven, Connecticut, head of the

organization, requested

a

meeting with FDR in January of

1935 to discuss the Mexican situation. The President instead

arranged for Carmody, and the executive committee of the
Knights, to meet with Secretary of State Cordell Hull.

Following the meeting with Hull, the group termed the

discussion "very satisfactory" but continued to lobby
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influential Catholic members of congress. Through the
efforts of Senator David Walsh from Carmody's neighboring

state of Massachusetts, Senator William

introduced

a

E.

Borah of Idaho

resolution in the Senate calling for an

investigation "into the persecution of Christians... now
being practiced in Mexico" and for Senate resolutions

protesting the "anti-religious campaign" being conducted in
Mexico

.

[

4

]

Catholic newspapers editorialized in favor of passage
of the Borah resolution,

and several prominent members of

the Catholic hierarchy spoke out in favor of it.

In an

editorial of February 15, 1935, Commonweal acknowledged that
the Borah Resolution was not expected to pass. But the

editors took issue with the Protestant periodical The

Christian Century

,

which had criticized the role of the

Catholic Church in Mexico, claiming the church had
"underwritten

a

blanket denunciation of socialism and

socialistic education." Commonweal

'

editors argued that

a

"common-sense" distinction had to be made "between the
'socialism' of social reformers and the 'socialism of say,
Marx, Lenin, Bakunin and their modern exemplars in Russia
and Mex ico

.

"

[

5

Only a week earlier, on February
carried an article by William

T.

8,

1935, Commonweal

Walsh entitled "Is

Communism Dangerous" in which he compared General Calles to
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Stalin and criticized Daniels for his public praise
"...in
favor of a Communistic plan to transfer all control
of

children's education form the parent to the state." But,
perhaps even more ominously for FDR, Walsh quoted an article

Saturday Review to the effect that "collectivism
some form is inevitable

...

in

sovietism, fascism and President

Roosevelt's 'New Deal' will be found in the long run,
despite apparent divergencies, to have been fundamentally
the same thing." Not only were readers being asked to equate

Mexico's revolution with Soviet Russia, but also to equate

Roosevelt's New Deal with Soviet style collect ivism.

t

6

The administration took the position that the Borah

Resolution represented "a premature indictment of

a

friendly

neighboring government" and would hinder the development of
the president's Good Neighbor policy. Nonetheless a petition
in the House garnered 242 signatures which was presented to

Roosevelt. The President needed to say something and put the
issue behind him. A second request for a meeting with the

President was sent by Carmody in April and again was
referred to the State Department. This time, however, FDR

requested

a

reply be prepared that could be sent over his

signature. Commonweal returned to the issue that same month

with an article entitled "Marx Among the Aztecs." The
author, Dixon Wecter, equated Mexican and Russian socialism
and collectivism and reminded readers that "In 1927
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Secretary Kellogg sought to convince the Foreign
Relations
Committee of the Senate that Communism was receiving
official encouragement in Mexico." Official encouragement?
Was Wecter implying that FDR was encouraging Communism
in
one of our closest neighboring states? The evidence seems to

suggest that this is precisely what was happening. The

association with New Deal social programs promoting
collectivism, reluctance to challenge the Mexican government
and the Russian recognition issue were leading many

Americans, both Catholic and non-Catholics alike, to the

conclusion FDR's sympathies lay with some foreign ideology.
In May Bishop John F.

Noll of Fort Wayne,

Indiana, expressed

this concern in a letter to Roosevelt asking him to take a

strong public stand on the religious freedom issue and "end
rumors of Roosevelt sympathy for communism.
Finally,

in early July,

"

[

7

the President met with Carmody

and a delegation from the Knights of Columbus. The group

again asked the President to speak out publ icly against the

persecut i on of the church in Mexico

.

FDR, however , would

give the group no specific promise. After the meeting, the

Knights told the press he had been gracious but
noncommittal. Eight days later the President met with

a

Congress ional delegat i on on the same subject and used the

opportunity to issue

a

statement on religious freedom which

said he wished to "make it clear that the American people
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and the Government believed in freedom of
religious worship
not only in the United States, but also in other
nations."
[8]

The Catholic press seemed relieved by the statement.

Most took the position that Roosevelt had spoken directly to
the Mexican situation, although he had not mentioned Mexico.

Commonweal praised the statement as the forerunner of an

international pact on religious freedom. The Catholic
journal Amer ica editorialized that "a major objective of our

campaign on Mexico was achieved." It seemed as though

a

collective sigh of relief was taken by Catholic opinion
leaders. The President had said something, anything, and

they could now return to cementing relations with

President they believed was taking

a

a

genuine interest in

Catholic issues.
It seemed the President had put the

issue to rest.

However, the Knights of Columbus were not so easily

mollified. At their annual convention at New York in August
the Knights passed a unanimous resolution authorizing

Carmody to send yet another letter to the President
expressing their regret at the President's apparent lack of
concern over matters in Mexico. In October, the National
Board of Directors sent

a

vigorous letter of protest to FDR

arguing that the President's statement on religious freedom
fell far short of what was needed. The letter concluded.

46

"You cannot escape responsibility for throttling
the Borah

Resolution.

Government
bleed ing

.

.

for the endorsement given the Mexican
.by your ambassador ... for nonaction on behalf of

.

Mex ico

.

"

[

9

)

This time the Knights had gone too far. The political

activism generated by the Mexican situation was calling into
question who had the authority to speak for the church.

Archbishop John

J.

McNicholas of Cincinnati issued

a

statement to be read in all churches of his archdiocese

stating that the Knights "in no sense speak for the priesthood or for the Catholic laity of Cincinnati." McNicholas
was correct in stating that the Knights did not speak for
the entire Catholic community. The ant i -Communist rhetoric

which dominated much of the issue surrounding education

Mexico would now be overwhelmed by
Amer ican Ca t hoi ic educat ion

.

George Mundelein, would play

a

in

symbolic gesture from

Chicago's liberal Cardinal,
a

key role in bringing the

clamor created by the Knight's latest letter to an end. [10]
In November of 1935,

the University of Notre Dame, the

most prestigious Catholic university in the country,

invited

Roosevelt to receive an honorary degree. Frank Walker, mayor
of Detroit and a close political advisor to FDR and a Notre

Dame graduate

,

appears to have been closely involved with

the decision to present the degree to the President in the

midst of the swirling controversy over the Knight's letter.
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Notre Dame President John O'Hara was
delighted with the

prospect and traveled to Washington to complete
the
arrangements. Cardinal Mundelein presided at the

presentation at South Bend on December

9

and said his

presence was to insure the President he was "among friends."
The Cardinal,

in a direct reference to the Knight's

controversy, said no one group had the right to claim to
speak for all Catholics. Secretary of the Interior Harold
Ickes confided to his diary that the Cardinal's speech

amounted to "a pretty complete endorsement of the

President." For his part FDR gave

a

ringing endorsement of

the concepts of "freedom of education and freedom of

religious worship" as

a

necessity for "true national life."

The sight of the President receiving an honorary degree from

Notre Dame from a Cardinal of the church would surely put to
rest the idea that the President was secretly encouraging
the spread of Communism. FDR was thus able to move into the

election year of 1936 with what Arthur Krock of The New York
Times described as a Catholic endorsement of the President.
But 1936 would bring the President into yet more controversy

with American Catholics, and again the issue would be

Communism, at home and abroad.
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CHAPTER

4

A COMMUNIST IN WASHINGTON'S CHAIR
The 1936 presidential campaign began in earnest
in

January when Al Smith addressed

a

glittering gathering of

the nation's wealthy at Washington's Mayflower Hotel.
The

sponsor of the evening was the American Liberty League,

a

self -proclaimed nonpartisan political group organized in
1934.

The organization's principal sponsors, however,

included business and industrial leaders such as Irenee Du
Pont, John J. Raskob, William S. Knudsen and J. Howard Pew.

The Liberty League was opposed to virtually every aspect of

Roosevelt's New Deal, viewing it as "creeping socialism" at
best and outright Communism at worst. The League managed to

recruit both Smith and 1924 Democratic presidential

candidate John W. Davis as their spokesmen, hoping that
having two former Democratic presidential candidates telling
the nation that the New Deal was a betrayal of American

principles would cause

a

split in the party and possibly

deny FDR the 1936 nomination.
A national radio audience heard the onetime "Happy

Warrior" of the Democratic Party denounce the inflationary

spending policies of the administration, call for

a

return

to the principles of state's rights and assert the need to

honor the constitution. Smith said the choice was clear;

America had to choose between "Washington and Moscow, the
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pure air of America or the foul breath of
communistic

Russia... the stars and stripes or the red flag of
the
godless.
a

.

.Soviets." Smith said the President himself was not

Communist or

around him.

a

socialist, but was being misled by those

[1]

Jim Farley, again heading the president's campaign,
claimed Smith made a major mistake aligning himself with the

very elements which fought against his run for the

presidency eight years earlier. Farley believed Smith had
alienated himself from the urban Catholic working-class

constituency which once formed the basis of his strength
within the party. FDR's crushing defeat of Herbert Hoover in
1932 had achieved the very coalition of urban working-class

Catholics with rural Protestant farmers of the South and
Midwest which had been the goal of the Populist Party. The

Democratic Party had again been unable to pull off such

a

coalition in 1928 with Smith as its standard bearer. The

Protestant "core" was unwilling to accept the leadership of
the Catholic "periphery." Now the Liberty League was hoping
to drive a wedge into the New Deal coalition by separating

the core from the periphery over the issue of Communism.

While Smith, the only Catholic ever nominated by

a

major party to run for president, broke with FDR over the

New Deal early on, another important former Catholic
supporter of FDR would soon do the same. Father Charles
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E.

Coughlin was becoming more critical of FDR with
each passing
week.

Shortly after praising the President's State of the

Union address the radio priest made his final break
with
FDR,

charging that the President's Brain Trust was Communist

infiltrated, virtually the same thing Smith was saying. He

apologized to his radio audience for his earlier support of
FDR and told them,

"The slogan

be altered to read

'Roosevelt and Ruin.'" Two of the most

'Roosevelt or Ruin' must now

popular Catholics in the country were both accusing

Roosevelt of leading the nation down the road of Communism.
How would the President respond to this new challenge?

American Catholic voters were being asked to make

[2]

a

decision on the New Deal: was it Communist? These same
Catholic voters were faced with something of

a

paradox: some

prominent, politically popular Catholics like Smith and

Coughlin were declaring the New Deal Communist or Communist
inspired. Other prominent, politically act ive Cstholics like
Farley, Joseph P. Kennedy and many more were active

partici pants in the New Deal and seek ing FDR

's

And both groups we re decidedly anti -Commun is t

.

reelection.
Th i s

is

hardly surprising in view of the general ant i -Communist
rhetoric of the Catholic Church and the speci

f

ic

ant i -Communist campaign being waged by the Jesuit order in

America.

In early April of 1934 the father general of the

society wrote to the fathers provincial in America "to
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organize a plan of concerted action against
Communism as it
exists and labors in your country." Father Edmund
Walsh of

Georgetown University took up the challenge and implemented
a fourteen point

program of "practical and concerted" action

against American Communism. At the same time Coughlin and
Smith were charging the New Deal was Communist inspired

American Catholics were being deluged with some 4.5 million
pamphlets on a variety of subjects, but "Communism was the
topic most in demand, being represented with 18 titles...."
The Catholi c Periodical Index for the period 1934-1938 lists

eight hundred thirty-eight entries under the heading of

communism, quadruple the number for 1930-1933.

[3]

The Catholic doctrine being so widely disseminated

contained three elements.

1)

That the origins of Communism

were moral and spiritual.

2)

That Communism is inherently

atheistic and anti-God.

3)

That Communism acquires its power

through deceptive propaganda. The first of these elements

is

crucial to an understanding of Catholic thought. Leo XIII in
his encyclical Rerum Novarum issued in 1898 saw the origins
of both socialism and Communism in "the religious and moral

destitution in which wage-earners had been left by liberal
economics." Liberalism was thus "designated an amoral,

materialistic philosophy originating with the Enlightenment
which promoted a laissez-faire attitude toward economic

arrangements." This produced the rankest sort of materialism
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which left Catholics condemning both Communism
and
Capitalism. As Robert Frank describes the effect
"a

religious and amoral liberalism begat individualism
which
begat socialism which begat communism." This "liberalism"
in

turn was perhaps more dangerous than outright Communism

because it allowed liberals to fall under the sway of
element number three: the power of deceptive Communist

propaganda

[

.

4

]

According to Catholic doctrine the Communist ability
to deceive liberals created something of a multiplier effect

enabling the relatively small number of actual Communists to
become a genuine threat to the nation. By virtue of their

ability to deceive "the millions of unwitting 'dupes' of the
communists

mostly 'liberals' and most of these consisting

of teachers,

writers and assorted union activists"

the

Commun ist threat was far greater than their actual numbers
indicated. While the Popular Front tactics of the Communists

during the Thirties may have enabled them to penetrate and

manipulate

a

host of liberal causes, they were not fooling

the Catholics. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI and a

devout Catholic, entitled his book on Communism Masters of
Dece i

for just this reason.

In his encyclical Divini

Redemptor is Pius XI noted that "in the beginning communism
showed itself for what it was thus alienating the people,"
but with the adoption of Popular Front tactics by the
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Comintern "it has therefore changed its tactics,
and strives
to entice the multitudes by trickery of
various forms,
hiding its real designs behind ideas that in themselves
are
good and attractive." Thus the liberal FDR was being

cast by

both Smith and Coughlin as something of

a

"dupe" of

communists that had infiltrated his New Deal Braintrust. The

New Deal was just another liberal program that might be
"good and attractive" in and of itself but which was being

corrupted by Communist "trickery."
In April Senator David I.
a

[5]

Walsh of Massachusetts gave

speech to the Tidewater Holy Name Society of Tidewater,

Virginia. Walsh's theme was not greatly different from many

others of the period, but it is an indication of where he
and many other American Catholics were heading in this

crucial period. The Richmond Times Dispatch proclaimed on
April 27 that "Senator (Walsh) Heralds War of Churches Vs.

Reds." The Norfolk Virginia Pilot reported on the same day
that "Walsh Sees Fight Facing Christianity" and that the

senator told the members of the Holy Name Society they "must
battle Communism."

[6]

The speech suggests that Walsh perceived the great

threat to western civilization as being the threat of

Communism, not against democracy per se, but against

Christianity. An anti-Communist speech coming from

a

Catholic senator in 1936 would hardly be surprising, but
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neither would it be surprising coming from a
Protestant
senator. The core and periphery, which had clashed
so

alarmingly in the 1920's, seemed to have

a

common issue

around which to rally in the 1930's, the threat of
Communism
to Christianity.

However, much of non-Catholic America was

not yet ready to jump on the ant i -Communist bandwagon,

especially if Catholics were holding the reins. The
Christian Century, arguably the most influential Protestant
periodical of the era, took up the argument with

a

series of

articles with such titles as "The Catholic Anti-Red
Campaign,";

"Shall Protestants Accept the Pope's

Invitation?"; and "Stay Out!". Clearly the center-core
groups were not entirely ready to accept the Catholic

perception that Communism presented the greatest threat to
the Republic.

[7]

The spring primaries which demolished the hopes of the

Liberty League created

a

more disturbing problem. Father

Coughlin had turned his National Union for Social Justice,
which he claimed had more than five million members nationwide,

into a political movement. Coughlin announced the

Union would endorse congressional candidates that espoused
its principles.

In Pennsylvania,

Coughlin endorsed twenty

Democrats and twelve Republicans. Twelve of them won,
including Representative Michael J. Stack in Philadelphia,
who was opposed by the local Kelley machine. However, ten of
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the twelve were incumbents, and with the
economy beginning
to show signs of recovery,

incumbency was

to hold for congressional races.

In Ohio,

a

strong position

the radio priest

endorsed seventeen Democrats and fifteen Republicans.

Fifteen of the candidates won, and the Cleveland Democratic
machine was defeated along with two incumbents. Coughlin
claimed similar victories in Wisconsin, Massachusetts,

Michigan and Maine. While

a

Coughlin endorsement did not

seem to guarantee victory, both parties were surprised at
his apparent ability to translate his public popularity into

votes. Perhaps more importantly, he had overcome the

opposition of the big city machines so traditionally Irish
and Catholic and staunchly Democratic.

This was exactly what the President and Farley had
feared, and Farley was undoubtedly ready to call in all the

political lOU's. Catholics had been one of the groups to
benefit most from FDR's patronage. The percentage of

Catholics appointed to the federal judiciary increased from
four percent during the combined administrations of Wilson,

Harding, Coolidge and Hoover to 29 percent under Roosevelt.

Many prominent Catholic politicians were calling on the
American church to take
Edward

J.

a

public position against Coughlin.

Flynn of the Bronx, a close Roosevelt ally, was

reported threatening to leave the church

if

the clergy did

not repudiate the priest. Joseph P. Kennedy, Chairman of the
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Securities and Exchange Commission, and Frank Murphy,
Governor of Michigan and former close friend of
Coughlin,
were assigned to work against the priest among
Catholic
laymen.

[8]

Both Murphy and Kennedy had close ties to the radio
priest. Kennedy visited Royal Oak on several occasions, and

once brought his young son Jack to meet Coughlin. The two

disagreed on many aspects of politics, with Kennedy
referring to Coughlin often as

a

"jackass," but this only

solidified the priest's respect for Kennedy's openness and

down-to-earth style. The Kennedy-Murphy duo kept FDR
informed of Coughlin's shifting opinions. In late 1935

Coughlin told Murphy: "the general criticism against Mr.

Roosevelt

is

due to the fact that he has broken nearly every

promise that he has made while he prefers to seek means and
methods closely allied with socialism and communism to

rectify our economic ills. Joseph Kennedy agrees with me in
this analysis." Indeed Kennedy often openly disagreed with

many of FDR's policies; the same candor and frankness which
produced his friendship with Coughlin had the same effect on
FDR until Kennedy's own break with President.

[9]

Kennedy, at FDR's request, arranged a meeting between
the President and Coughlin in September of 1935 at the

President's home in Hyde Park. Kennedy met the priest's
train in the early morning hours of September 10 at Albany,
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and both were taken by surprise by the
early morning

headlines announcing the death of Huey Long. They
arrived
to find the President still asleep,

and in the informal

tradition surrounding Hyde Park prepared their own breakfast
in the President's kitchen.

When the pair finally heard the

President moving about upstairs, Coughlin ran up and
announced, "your boyfriend

is

dead."

The news must

certainly have changed the president's approach to the
forthcoming discussion as Farley's greatest fear was the
potential alliance of Coughlin's rhetoric and popularity
with Long's political acumen.

[10]

After the president had breakfast the two got down to

business:

"Cards on the table Padre, cards on the table. Why

are you cooling off to me?" the president asked. Coughlin

produced a check given to him by Bishop Gallagher. The check
had been sent to Gallagher by the bishop of Guadalajara and

was allegedly issued by

a

communist sympathizer in the

Treasury Department to Mexican revolutionaries. "Michael
Gallagher's afraid we're going soft on the Communists down
there," Coughlin said. FDR was surprised and promised to
look into the matter. Coughlin then raised the issue of the

president's recognition of the Soviet Union, but was not

overly concerned because the US had to look out for its own
interests, and no nation could go bankrupt, as the Soviet

Union surely would, without it effecting the rest of the
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world. Coughlin then turned to domestic
affairs, telling the

President he should pursue more inflationary fiscal
policies
and get rid of the Federal Reserve. FDR replied
that he was

"only the President" and that Coughlin should not "be
so

innocent as to think that the President of the United States
can also be the Congress of the United States." He then

reminded Coughlin the country still faced serious problems
which would be compounded if
1936.

If

a

Coughlin were to lead

Republican were elected
a

in

third party movement in

1936 the prospect of a Republican victory would be enhanced,

and was that what he wanted, the President asked. Coughlin
was noncommittal, but surely the knowledge of Long's death

strengthened the President's hand and weakened Coughlin's.
[11]

By the summer of 1936 Coughlin allied his National

Union for Social Justice with three other groups

disenchanted with the New Deal: the remains of Huey Long's
Share Our Wealth Society, now under the leadership of the

Reverend Gerald L.K. Smith; Dr. Francis

E.

Townsend of

California, the spokesman for a movement advocating monthly
old age pensions; and Congressman William Lempke, spokesman
of neopopulist plains state farmers.

Lempke would be the

candidate of the Union Party, as the new organization was
called. But the real threat to Roosevelt now that Long was
no longer part of the political equation lay in the
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possibility that Coughlin could translate his huge
radio
audience into

a

national voting block. On June 19, Coughlin

announced the formation of the new party and his support
of
Lempke for President on

Claiming

a

culture,

labor,

a

special nationwide broadcast.

"new day for America," Coughlin called on "agrithe disappointed Republicans and the out-

raged Democrats" to join the new party and help "avoid the

treacherous pitfalls of red communism." [12]
In early August the followers of Dr.

for their convention.

Townsend convened

Reverend Smith spoke to the delegates

in a speech that was to set the tone for the upcoming

campaign. The country was faced with

choice:

a

presence of atheistic Communist influence.

.

.It

"in the
is

the

Russian primer or the Holy bible... the Red flag or the Stars
and Str ipes ... Lenin or Lincoln ...Stalin or Jefferson." H.L.

Mencken said he never heard

a

more effective speech

Coughlin was not about to be upstaged. Taking the platform
the next morning, he told the crowd that FDR stood for

"Franklin Double-crossing Roosevelt,

"

a

charge which drew

both cheers and boos from the audience. The Sargeant at Arms

called for order, and Dr. Townsend asked that the "booers"
be put out

.

Coughl in resumed by ask ing the crowd why the

American Communist Party was supporting Roosevelt for
president. Ripping off his Roman collar, he called FDR a
"liar" and a "betrayer." In a state of near exhaustion.
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Coughlin was assisted from the stage. Once
again the
criticism of the Popular Front tactics of the
American

Communist Party in endorsing Roosevelt and his New
Deal
comes to the fore. Swept away by his own rhetoric,
Coughlin
is now associating FDR himself with the
Communist plot,
calling him a liar and betrayer.

[13]

Church leaders were taken aback by the ferocity of

Coughlin's attack on the President. His immediate superior.
Bishop Michael Gallagher of Detroit, was about to leave for
Rome and discussions with Pius XI. Questioned about

Coughlin's speech, Gallagher said he did "not approve of the
language Father Coughlin had used in expressing himself on
the President." The bishop said he did not believe Roosevelt
was a Communist and that disagreement over policy was not a

reason to call a man

a

"liar." However, Gallagher said he

could not censure Coughlin and would not be discussing the

priest with Vatican officials "unless they speak of it."
[

14

]

The Vatican would indeed "speak of it" when Gallagher

arrived in Rome. While Gallagher and his traveling
companion. Bishop Joseph Schrembs of Cleveland, were en
route to Rome, the Vatican released

a

statement saying that

Coughlin's characterization of Roosevelt as

a

liar was a

"painful expression." Coughlin took the opportunity to

publish an apology to the President in the form of an open
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letter to FDR in his newspaper Social Justice.
Coughlin

wrote "in the heat of civic interest

anger...! used the word 'liar.'

I

in righteous

now offer the President my

sincerest apology." [15]
On arriving in Rome Gallager and Schrembs denied

rumors that Gallagher had been called to Rome specifically
to discuss Coughlin and went so far as to defend Coughlin's

"fight for the preservation of American democracy." The

bishops would quickly change their tune. After meeting with

Vatican officials, including Monsignor Giuseppe Pizzard, the
Pope's closest political advisor, Gallagher announced that
he "personally, would favor Mr. Roosevelt more than any

other candidate at present" and that he and Schrembs "have

been advised to cease talking about Father Coughlin." [16]

Coughlin did not appear ready to compromise. Taking to
the campaign trail in early August, he continued to hammer
at FDR,

now referring to him as

a

"scab" President leading a

"scab army' of reliefers. Coughlin claimed the New Deal was

"surrounded by red and pink Communists and by 'frankfurters'
of destruction," a pointed reference to Harvard Law School

Professor Felix Frankfurter, an important advisor to FDR.
The President would appoint Frankfurter to the Supreme Court
in 1939.

Coughlin became threatening in Providence, R.I.,

claiming there "would be more bullets in the White House
than you could count with an adding machine" if FDR were
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reelected.

In New Bedford,

Massachusetts he told an audience

of 12,000 that he had been instrumental
in removing Herbert

Hoover from the White House and
taking

a

"I

will be instrumental in

Communist from the chair once occupied by

Washington." [17]

Returning to Cleveland for the national convention of
his National Union for Social Justice in mid-August,
both he

and Smith returned to the now familiar theme of Roosevelt

and Communism.

Smith gave one of the most dramatic speeches

of his career.

The New Deal was led by "a slimy group of men

culled from the pink campuses of America with friendly gaze
fixed on Russia... and they had the face to recognize Russia,

where two million Christians had been butchered." Smith

concluded to

a roar

when he announced that the election was

really meaningless to him: "My real mission is to see that
the red flag of bloody Russia is not hoisted in place of the

Stars and Stripes." [18]

Coughlin appeared angered at the enthusiastic response
given Smith's speech by his National Union members. But his
flair for the dramatic would once again come to his rescue
in his battle of

one-upsmanship with Smith. Speaking under

a

hot sun the following day, Coughlin told his followers that

both Roosevelt and Rexford Tugwell, a key Roosevelt advisor,

were "communistic." Once again the theme comes across that
the President and his advisors,
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if

not outright Communists,

were at best "Communistic" in the sense of being
either
"dupes" or "fellow travelers." Referring to the campaign
as
a

"war," he advised the National Union members "to
go to

your homes as to a trench." He then collapsed and was

assisted from the stage. He was treated for

exhaustion and advised to rest.

a

mild case of

[19]

The political threat that Coughlin and the Union Party

presented to FDR was beginning to take

a

back seat to the

threat to the church presented by his activities. The
specter of a revived ant i -Cathol ic ism which had dominated

presidential politics as recently as the 1928 campaign began
to surface.

A faculty member of the Concordia Lutheran

Theological Seminary stated publicly that "the voice behind
that radio priest is the voice of his church." At the same

time the New Republic

^

a

liberal periodical, reported that

"the Union Party marks the deliberate entrance of the Roman

Catholic Church into national politics" and suggested that
the Vatican was backing Coughlin because it was depending on

the financial support of "wealthy American Catholic

families." In addition, "influential and wealthy Americans
such as Al Smith and John J. Raskob, think he can help

defeat Roosevelt." [20]
Both the Vatican and the American Catholic hierarchy

were concerned with distancing themselves from Coughlin and

assuring all Americans that his views were not those of the
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church. But in

a

very real way they were. His ant i -Communist

rhetoric claiming deception and infiltration of the
New Deal
by Communists or liberals deceived by Communist
propaganda
was clearly the message the Jesuits were proclaiming.
That
was the Catholic message on Communism being directed at

labor unions and other organizations. Coughlin and others

were now directing the same message at the New Deal. On

September

2,

Osservatore Romana criticized priests that

challenged the constituted authorities in the countries

in

which they lived and pointed out Coughlin's attacks on the

President as an example. The article also took issue with
Bishop Gallagher for stating that the Vatican approved of

Coughlin's activities. Both Coughlin and the press were on
hand when Gallagher's ship returned from Rome. Seemingly

overwhelmed by Coughlin's presence, the bishop was quoted as
saying:

"It's the voice of God that comes to you from the

great orator from Royal Oak. Rally round it." The bishop

denied the report in Osservatore Romana was accurate.

Coughlin was overjoyed with this seeming endorsement, but
then was shocked to hear Gallagher claim that Roosevelt was
the best-qualified candidate for the presidency. When asked

about the Osservatore editorial, Coughlin claimed

it was

only "one newspaper's opinion." The Vatican then took the
unusual step of sending

a

note to all press organizations
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confirming that the Osservatore editorial
represented the
official Vatican position on this issue. [21]
Just how much of a political threat the Union
Party

represented to FDR

is an open

question. The President was at

the height of his popularity, despite the sniping
and

accusations of Communist sympathies. Publicly, Farley

dismissed the third party movement; privately, he was taking
no chances.

He was continually monitoring the Union Party

strength through his vast network of personal contacts,

party workers and even postal authorities. FDR had
instructed Farley to monitor postal receipts for Royal Oak
to keep tabs on the priest's popularity.

Several states were

reporting great strength among Coughlin supporters. Both the
nation's conservative and liberal press were taking the new

party seriously. The conservative Los Angeles Times

,

perhaps

wistfully, suggested that "Lempke's third party may defeat

Roosevelt." The liberal New Republic editorialized "this

party

is

far more formidable than Al Smith's Liberty

League.... It might prove that the New Deal has not been

radical enough to satisfy popular discontent." The

Minneapolis Tribune suggested that Lempke's popularity in
the farm states would challenge FDR's earlier vote. A New

York Times survey revealed Townsend's popularity in

Washington, Oregon and California would disrupt traditional

Democratic and Republican voting patterns.
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[22]

Unquestionably, Coughlin's strength rested with

Catholic voters.

Massachusetts political leaders were

virtually unanimous in their fear of Coughlin's campaign.
Governor James Curley, Congressman John McCormack and
Senator David Walsh all reported to Farley that Coughlin's

popularity would translate into

large Lempke vote.

a

McCormack, who survived the September primary in

Massachusetts despite the Union's opposition, wrote to FDR

proclaiming Coughlin's supporters were "sullen discontented
and bitter, using any argument they think will appeal to the

hearer." The President's son, James Roosevelt, claimed

Coughlin was "stronger in Massachusetts than in any other
state." Farley disagreed, stating that Ohio was the

strongest Coughlin state. Reports were coming

in

almost

daily of the threat Coughlin forces represented in
Cleveland, where Coughlin's endorsement in the spring

primaries had been credited with defeating the local machine
candidate. The priest was demonstrating great influence
among both German and Irish Catholics. One party worker
claimed:

"I

am not anti-Cathol ic,

.

.

.

but go into any Catholic

settlement in Northwestern Ohio and you will find

a

lot of

strong Lempke sentiment and following." [23]
Just who was supporting Coughlin at this point? One

writer has described the priest's final audience as "the

congregation of despair." One early supporter of both
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Coughlin and FDR wrote to Roosevelt exclaiming,
"You are
Christian Gentleman, and ...you abhor and
despise

a

Corruption, and the wealth of the Nation in the
Hands of the
Few, who strangle the Poor even unto Starvation."
The same
writer now told the President "I loved you, and you
betrayed
me." Clearly the Coughlinites were comprised of those
who
felt the New Deal had not gone far enough. This was
the same

analysis being put forward by The New Republic and

Congressman McCormack

.

[24]

While Senator Walsh was demonstrating

a

lukewarm

attitude toward the administration, his longtime rival in

Massachusetts politics, James Michael Curley, was going all
out for FDR. When Curley's brother John arrived at the

Democratic convention,

it set

off "speculation of an attempt

to put Curley on (the) ballot as vice-president."

Realistically, Curley had no chance of being named FDR's
running mate, and John probably started the speculation
himself. Real "Hotel gossip" was swirling around the third

ticket possibilities of Father Coughlin's Union Party.

Boston District Attorney Thomas

C.

O'Brien had been given

the Union Party nomination for vice-president and would be

Congressman William Lempke's running mate. Most of the
Massachusetts delegation, according to news reports,
"believe that the selection of O'Brien was a ploy engineered
by Governor Curley to keep O'Brien out of the Senatorial
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contest in Massachusetts in September." This
speculation

centered around the fact that the Lempke-0 Br ien
ticket was
•

announced "after the visit of Father Coughlin to Boston
and
his conference with Governor Cur ley

.

"

(

25

In addition to removing a potential rival to Curley's

bid for the senate the fact that an Irish Catholic would be
on the ticket in Massachusetts, where Coughlin was

considered very popular, added to the possibility that the
Union Party could cost FDR the state. On the other hand,

Catholic on the ticket was potentially dangerous

a

in terms

of

alienating the core, which had soundly rejected Catholic Al
Smith only eight years earlier. FDR was not about to be

saddled with the volatile James Michael Curley, even in

Massachusetts, and shortly after the convention he named
Walsh as his campaign chairman in Massachusetts. FDR thus
had his own Irish Catholic politician running his campaign
in Massachusetts and one with a far better vote-getting

record than Curley in the state.
In August The Boston Herald carried a story under the

headline "Walsh Afraid of Lempke Vote

.

"

The article quoted

Walsh as saying, "if the Union party polls 100,000 or more
votes in Massachusetts, President Roosevelt will lose the

state." Polls at the time were indicating Lempke would

receive seven percent of the Massachusetts vote
of the old progressive still remained
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in Walsh,

•

Something
however , as

the same article carried his attack on "those
calling FDR an

enemy of the constitution and of liberty," wording
that
could have referred to either or both the Union
Party and
the Republicans.
is

Walsh declared, "what they mean by liberty

the freedom of the exploiter to gain untold wealth at
the

expense of the general welfare." Indeed, FDR had used
similar rhetoric at the Democratic convention when he

attacked the "economic royalists"

who sought to create

a

"new despotism." "They complain that we seek to overthrow
the institutions of America," the President exclaimed,

"What

they really complain of is that we seek to take away their
power." Both Walsh and FDR were using the very type of

Bryanesque and Wilsonian rhetoric used by Coughlin and were
now using it to undercut his appeal.

Ironically, Walsh would

break with FDR over his court-packing scheme and end up

critic of the New Deal.

a

[26]

In mid-October the Associated Press carried a story in

which Walsh declared that president Roosevelt's reelection
had been "virtually certain" from the outset of the

campaign. The outcome in Massachusetts, however, was still
in doubt and "hinges on the size of the vote polled by the

third party ticket backed by Father Coughlin." Walsh said

FDR would carry the state easily in a "straight two party

vote," and indeed he could still win "even with Democratic

deflections to the third party there." Walsh's predictions
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proved accurate when the Union Party polled
its strongest
showing in Massachusetts, but FDR carried the
state.

[27]

While Catholic politicians and laymen were busy

solidifying FDR's position among Catholic voters, the clergy
was no less active in making its position known. In
July,

shortly after Coughlin's opening attack on the president.
Reverend Maurice

S.

Sheehy of Catholic University wrote to

Roosevelt informing him that his "friends are not ignoring
the calumnies of Father Coughlin." Sheehy told FDR of

meeting he had attended

in

a

New York with four bishops and

three monsignori at which Coughlin's attacks on the

President had been the topic of discussion. The result was

a

plan on "how this matter might be handled most effectively
and we have taken action."

[28]

Although Sheehy's letter to FDR did not outline the
plan of action discussed at New York,

it

soon became clear

that the church hierarchy intended to refute Coughlin at

every turn and disassociate his campaign rhetoric from any
official sanction by the church. Coughlin continued to
attack the president as

a

"communist" and the New Deal as

a

Communist-inspired program developed by the President's
advisors. He told the public that in -voting for Roosevelt
"We are voting for the Communists, the socialists, the

Russian lovers, the Mexican lovers and the

K ick

-me-downers

Before a crowd estimated at 100,000 in Chicago he decried
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.

the "Commies" in the administration:

"Rexie Tugwel 1

shaker of Russia, plow-me-down Wallace

.

.

.

hand

Josephus

Daniels-the man who applauds the slaughter of priests
and
nuns in Mexico." He was raising again all the issues

associated by Catholics with communist influence in the
years of the Roosevelt administration

.[

29

But now his remarks were not going unchallenged. When

Coughlin gave

Roosevelt

a

speech in Cincinnati in which he declared

a

"dictator" and said it might become necessary to

use "bullets"

instead of "ballots," Archbishop McNicolas

responded that he "cannot let pass the advocacy of the use
of bullets and

I

condemn such remarks." South Dakota's

Bishop Bernard Mahoney publicly called Coughlin

"Cultural

a

vulgarian," and Boston's Cardinal William O'Connell spoke
out against him.

[30]

In early October the anti-Coughlin campaigns of the

Catholic politicians and the Catholic clergy converged.
Senator Joseph 0 'Mahoney of Wyoming reached Monsignor John
Ryan of Catholic University with a request that Ryan make

a

radio speech rebutting Coughlin's charges of Communists in

Washington. Ryan agreed to make the speech and submitted
several drafts to O'Mahoney. FDR himself seems to have had
some input into the speech. An early draft, with

a

specific

reference to Coughlin was edited to delete his name; then
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it

was put back in,

"reportedly at the direction of the

president." [31]
Ryan went on the air on October

8,

addressing himself

to "the wage earners" and "toilers" who had
suffered the

most from the depression and benefited the most
from the New
Deal. This category of course contained the great
bulk of

working-class Catholics that had made up the great waves of
immigration concentrated

in

America's urban areas. Ryan

dismissed Coughlin's charges that FDR and his advisors such
as Felix Frankfurter and Rexford Tugwell were Communists.

Ryan charged that Coughlin's explanation of what was wrong
with the American economy was "at least 50 percent wrong"
and his solutions were "at least 90 percent wrong." He

concluded by begging "the toilers of America" not to abandon

Roosevelt in the coming election. Ryan quickly began to hear
from Coughlin's supporters. The letters again demonstrated
that Coughlin's support rested with Irish and German

Catholics. Of 78 letters attacking Ryan's position, 36 were

written by persons with Irish names and
German names.

39

by persons with

[32]

The Vatican, meanwhi le, had again stepped into the

picture. On September 30 it was announced that Cardinal

Secretary of State Eugenio Pacelli would visit the United
States for a three-week "vacation." The American hierarchy
was taken completely off guard by the announcement, with the
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exception of Boston's Auxiliary Bishop Frances
Spellman, who
was secretly notified of the visit in August.
The bishop

confided to his diary his reservations of the second most
powerful prelate in the Vatican visiting the United States
in the midst of a heated election in which Catholics
were

playing such

a

prominent role. Spellman realized, or knew,

that this visit would not be confined to

a

simple

"vacation." A nationwide tour for the Cardinal was
organized. Pacelli spent four relatively quiet days at

secluded Long Island estate before embarking on

a

a

trip that

took him to Boston, Cleveland, Philadelphia, Washington,

Chicago, St. Paul, Los Angeles, San Francisco, St. Louis,

Cincinnati and back to New York. Pointedly omitted from the

Cardinal's itinerary was the Diocese of Detroit, Father

Coughlin's home base.

[33]

Bishop Gallagher was angered at the snub and traveled
to Cincinnati along with his friend Bishop Schrembs of

Cleveland seeking to meet with Pacelli. Although the two
arrived early in the morning, they were informed that the

Cardinal was already in a meeting with McNicholas. The two
bishops were left waiting most of the day and then informed
the Cardinal would not grant them an audience. The next day,

however, Gallagher was informed by Pacelli "to exercise more

control over Father Coughlin and to inform him that he was
not to participate in political campaigning once the 1936
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election was over."
the message.

Gallagher seems to have tinally gotten

On October 30,

with Pacelli still in the

country, Gallagher forced Coughlin to make

public apology

a

for calling Roosevelt a "scab President." He also

implied

that Coughlin would no longer be allowed to participate in

politics after the election, something which Coughlin later
confirmed. Pacelli

's

national tour in the closing days of

the election drew Catholic attention away from Coughlin at

the most critical point of the campaign.

[34]

When the votes were counted, Roosevelt won an

overwhelming victory. The President carried
popular vote plurality of over

Union Party had not been

a

11

46 states with a

million votes. Coughlin's

factor in the outcome.

Nonetheless Lempke received 882,000 votes nationally. The
evidence seems clear that Farley had pulled out all the
stops to keep Catholic voters from deserting FDR

in

favor of

the popular Coughlin and had succeeded dramatically.

Election analysts agreed that Catholics voted for Roosevelt
in huge numbers.

They disagreed only on the exact magnitude

of the percentage that voted for FDR.

George Gallop

estimated the Catholic vote for Roosevelt at over 70
percent. R.M. Darrow said of Catholics voting over 80

percent voted for FDR. Catholic voters had apparently

resolved the ant i -Communist rhetoric and charges against the
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New Deal in favor of the ant i -Communist Catholics
within the
New Deal. [35]
In the midst of Pacelli's whirlwind tour of
the

country Spellman noted in his diary on October 24: "Joe

Kennedy arranged for President to invite Cardinal to lunch
with him on November 5th and so told me, but

I

said to have

Cardinal invited directly and through neither of us." The

day after the election Roosevelt met with Cardinal Pacelli
at his home at Hyde Park.

The guest list for the

post-election day luncheon hosted by the President's mother,
Sara Delano Roosevelt, was surprisingly limited; the

President, Cardinal Pacelli, Bishop Spellman, Bishop Stephen
J.

Donahue representing Cardinal Hayes of New York, Count

Galeazzi, Joseph P. Kennedy and Mrs. Kennedy and Frank

Walker and Mrs. Walker. In

a

C.

letter to his brother Bishop

Spellman said such a meeting "before the Presidency of

Franklin Delano Roosevelt, would have been considered
fantastic." The President-elect and the Cardinal sat before
the fireplace and discussed a wide range of topics.

"This

was a great day for America and for Catholic America,"

Spellman concluded.

[36]

Little else is known of the events of that day or of
what the President and the future Pope talked about in front
of the fireplace.

A crowd of reporters gathered outside the

President's home waiting for the Cardinal to emerge. They
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speculated that the two men discussed Communism,
Father
Coughlin, and the possibility the President would
recognize
the Vatican: sending an envoy to the Pope. Their
hopes for

a

quote on any of these matters were dashed when the
Cardinal
emerged. The following day The New York Times reported that

Pacelli left the meeting with FDR and greeted the waiting

correspondents. However, attempts to question the cardinal
"were stopped before a single question could be completed."
The Cardinal's escort. Bishop Spellman,

"declared that the

Cardinal had given no interview and should give none now."

Despite efforts to convince the Cardinal that questions he
did not want to answer would be considered "as not having
been put," Bishop Spellman "firmly declined." [37]
The lesson of the day was not lost on either the press
or President Roosevelt: Bishop Spellman carried great weight

with Cardinal Secretary of State Pacelli. This would become

increasingly clear in future years as FDR relied on Spellman
as a private channel of communication to the Vatican,

circumventing normal diplomatic channels such as the
Apostolic Delegate in Washington and other, higher ranking
members of the American Catholic hierarchy. It was just such
a

message which Spellman sent to Pius XII outlining FDR's

postwar plans in late 1943.

Although Roosevelt was overwhelmingly reelected and
the Union Party crushed in the 1936 election,
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it would be a

mistake to view the election results as

a

complete

repudiation of Coughlin, Analysts have correctly pointed
out
that the Union Party faced more than the usual obstacles
placed in the path of American third-party movements. There
was never a real political organization associated with the

Union Party. No cadres to get out the vote, no workers to

canvass and identify potential vote's. Both Coughlin and
Smith used the party to advance their own personal agenda

rather than to foster

a

new political movement. The party

managed to get on the ballot in only 36 states, and

in six

of those states the party label did not appear on the

ballot. As the campaign progressed the desention within the

party became evident until even Dr. Townsend recognized the

problem and switched his support to Landon. Voters were
faced with the usual third-party dilemma: would their vote
be wasted? In spite of all these problems,

the party polled

almost as many votes as the Socialist Party at the height of
its popularity in 1912.

One can only speculate on how that

might have been different with Huey Long at the head of the

ticket rather than Lempke.
There is no measure to determine how much of the

public believed the charges of Communist influence within
the New Deal or the accusation that FDR himself was a

Communist. Certainly it did not affect the presidential
voting. But the charge hung in the air. The New Deal
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coalition between the core and the periphery held
together,
in

large measure due to the efforts of anti-Communist

Catholics working to beat back the charges of Communist
influence on the New Deal. To a large degree the periphery
had dominated the campaign. The issue of Communism and

Communists in government would not go away. And for
Catholics the issue would become more critical very soon.
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CHAPTER

5

"...THE LOSS OF EVERY CATHOLIC VOTE..."
The President barely had time to celebrate his

reelection before Catholic ant i -Commun ism was once again
thrust into his decision-making process. Events at home and
abroad were again beginning to focus around the fear of the

spread of international Communism, and around charges that
FDR was fostering Communism within the U.S.
In July of 1936 General Francisco Franco led a revolt
of the Spanish army against the democratically elected

Popular Front government, which included elements of the

Spanish Communist Party. The Popular Front received only

46

percent of the votes cast in the Spanish elections. However,
the proportional representation used to allocate seats in
the Diet resulted in the Front receiving almost two-thirds
of the seats.

The anti-Catholic sentiments of the extreme

left within the Front quickly manifested itself in

widespread incidents of ant i -cler ical ism: churches were
burned, religious education attacked, and priests, bishops
and nuns murdered. Catholics argued that Franco's revolt

was based on the fact that the democratic elements within
the coalition had "succumbed to the extreme Leftist groups"
and was founded "on the legitimate ground that the

government had betrayed the electorate
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."[

1

]

Franco's revolt was widely viewed as the latest

manifestation of European Fascism challenging the rule of
democracy. Therein lay the problem for American Catholics.

Commonweal opened the new year with an editorial on January
1

taking issue with its Protestant counterpart. The

Christian Century, which had editorialized

late 1936 that

in

the Catholic Church was conducting a world-wide campaign

against Communism because "the Holy See is really concerned
with supporting Fascism, with its inevitable accompaniments
'

of autocracy and brutal ity,

and for the special pr ivi leges

which the Roman Catholic Church is able to enjoy under

Fascist governments.'" The editors of Commonweal found this
charge incredible and pointed to the opinion of the editor
of Per Anqr iff,

Joseph Goebbels, who charged that Cardinal

Pacelli's visit to the United States was part of
set up a "Cat ho lie Center Party"

in order

plan to

a

to prevent the

spread of National Social ist doctr ine and that FDR

reelect ion was "one ano inted by the Vat ican
editors doubted both views could be correct

.

"

.

[

'

The Commonweal
2

The Church's condemnation of Communism was not

political, according to Commonweal

,

but religious. Communist

propaganda, as in Spain, embodied in the slogan "join with

Communism against Fascism to save democracy" was
issue.

a false

The real issue was not between Communism and Fascism

but between "democracy and all forms of total i tar i an ism.
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including Communism." Fascism was nothing more
than

reaction against Communism, without which

it

a

could not

exist. The editorial framed the issue for American
Catholics
and would form the basis of the Catholic approach
to Spain
as long as the civil war went unresolved. More
importantly,

the Catholic attitude would carry great weight with FDR.

[3]

Isolationist sympathies in the United States were

greatly strengthened following the revelations of the Nye
Committee in 1934. These hearings produced the 1935

Neutrality Act prohibiting U.S. arms manufacturers from
supplying belligerents in any foreign war. FDR attempted to

apply the act to the Spanish Civil War, but the act did not
mention civil wars, and U.S. arms manufacturers began to
make shipments to both sides. When the administration's

efforts at moral persuasion failed FDR asked for an

amendment to the 1937 renewal of the act that would include
civil wars and expand executive discretion in applying the
act.

Congress willingly approved the inclusion of civil wars

in the act.

matter

.

(

The extension of executive powers was another

4

FDR opened his second term with perhaps the most

serious political blunder of his years in office: his

attempt to pack the Supreme Court. Much of the congressional

debate surrounding the extension of executive powers sought
by the President in the Neutrality Act revolved around his
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attempt to assume "dictatorial powers." Senator Hiram
Johnson, an ardent isolationist, said Roosevelt's
attempt to

alter the nature of the court would lead to him making

himself "an absolute dictator in fact." The court fight

spilled over into the Neutrality Act fight over the question
of extension of executive powers.

fight was also changing.

The nature of the Spanish

In March Italian troops were

captured at Guadalajara, proving the charges that Italy and

Germany were actively supporting the Franco "Nationalists."
[5]

As the civil war in Spain intensified, American

opinion on the Neutrality Act began to shift. The

Guadalajara incident shifted the argument from direct help
to the Loyalist government to imposition of the Neutrality

Act against Italy and Germany. At the same time the Vatican
was clarifying its position on the conflicting ideologies

involved in the struggle. In early March Pius XI issued

back-to-back encyclicals. The first, Mit Brenneder Sorge,
(With Burning Sorrow) was an open attack on German National

Socialism. The encyclical charged the Nazi government with

violating the 1933 concordat concluded between the Reich and
the Vatican and with sowing "suspicion, discord, hatred,

calumny" and "secret and open hostility to Christ and His
Church." The Pope attacked the racial and religious policies
of the Third Reich and predicted "destructive religious
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wars... which have no other aim than

...

exterminat ion

.

"

The

concordat of 1933 had been negotiated by Eugenic Pacelli,
then serving as Papal Nuncio in Germany.

It

guaranteed

freedom of the Catholic religion and the right o£ the church
"to regulate her own affairs." The Reich broke the
concordat

within five days of its signing. Thousands of priests and
lay leaders were arrested and confined to concentration

camps, church property was confiscated. Catholic

publications suppressed and the sanctity of the confessional
was violated by the Gestapo.

[6]

The second encyclical, Divini Redemotoris

.

attacked

"the principles of dialectical and historical materialism"
and condemned communism as "intrinsically wrong." It further

stated that "no one who would save Christian civilization

may collaborate with it in any undertaking whatsoever." This
"plague on both your houses" attitude of the Vatican may

explain why American Catholic opinion was split on the

question of Spain. With Communists on one side and Fascists
on the other.

Catholics were being forced to choose between

the lesser of two evils, as Commonweal suggested. The

American Catholic hierarchy, however, had no difficulty
choosing sides.
portrayed

in

Increasingly,

in

the struggle in Spain was

terms of the Communist faction within the

Loyalist coalition. While the Catholic press was

highlighting the anti-clerical atrocities of the Loyalist
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government, bishops throughout the country were
associating
the government's activities with the spread of
international

Communism.

[

7

In late April the bombing of Guernica thrust the

entire question of the embargo back into the spotlight. It
also exemplified the confusion surrounding the entire matter
for American Catholics. German-made planes bombed the Basque

city for several hours, leaving 1,654 people dead and
another 889 wounded. Calls immediately went out for an
embargo against Germany and Italy. The Basque region was

largely Cathol ic, and the bombing should have outraged

Catholic opinion in America as

it did the rest of the

country. But the Basques were fighting for the Loyalists,

which meant the Communists

.

German planes be ing used to bomb

Spanish Catholics who were fighting for the Communists? It
was enough to confuse any Catholic. [8]
In the meantime FDR finally worked out a compromise

with Senator Pittman regarding the extension of the

Neutrality Act. The President was forced to accept less of
the discretionary power he first sought under the act in the
face of

P

i

ttman

's

objections to the expans ion of

"dictatorial powers." On May

1,

the permanent Neutrality Law

went into effect. Norman Thomas met with the President in

June after returning from Spain and observing the war first
hand. When Thomas raised the issue of the war in Spain and
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the embargo, the President told him his
position "had been

and would be guided by what he thought was the
attitude of
the Catholic Church in America."

[9]

Was the President's position on Spain a payback for

the role the Catholic hierarchy played in the 1936
election?

Catholic public opinion was, and would continue to be, split
on the question of what to do about Spain.

the church,

The hierarchy of

however, was virtually unanimous. The debate

over the civil war in Spain would continue through the rest
of 1937 and 1938.

FDR continued to refuse to apply the

embargo to Berlin and Rome and to lift it against Spain. He
did this in spite of polls indicating the overwhelming

support such a move would have with the American people. A

Gallop Poll conducted in December of 1938 asked: "Which side
do you sympathize with in the Spanish Civil War?"

Nationally, 76 percent sympathized with the Loyalists, while

only 24 percent sympathized with Franco. When broken down by
religion, however, only 42 percent of Catholics sided with
the Loyalists, compared to 83 percent of Protestants. Franco
was favored by 58 percent of Catholics compared to only 17

percent of Protestants. Clearly, Catholic opinion on Spain
varied widely from its Protestant counterpart in America.
However, the position of the Catholic periphery would come
to dominate the political center. [10]
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For FDR the issue was framed in terms of the

opposition of the Catholic hierarchy. Clearly, Catholic lay
opinion on Spain was divided, as the poll indicated. As the

congressional elections

in

the fall of 1938 approached, FDR

put the matter in purely political terms. Secretary of the

Interior Harold Ickes was furious when Roosevelt failed to
act on lifting the embargo against Spain. He recounts in his

diary how he overcame FDR's logistical objections to lifting
the arms ban only to have the President relate that he had

discussed the matter that morning with congressional leaders
and they feared that to raise the ban "would mean the loss
of every Catholic vote in the coming fall elections." The

Interior Secretary exclaimed in his diary: "This proves up
to the hilt what so many people have been saying,

namely,

that the Catholic minorities in Great Britain and America

have been dictating the international policy with respect to

Spain." Surely the periphery was dominating the core and the
issue was ant i -Communism .[

1 1

Clearly, FDR's position was political, as any

President's would be. It was also consistent, as the two

conversations with Thomas and Ickes demonstrate. The thrust
of both conversations,

coming over a year apart, indicate

that the President was unwilling to risk losing the Catholic

vote over the issue of Spain. They also demonstrate that his
i
fear was that the Catholic hierarchy's strong ant -Communist
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position on Spain was the deciding factor. The
ability of
the hierarchy to offset Coughlin's influence
in the 1936

election was

a

lesson not lost in the White House. Some

historians argue that recollections of private conversations
with FDR cannot be taken at face value because he had

a

tendency to tell people what they wanted to hear, and then
did what he wanted. Clearly, what FDR was telling both

Thomas and Ickes was not what they wanted to hear, and what
he did was not what they wanted him to do but rather what he

felt he needed to do.

While the controversy over lifting the arms embargo

against Spain was raging, the question of Communist
influence within the administration would not go away.
Father Coughlin briefly left the air following the 1936
election, as he said he would if the Union Party was not

victorious, but quickly resumed his broadcasts and

supervision of his Social Justice newspaper. By July of 1937
Coughlin was again on the attack against Communists, this
time within the Congress of Industrial Organizations. He

labeled the entire CIO as a "Moscow tool teeming with

communists" and charged they were taking instructions from
the "Communist Central Committee of the United States."

Earlier, Coughlin labeled CIO head John L. Lewis

a

"labor

dictator" and "a communist tool being used to prepare the
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way for the eventual victory of Marxism in the United
States

.

"

[

12

]

With Coughlin back in stride questions began to

surface in places generally considered more congenial to the
President. Writing in Commonweal in September Oliver McKee,
Jr.

denounced the "class prejudice" being fostered by the

New Deal. McKee argued that FDR's "political strategy and
many of his policies have

...

tended to incite class

prejudice, and create in the public mind the impression that

property

is

necessarily the foe of human rights." McKee does

not charge that FDR is a Communist,

or even being influenced

by Communists, but the suggestion that the New Deal is

promot ing class war fare and "appeals to class consciousness
to win popular support" demonstrate that even the liberal

Commonweal was beginning to question the aims of the New
Deal.

[13]

In early 1938 Coughlin was again attracting

considerable attention, so much so that the Gallop Poll
conducted

a

survey in an attempt to gauge his strength. The

poll revealed that some 8.5 million American families with

radios listened to Coughlin either regularly or "from time
to time." This represented one-third of the 24 million

households with radios. More importantly,

83

percent of

those listening to Coughlin "approved" of what he said. The

survey was crude by today's standards and did not break down
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the audience by religion,

income, region or other indicators

of where Coughlin's message was having an effect.

[14]

Clearly, however, large numbers of Americans were
still listening to Coughlin and agreeing with what he was
saying. At the time of the poll Coughlin's attacks on FDR
and the New Deal were becoming increasingly vitriolic.

In

October of 1937 Coughlin commented on the "personal

stupidity of President Roosevelt" in an interview, while on
the same day an article in his Social Justice declared that

Catholics could not belong to the CIO because "Catholicism
was as incompatible with the CIO as Catholicism was

incompatible with Mohammedanism." He now added

a

new aspect

to his attack on international Communism, associat ing it

with

"

inter national Jewry

.

The pages of Social Justice

"

became filled with ant i -Semi t ic articles and pro -German
sentiments, placing him

in

direct oppos it ion to the

ant i -Nazi position asserted by Pius XI in his encyclical
"Mi t Brennender Sorge"

.

[15]

The Communist threat was everywhere according to

Coughl in

:

in labor unions,

colleges, and the administration.

The radio priest was providing the widest possible audience
to the elements of the Jesuit campaign discussed earlier.

In

the process the per iphery pos i t i on is coming to dominate the

developing popular culture of ant i -Communism. The political
atmosphere, poisoned by Coughlin and others, continued to

93

focus on the inability of the New Deal to bring
the

depression to an end, and manifested itself

in the summer

of

1938 when the House voted 181 to 41 for the creation of the

House UnAmerican Activities Committee. Ostensibly, the

committee was chartered to investigate extremist political

activity on both the left and right. However, under the

chairmanship of Martin Dies of Texas, the committee focused
almost exclusively on the question of Communist infiltration
of organized labor,

education, and government.

The committee issued its first report in January 1939,

defining UnAmer icanism and Communism. Citing the "Trojan
Horse" tactics of Communism, the report suggested Communists

infiltrated existing organizations or set up "front

organizations" dedicated to popular causes, but

in

reality

under the direction of Moscow. Witnesses identified 640

organizations, 483 newspapers and 280 labor unions which
they said were Communistic, including the Boy Scouts, Camp
Fire Girls, and several Catholic organizations. At least one

member of the committee branded the New Deal itself as

Communist. Representative

J.

Parnell Thomas,

a

Republican

member of the committee claimed the New Deal was "working
hand in glove with the Communist Party" and that it was

"either for the Communist Party, or is playing into the
hands of the Communist Party." [16]
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One of the "experts" on Communism called to
testify

before the Dies Committee was Father Charles Coughlin.
In
his ongoing battle with the CIO he released to the
committee
a

copy of remarks made to him in

a

private conversation with

Homer Martin, former head of the United Auto Workers,

in

which Martin claimed most of the leadership of the union
were Communists. When Martin was forced to acknowledge the

comments in public, it made the split within the UAW
irreversible, providing Coughlin with
over the CIO.

a

sense of victory

[17]

The fact that a standing committee of the congress was

leveling the same charges as Coughlin, and providing him

with yet another forum for his attacks, could do nothing but
lend credence to his charges. The criticism leveled at the

tactics of the committee, and the ridicule of some of the

testimony by the press, was not keeping the public from
being impacted

.

A poll conducted in November of 19 3 8 showed

that 60 percent of the respondents had heard of the

committee, and

74

committee felt its

percent of those
f

f

ami liar with the

ind ings were "important enough to

justify continuing the investigation." A year later,

a

similar poll found support for continued funding of the

committee at 75 percent

.

[

18

As FDR approached the midpoint of his second term he

found himself embroiled once again in charges that he was
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a

Communist or under the influence of Communists
within the
New Deal. He openly admitted to both Harold Ickes
and Norman
Thomas that his policy on Spain revolved around the
position
of the Catholic hierarchy,

which was based on the now

official anti-Communism of the church, and the need to keep

Catholic voters in the Democratic Party. A resurgent Father

Coughlin was continuing his attack on the New Deal and the
President. Conditions in Europe were rolling toward war and

speculation was beginning to mount that the President would
seek an unprecedented third term. Having seen the effort FDR

made to keep the "Catholic Vote" in the 1936 election, and
his position on Spain designed to keep it in the 1938

midterm elections, it seems clear that

a

pattern was

developing in the President's political relations with
American Catholics centering around the issue of
ant i -Commun ism and leading to Teheran and Yalta.

96

Notes

Wilfrid Parsons, "Fascist-Communist Dilemma," Commonweal
(February 12, 1937), "p." 430.

1)

Editorial, "Catholicism and Communism," Commonweal
(January 1, 1937), "p." 257.

2)

3)

Ibid..,

"p." 258

.

Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign
Policy. 1932-1945. (New York: Oxford University Press,
4)

1979), p. 140.
5)

Ibid

.

William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich;
A History of Nazi Germany. (New York: Simon and Schuster,
6)

1960), p. 235.

Claudia Carlen Ihm, ed , The Papal Encyclicals 1903-1939
V. 3, (Raleigh, N.C.: McGrath Publishing Co., 1981), p. 539
7)

.

and 549.
8)

Dallek, Roosevelt and Foreign Policy

^

p. 141.

Norman Thomas, "Some Impressions of the
Strenous Decade; A Social and Intellectual
Nineteen- Thirties, ed by Daniel Aaron and
(Garden City, New York; Doubleday and Co.,

Thirties," in The
Record of the
Robert Bendiner,

Gallop, The Gallop Poll. Vol
(New York; Random House, 1972), p. 132.

1.

9)

.

10)

George

H.

1970), p. 504.

1935-1948.

Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes.
(New York; Simon and
Vol. 2. The Inside Struggle 1936-1939
Schuster, 1954), p. 390.: see also James MacGregor Burns,
Roosevelt the Lion and the Fox (New York: Harcourt Brace
and World, 1956), pp. 356-357.
11)

,

.

Sheldon Marcus, Father Coughlin. The Tumultuous Life of
the Priest of the Little Flower. (Boston; Little, Brown and
12)

Co.,

1973), p. 194.

Oliver McKee, Jr., "Class Prejudice," Commonweal.
(September 17, 1937), p. 468.

13)

pp. 100-101.

14)

Gallop, The Gallop Poll

15)

Marcus, Father Coughlin. p. 140.

,

97

William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and thP
New Deal, 1932-1940, (New York: Harper and Row,
1963),
p. 280.; and William Gellermann, Martin Dies
(New York- Da
Capo Press, 1972), p. 68.
16)

^

John McCarten, "Father Coughlin: Holy Medicine Man," The
America n Mercury. (June, 1939), "p. "129.
17)

18)

Gallop, The Gallop Poll

,

p. 128.

98

CHAPTER

6

PAPA ANGELICUS
Events in Europe were rapidly deteriorating in early
1939 when Pope Pius XI died on February 10. While the

College of Cardinals began to assemble in Rome to choose

a

successor. Hitler was pressing the government of what

remained of Czechoslovakia. The Munich agreement, which had
"guaranteed peace in our time," was falling apart under the
onslaught of Nazi demands.
On March 2,

the traditional puffs of white smoke arose

from the Vatican announcing to the world the selection of

a

new Pope. Eugenio Cardinal Pacelli had been elected and
chosen the name Pius XII. The former Papal Secretary of
State who sat by the fire with FDR at Hyde Park after his

reelection in 1936 was now the leader of worldwide
Catholicism. The election of

a

new Pope whose career within

the church centered on Germany and diplomacy was widely

regarded as

seeking

a

a

signal the church planned on playing

a

role in

peaceful solution to the problems in Europe. The

election also initiated

a

series of events which would alter

the relationship between FDR and American Catholics.
The new Pope was immediately faced with a crucial

decision concerning the American church left by the sudden
death of his predecessor. The most powerful position in the
American hierarchy had been vacant since the death the
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previous September of Cardinal Hayes of the archdiocese
of

New York. Speculation on

a

successor to Hayes centered on

Archbishop Edward Mooney of Detroit and Archbishop John
McNicholas of Cincinnati, both longtime friends of FDR.
However, barely

a

month after being named Pope, Pacelli

turned to his old friend the auxiliary bishop of Boston,

naming Francis

J.

Spellman the new archbishop of New York.

Under Spellman's tutelage the chancery office of the

archdiocese would come to be known as the "Powerhouse" by
political leaders of both parties and all religious

denominat i ons
With the deteriorating European political situation
the new Pope needed as many friends in high places as he

could find. By the end of March Czechoslovakia disappeared

from the map of Europe, absorbed by Germany, Poland, and
Hungary. Hitler was now turning his attention to Poland

.

The

attitude of the new Pope toward the Third Reich was of great
interest to the Fuehrer. Pacelli served as Papal Nunc io in

Germany from 1917 to 1929 and negotiated the concordat
between the Reich and Vatican in 1933. There were some 35

million Catholics in Germany (including Hitler who was

a

nominal Catholic), and they, along with the Socialists, had

provided the main support of the Weimer Republ ic

.

Hitler

despised the political nature of the German church and
immediately outlawed the Catholic Party upon taking office.
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In spite of the concordat,

confessional schools came under

attack, along with Catholic Action Leagues, Catholic labor
unions, and the Vatican itself as

influence

.

[

a

non-German foreign

1

While Hitler was completing the destruction of Czechoslovakia, the German Foreign Office was completing an

analysis of the new Pope. The memorandum on Pacelli stated:
"His advocacy of an orthodox church policy repeatedly

brought him into conflict with National Socialism on matters
of principle." The Foreign Office regarded Pacelli as a

"Germanophile" as

a

result of his long tenure in Germany. He

admired German culture, phi losophy, mus ic, and literature.
The report also drew attention to the fact the new Pope

seemed particularly affected by the appellation "Papa

Angelicus" associated with his reign. The term referred to
the prophecy of St. Malachy which attributed to the 106th

Pope a revival of Apostolic simplicity and zeal which would

inaugurate

a

new age.

[2]

While Hitler continued his pressure on Poland, his
Axis partner Mussolini took the opportunity to invade

Albania in early April. This move solidified the resolve of
Great Britain and France as both countries guaranteed the

borders of neighbor ing Greece and Yugoslavia. FDR meanwhi le
sent

a

letter to Hitler on April 15 listing 31 countries and

asking the Fuehrer "to give assurances that your armed
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forces will not attack or invade the territory" of
any of
them. The President sought the support of the Vatican
for

his peace initiative. Undersecretary of State Sumner
Welles

approached the Apostolic Delegate Ameleto Cicognani through
Monsignor Ready of the National Catholic Welfare Conference.
The Vatican already had been approached by both Britain and

France to support the proposal. The Vatican, however, took
the position that the President's letter reflected an

unneutral attitude, would be rejected out of hand by the
Axis leaders and would reduce the pope's influence in

Germany if endorsed by the Vatican.

[3]

Hitler's response to FDR's peace proposal indeed took
the form of the total rejection the Vatican predicted. The

Fuehrer publicly rebuked the President before the Reichstag
on April 28.

William Shirer called Hitler's speech that day

"the most brilliant oration he ever gave." As Shirer put it,
"for sheer eloquence, craftiness,

hypocrisy,

it

irony, sarcasm and

reached a new level that he was never to

approach again."

[4]

The Fuehrer's rejection of FDR's proposal did not

deter the Pope from putting forth his own peace plan in

early May. The Pope's plan was given to the Fuehrer by the

apostolic nuncio in Berlin, Cesare Orsenigo. According to
the German report of the meeting, the nuncio told Hitler of
the Pope's concern about the tension in Europe and his
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desire to do all in his power to prevent the outbreak
of
war.

He suggested a conference of the five great powers
of

Europe to discuss the German-Polish and Franco-Italian
problems before they got out of hand. Hitler responded that
the danger of war was exaggerated by propaganda, and in any

event he would have to discuss such

a

proposal with

Mussolini first. He concluded by saying he would "in
short time...let the Pope have his answer

.

"

a

very

[51

The five great powers of Europe included in Pius' plan

were Britain, France, Poland, Germany and Italy. The British

Foreign Minister, Lord Halifax, in

a

conversation with the

apostolic delegate in Britain, expressed regret that the
Russians were not invited to attend the conference and was
told "that in no circumstances would it be possible for the

Pope to consider such an approach." His predecessor's

encyclical effectively banned any cooperation with the
Soviet Union. This official Catholic ant i -Communism would

become an increasingly difficult problem for FDR and

American Catholics to deal with in coming months.

[5]

However, despite Halifax's admonitions,the British
were in something of

a

quandary themselves at that moment as

to what role the Soviets were to play in the European

situation. Foreign Commissar Maxim Litvinov approached both
the British and French in April with the possibility of

forming an alliance of the three governments to protect all
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the nations of central and eastern Europe which felt

threatened by Germany. When the British government had not

accepted the proposal by early May, Winston Churchill was
openly critical stating "there

is

no means of maintaining an

eastern front against Nazi aggression without the active aid
of Russia."

[7]

On May 17 Berlin Nuncio Orsenigo was finally given

Hitler's response to the Pope's peace initiative. Foreign

Minister von Ribbentrop told the nuncio that while Hitler
and Mussolini were "very grateful to the Holy Father for his

benevolent intervention on behalf of universal peace.
think the moment is not yet ripe for

a

.

.they

conference" to

discuss the outstanding issues between the various nations.
The nuncio reported that when questioned on the current

international situation, Ribbentrop replied that "Poland,
she judges badly enough to provoke

a

war,

if

will be crushed in

less time than it takes to say it." He also offered that

Germany was not afraid of war with France and England,
neither of which would be able to penetrate Germany 's

defense in the west except at

a

cost of a million men. More

importantly, Ribbentrop raised the prospect of Germany

reaching an agreement with Russia. Noting Stalin's

displeasure over the British and French position and the
dismissal of Litvinov, he said, "We have no quarrel with
Russia except about Bolshevism, in other words we do not
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want its perfidious propaganda for

a

world revolut ion

.

.

.

but

should Russia drop this propaganda nothing prevents us from

drawing closer together."

[8]

While the Pope "in no circumstances" would approach
the Soviet Union, and the British were putting off

responding to Soviet overtures for an alliance against
Germany, the German Foreign Minister was acknowledging to

Vatican official the prospect of

a

a

German-Russian

accommodation. The prospect of an alliance between Hitler
and Stalin must have seemed so remote as to border on the

preposterous. There is no indication in the Vatican

documents that this information was passed on to any other

European embassy
FDR meanwh ile reopened the prospect of establishing

some type of permanent diplomatic relationship with the
Vat i can

Sumner Welles had been meeting regularly with the

.

Apostolic Delegate to Washington, Ameleto Cicognani, and
Msg. Ready of the National Catholic Welfare Council. Welles

was expressing the continued desire of the President to

convene

a

conference aimed at resolving the European

situation: He added that the "United States government was

prepared to take part in

a

conference of nations to adjust

the present causes of world unrest." FDR seems to have been

disturbed by the exclusion of the U.S. from the Pope's
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original proposal for
a

a

peace conference and was indicating

firm wish to be included in any future plans.
In August,

[9]

FDR asked Welles' opinion on the

advisability of establishing diplomatic relations with the
Vatican. Welles responded that the Vatican had access to

valuable sources of information "particularly with regard to
what is actually going on in Germany, Italy and Spain" which
the U.S. did not possess, and the ability to get that

information "was of cons id er able importance

.

"

The U.S. had

maintained official diplomatic relations with the Vatican
prior to 1867, when congress reacted against an unpopular

President and

a

more unpopular Pope by cutting off funds for

the mission. The subsequent loss of the Papal States removed
the justification for maintaining relations with the Vatican
as a foreign state,

but the Lateran Treaty had returned that

status to the Vatican. Speculation that FDR intended to

reestablish diplomatic relations with the Vatican had been
high at the time of Pacelli's visit to the U.S.
i

in

1936,

and

ndeed FDR discussed the possibility with Archbishop

Spellman several times over the next two years.
In October,

[10

1

after the outbreak of war, the President

again raised the issue with Spellman, saying that "he was

looking for a moment and occasion suitable for

a

persuasive

appeal to the American people." Spellman said that the

present situation in which both the Vatican and the U.S.
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were working for the similar aim of restoring peace
seemed

"favorable and propitious." When Spellman raised the

possibility that such an action would undoubtedly raise
criticism, the President agreed, but added,

"I

think that

every moment brings us nearer to the conclusion of this
matter," The President obviously had

a

plan,

which he then

outlined to Spellman. He projected that the Congress would

adjourn sometime in November after taking up the revision of
the Neutrality Act and would not return until January

3.

He

felt an announcement during that time would be appropriate

and that it could be justified by his belief that "such an

association would be of great help to the peace of the
world, as in effect it is." He also suggested the mission

could be viewed in terms of assistance to the refugee
problem.

[

11

That the President had already made up his mind seems
clear. He then discussed the question of

f

mission and proposed that it be considered

und ing such a
a

"special

mission of the United States Government to Rome accredited
to the Holy See" because special missions did not require an

act of Congress for fund ing,

launched,
jnore

if

"but once the mission has been

everything goes well. Congress could be induced

easily to vote the funds for

a

permanent mission." FDR

had already narrowed the field of candidates to head the

mission to Myron Taylor and former ambassador to Italy
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Breckenridge Long. Spellman said either man would "be
suitable" because the Pope already knew Taylor and Long had

substantial diplomatic experience.
If the

[12]

President had not already decided on Myron

Taylor to head the mission to the Vatican at the time of his

meeting with Spellman, he soon did. Taylor was almost the
perfect candidate for the job. A Protestant, Episcopalian
with Quaker ancestors, he would not be accused of being

pro-Catholic. He could also not be accused of being

a

wild-

eyed New Deal social reformer. Formerly Chairman of the

Board of United States Steel, he still sat on the Board of
Directors. He was also

a

Director of American Telephone and

Telegraph and The First National Bank of New York. In
addition he had his own villa in Florence and could take
care of his own expenses if need be until government funds
were provided.

While FDR was working out the details of this mission
to the Vatican,
as abruptly as

the war in Europe seemed to come to an end
it started.

The Nazi Blitzkrieg overwhelmed

Poland just as Ribbentrop told Orsenigo back in May. The
lull in the war was now being dubbed Sitzkrieg

,

or the

sit-down war, by the western press. Hitler was making
overtures to the British that the war need not continue. The

Foreign Office was taken completely by surprise by the
Pope's latest effort to secure a peaceful settlement to the
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conflict. Sir D'Arcy Osborne, British ambassador to the
Vatican,

informed the Foreign Office in late November that

Pius had been approached to act as an intermediary for

a

discontented group within the German Abwehr led by Colonel
Hans Oster. This group contacted Monsignor Ludwig Kaas,

former leader of the German Centre Party living in exile in
Rome, with a proposal for a military coup against Hitler

involving members of the General Staff. The conspirators
sought the Pope's guarantee that if the coup were successful
the British would negotiate a peace based on the restoration
of Poland and non-German Czechoslovakia,
as part of Germany.

but leaving Austria

In other words post-Munich Germany would

remain intact, but without

a

Nazi government.

[13]

Notes went back and forth between Halifax, Chamberlain
and Osborne. The Foreign Office wanted to bring in the

French, but the Pope wanted to limit knowledge of the plan
to as small a number of people as possible and was convinced

the French would go along if the British agreed. The

negotiations dragged on unt i 1 March with the Foreign Office

apparently vacillating between taking the matter seriously,
and then raising doubts about the nature of the conspiracy

Osborne's diary relates his frustration with the long
process of communicating questions from Halifax and

Chamberlain to the Germans through the Pope and then their
response. The Germans in turn were attempting to find out
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who would be acceptable to the British in a non-Nazi

government. The whole thinq collapsed as the Generals
involved,

including Beck and Haider, put off acting as final

preparations for the Spring offensive in the west drew
nearer

.

[

14

]

Meanwhile, on December 24, FDR announced he was

sending Myron Taylor to Rome as his "personal representative
to the Pope." The President was still clearly worried about

reaction to his announcement

.

He sent a letter to Pi us

informing him of Taylor's appointment and

a

similar letter

Charles A. Buttrick, President of the Federal Council

to Dr.

of Churches of Christ in America,

and Rabbi Cyrus Adler,

President of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America. The

President couched his appointment of Taylor in spiritual
terms, seeking the Pope's opinion on matters of peace and

guidance in these troubled times. He also asked Buttrick and
Adler to do the same

.

The difference, however

,

was

substantial, as pointed out by Cicognani: "the President

sending

a

is

Representative to the Holy See, while to the two

above mentioned gentlemen he is extending

a

simple

invitation to call on him." [15]
The American Protestant community also noted the

difference. Buttrick's organization called for Taylor's
immediate recall. Protestant groups throughout the country

condemned the appointment, some in open ant i -Cat hoi ic
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hostility, others calling on the tradition of the
separation
of church and state.

Dr.

George Truett, president of the

Baptist World Alliance, said the Pope "has in fact no better
title to receive governmental recognition from the United

States than... the head of the least of the Baptist

associations in the hills of North Carolina." FDR weathered
the criticism, cracking jokes at a press conference about
just what an ambassador to the Vatican would do each day.

The strategy he outlined to Spellman worked, however, and

Congress raised little objection to the Taylor mission when
it returned.

[16]
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CHAPTER

7

"THE DEVIL IS A COMMUNIST"
The evening before the final session of the Teheran

Conference FDR dined with Churchill and Stalin. When dinner
was over, the President excused himself from after dinner

coffee and cigars claiming he was not feeling well.
Churchill, Eden, Stalin and Molotov engaged in general

conversation which eventually turned to the question of
Poland. According to Eden, the discussion went favorably

with both sides believing the sooner the issue could be

resolved the better. The problem lay in the fact that the
"Americans are terrified of the subject which Harry
[Hopkins] called

'political dynamite'

for their elections."

Eden told Hopkins the situation would only get worse the
longer it was left unresolved and that in six months, with

Russian armies in Poland, the elections would be that much
closer

.

[

1

]

The conversation turned to generalities about the

progress of the war during which Churchill remarked that he

believed God was on the side of the allies. Stalin grinned
when he heard the translation of the Prime Minister's remark
and interjected that the devil was on his side "because, of

course, everyone knows that the devil is
God,

no doubt,

is

a

a

Communist, and

good conservative." Over coffee and

cigars on the final evening of the Teheran Conference the
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stumbling blocks of the postwar peace were outlined: Poland,
religion and the American election.

[2]

The President returned from Teheran in time to present
his annual Christmas message to the American people from
his

home in Hyde Park. He told the nation that he had gotten

along fine with Marshal Stalin and that he believed

in the

future "we are going to get along very well with him and the

Russian people-very well indeed." As events unfolded in
early 1944 the public optimism the President expressed in
his Christmas message began to give way to the hard

political reality of dealing with Stalin's demands,

[3]

The stalemate which existed in Soviet-Polish relations

since the previous April took on new significance on January
4

when Soviet forces entered Poland. Now that Soviet troops

were returning to eastern Poland the London Poles were

anxious to resume relations and establish

a

basis for

cooperation between the advancing Red Army and the
Underground Home Army. In Washington, Jan Ciechanowsk i

,

the

Polish Ambassador of the government-in-exile, was told by

Secretary of State Cordell Hull that in his opinion "the
British Government, as an ally of both Poland and of Russia,
was in a better pos ition to initiate appropriate steps than

the American Government" in terms of mediating

a

reconciliation between the Soviets and the
government-in-exile. Hull was conveying to the London Poles
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tne same message FDR had given to Stalin at Teheran:
he

could not take

a

public stand on the Polish issue. Averell

Harriman later summed up the President's thinking at this
point:

"The 1944 election was fast approaching and he

preferred to postpone the Polish outcry until after the
votes were counted,

leaving Churchill to take the lead mean-

while." The formal treaty obligations the British had with
both Poland and Russia provided FDR with an escape mechanism
to avoid taking a public position on Poland.
It soon became evident

[4]

that Hull had not delivered the

U.S. position to the Poles too soon. The offer of the London

Poles to resume relations with the Soviets and coord inate

activities between the Red Army and the Home Army was

tersely rejected. The Soviets also rejected the "erroneous
affirmation" by the London Poles that the area the Red Army
was operating in was part of Poland.
said,

It was well known,

that the "Soviet constitution established

they

a

Sovi et -Po 1 ish frontier corresponding with the desires of the

population of western Ukraine and western White Russia...
[and]the territories.

.

.were incorporated into the Soviet

Union." In other words the Soviets were operating within
their June 1941 borders.

[5]

On January 22, Churchill met with the premier of the

Polish government-in-exile, Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, and

proposed

a

f

ive -point program as the bas is for renewed
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recognition by the Soviets. The Premier was told that

if his

government would agree to the acceptance of the so-called
Curzon Line as the basis of the western Polish frontier
(linking the eastern frontier to the grant to Poland of East

Prussia, Danzig and Upper Silesia to the Oder River), Poles
on the Soviet side of the eastern frontier would be granted

the right to return to Poland, all Germans within the new

Polish frontiers would be removed, and the guarantee these
agreements would be honored by the three principal United
Nations, relations with the Soviets could be resumed. In

reality this was the agreement the "Big Three" had reached
at Teheran.

It was also the outline of the new Poland Myron

Taylor had carried to Rome in September of 1942.

[6]

Churchill kept Stalin apprised of his negotiations
with the London Poles. He also cabled Roosevelt on the

position he was taking with Mikolajaczk. He informed the

Polish Premier that even though England had gone to war over
Poland it had done so not for the sake of "any particular
frontier," but rather for the existence of

a

strong,

free,

independent Poland." Churchill said Stalin also supported
this view and that even though England would have continued
to fight Germany alone "the liberation of Poland from the

German grip is being achieved mainly by the enormous

sacrifices and achievements of the Russian armies." Poland
would have to accept the fact that the allies would have
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a

large say about "the frontier of territory she
should have."
The Poles were willing to consider the matter,
according to

Churchill, but they refused to settle border issues prior
to
a

general peace conference after the war.

[7]

The border issue became secondary in early February.

Stalin informed British Ambassador Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
that at least three of the members of the Polish

government-in-exile were unacceptable to him and he would
not deal with them. FDR was anxious where this latest

difficulty would lead. On February

7,

he cabled Stalin that

he appreciated his desire "to deal only with a Polish

government in which you can repose confidence," but while
public opinion was still solidifying around the "broad

principles subscribed to at the Moscow and Teheran

conferences," it would be better to allow the Polish Prime
Minister to make changes in the makeup of that government
"without any evidence of pressure or diet at ion from

a

foreign country." [8]

While the question of Poland was beginning to heat up,
the President found himself embroiled in yet another issue

highlighting the ability of the Vatican to bring both
domestic and international political pressure to bear on
American public opinion: the bombing of Rome. Although Italy
formally surrendered to the Allies in September of 1943,
stiff German resistance continued in that country. As Allied
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forces began to move up the peninsula in early
1944 bombing
raids in Rome and other military targets resulted
in damage
and casualties within Vatican City, the Papal Villa
at

Castelgandolf o and the Abby of Monte Casino.
By mid-February public attention was being divided

between the deteriorating Polish situation and the flurry of

diplomatic correspondence between the Vatican and
Washington. Archbishop Amleto Cicognani, Apostolic Delegate
at Washington,

was conveying the objections to the bombing

by Pius XII and Luigi Cardinal Maglione, Vatican Secretary
of State,

to the President and the State Department. The

Vatican flatly denied Allied military reports that Monte
Cassino and Castelgandol f o were housing German military
personnel. General Mark Clark of the U.S. Fifth Army later

confirmed that no German military personnel were using
either site. Archbishop Spellman notified Roosevelt that he

intended to speak out publicly on the matter,

a

departure

from the archbishop's usually cordial relations with the

President. At St. Patrick's Cathedral on Washington's

birthday Spellman deplored the fact that American armed
forces had attacked "the territory of

a

neutral state" in

spite of the fact that the Pope himself had denied that

German troops were ever stationed in the areas under attack.
[9]
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On March 12 and April

1

the archbishop spoke on the

subject again, as bombing raids in and around Rome continued
to damage churches and shrines.

The fact that Spellman would

speak out publicly against the actions of American armed
forces in the midst of

a

popular war effort and an election

year suggests the possibility something deeper was involved.
In fact,

the Vatican was marshaling an international effort

on the bombing issue.

On March 15,

the Irish Ambassador to

the United States delivered a message from Prime Minister

deValera seeking an agreement by which "Rome may be saved."
The Irish vote could not be overlooked. Similar appeals came

from the Spanish government and from several South American

Republics.

[10]

The situation was becoming serious in the eyes of the

administration. On March 18, Secretary Hull cabled all

diplomatic representatives in the South American Republics
to "give your serious and urgent attention to the

possibility of discreetly stimulating some comment on the
part of high public officials, cultural leaders, and

prominent newspapers" that responsibility for placing

Christian shrines in jeopardy in Rome lay with the Nazis,
who continued to use the city for military purposes, and not

with the Allied airforce. The administration was promoting

counterattack of world opinion. Domestically, the situation
was not much better. A poll conducted in late April asked
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a

"Do you think the Allied Airforce should
bomb Rome?"

Nationally, only 37 percent of the respondents replied
yes,
while 57 percent said no, and 12 percent had no
opinion.

Among Catholics only 24 percent said yes, with 67 percent

saying no, and

9

percent with no opinion. Protestant

response was 36 percent yes, 52 percent no, and 12 percent
no opinion.

Clearly,

a

majority of American public opinion,

led by American Catholics, was lined up against the

administration. Just as in the case of the Spanish Civil
War, American Catholic opinion was dominating the political

center on

a

question of international importance .[ 11

At virtually the same time that Spellman opposed the

bombing of Rome, Reverend Gerald

Walsh, professor of

G.

history at New York's Fordham University and editor of
Fordham's quarterly journal Thought

^

spoke to the Women's

Press Club of New York. The theme of Rev. Walsh's speech was
the postwar peace. He quoted from a 1939 speech of Pius XII:
"The real lesson of history

-

that what is common to all men

and women is that they love the place where they were born,
and any future world must be planned on the premise that

they want their homeland to be free." In an obvious
reference to the recently concluded Teheran Conference Rev.
Walsh went on to say that peace plans currently under

discussion were merely "selfish nationalism based on the

military force of the Big Four." [12]
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A respected Catholic historian and journalist, in
an

election year, was publicly questioning the conduct of the

President's postwar planning in front of an influential
media group. His superior. Archbishop Spellman, had just

publicly questioned the President's conduct of the war. And
this was not the first time Spellman had used Fordham in an

election year to send the President

a

message. In 1940, when

FDR was seeking an unprecedented third term, Spellman

invited FDR to a Fordham ROTC inspection, the timing of

which was widely regarded in the press as

a

subtle

endorsement of the President, The prospect could not be
ignored that a breach was deve lop ing between Roosevelt and
the Catholic hierarchy he had so assiduously cultivated over
the years.

Since Spellman was fully aware that FDR's

position on postwar Eastern Europe went far beyond what had
been made public following the Teheran Conference makes this

public criticism even more telling.
In the meantime,

the Polish border question would not

go away. By early March, the cables between Churchill and

Stalin were becoming acrimonious. Stalin accused Churchill
of leaking confidential correspondence on the Polish issue
to the London press "with many distortions which

I

have no

possibility of refuting." Churchill responded that the leak
of

information had come from the Soviet Embassy

in

London

and in the case of The London Times had come directly from
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the Soviet Ambassador Feodor Gusev. At the same
time he

informed Stalin that he would announce to the House of

Commons that efforts to resolve the situation between the

Polish and Soviet governments had broken down, that Britain

continued to recognize the government-in-exile, that
territorial questions must await the postwar peace

conference and that Britain would recognize no forcible
transfers of territory. Stalin responded by saying he

considered Churchill's message "full of threats," and he
accused the Prime Minister of reneging on the Teheran

agreements concerning the restoration of the Curzon Line. He
also said that if Churchi 11 del ivered the speech outlined in
his message it would be considered an "unjust and unfriendly

act towards the Soviet Union.

"

The Soviets continued to

refuse to deal with the Polish government- in-exi le, which
both Britain and the United States recognized as the

legitimate government of Poland. They also continued to

claim the area in which the Red Army was currently operating
was not part of Poland but part of the Soviet Union.

[13]

The President apparently thought he clarified the

nature of the political problems the Polish issue would

create for him with Stalin at Teheran, but the Soviet

Premier was doing nothing publicly which would help solve
the President's problems. Poland continued to remain an

issue in U.S. domestic politics. Suddenly,
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in late April,

a

Polish Roman Catholic priest from Springfield,

Massachusetts, Rev. Stanislauv Orlemanski, arrived in Moscow
at the personal

invitation of Stalin and was granted two

private interviews with the Soviet Premier. The State

Department denied any connection with the Orlemanski visit,
saying his visa had been granted purely as

a

private citizen

visiting the Soviet Union. Bishop O'Leary of the Diocese of
Springfield denied that Orlemanski was on any mission having
the sanction of church authorities.

While the State Department continued to be rebuffed in
its efforts to obtain a visa for a Catholic priest to travel
to the Soviet Union to assist Father LeBraun in Moscow, a

Polish priest from
obtained

a

a small

parish in Massachusetts not only

visa but was granted private interviews with

Stalin. While not well known outside Polish-American

circles, Orlemanski was not
FDR.

a

stranger to either Stalin or

He first came to the attention of the OSS Foreign

Nationals Branch in the late summer of 1943. At that time he

established

a

"Kosciuszko League" in his local parish to

give moral support to the Kosciuszko Division which Stalin
had established in Russia to fight with the Red Army. This

organization quickly came to the attention of

a

pro-Soviet

Polish-American group in Detroit which had been involved in
the bitter sit-down strike union struggle of the 1930's. The

leader of this group, Waclaw Soyda,
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invited Orlemanski to

Detroit to establish

a

Kosciuszko League there as

to making it a national organization.

a

prelude

[14]

In early November Orlemanski delivered a speech at

Detroit in which he attacked the Polish government-in-exile,

claiming they had "forsworn" their right to represent the
Polish people when they fled Poland. He also attacked their

position on the territorial question of borders, arguing
that only the "Polish landed aristocracy was interested in

keeping the territory because they held great estates
there." TASS issued

a

lengthy report on the formation of the

Kosciuszko League and the fact that Orlemanski was named
"honorary president." Branches of the League sprang up

in

Chicago, Winnipeg, Roxbury and West Springfield. According
to an FBI report on the League,

all the branches were

largely made up of "communists or communist sympathizers."
(151
In January,

shortly after returning from Teheran,

Stalin had Foreign Minister Molotov propose to Ambassador

Harriman the inclusion of three Polish-Americans as part of
professor at the

the government-in-exile: Oscar Lange,

a

University of Chicago, Leo Krzycki,

leftist vice president

of the CIO,

and Orlemanski.

a

Harriman was taken aback by the

proposal and told FDR not to dignify it with

a

response. In

February, however, Soviet Ambassador Andrei Gromyko

requested that Lange and Orlemanski be permitted to visit
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the Soviet Union. At the same time DeWitt Poole of the
OSS
was reporting that Orlemanski was having second thoughts

about his association with the pro-Soviet groups. Poole's
report confirmed that Orlemanski was not

a

Communist but "a

strange blend of naive patriot, shrewd peasant and loyal

Catholic." He viewed his pro-Soviet activity as

a

means of

supporting FDR's position that the Soviets were our wartime
ally and declared that "if Roosevelt would declare war on
Russia today

I

would break all my sympathies for the Russian

cause and as an Amer lean go against Russia." (16]
Whi le Father Or lemansk

was meeting with Stalin the

i

political power of the Polish vote FDR was so concerned
about began to make itself felt. Just how important the
Poles were politically became clear when one hundred and

forty-seven speeches were made in congress celebrating
Polish Independence Day on May
in Moscow.

Jan Ci echanowsk

i

,

3,

while Orlemanski was still

Polish ambassador to the United

States, notes in his memoirs that he was told the Polish

vote was critical to the President in five states; Illinois,

Michigan, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and New York. The

connection between this analysis and the total Catholic vote
is

dramatically supported by

a

survey of religious

affiliations conducted among the members of the 78th
congress and reported
Opinion Ouarterly

.

in the

Spring 1944 issue of Publ

;c

The survey found that of 435 members of
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the House 80, or 18 percent, were Catholic. In addition,
63
of the 80 were concentrated

in nine states,

the five listed

by Ciechanowski along with Massachusetts, California,

Wisconsin and Louisiana. The importance of these nine
states, which represented 218 of the 266 electoral votes

needed to win the presidency (over 80 percent), is quickly

evident for any presidential candidate. Also, the Democrats
had suffered substantial losses in the mid-term elections of

1942 when their majority in the House had fallen from 91 to

only 14, and they had lost

8

Senate seats. Clearly, an

erosion in the Catholic vote represented by the loss of the
Poles would jeopardize the President's chances for
term.

Is

it

a

fourth

any wonder then that Harry Hopkins termed the

Polish issue "political dynami te? "

(

1 7

The President needed some indication from Stalin that
his concerns expressed at Teheran over the Polish vote, and

by implication the Catholic vote, would be addressed. The

answer was forthcoming from Father Orlemanski. On May

6

Father Orlemanski left Moscow to return to the United States

carrying with him

a

letter signed by Stalin which dealt with

the question of religious freedom in the Soviet Union and
the possibility of cooperation between Stalin and Pius XII
"in the matter of the struggle against persecution and

coercion of the Catholic Church." The American embassy in

Moscow learned of the contents of the letter from Harrison
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Salisbury of the United Press. Orlemanski had allowed
Salisbury to make

a

copy of the letter under the condition

it would not be made public until he could discuss

it with

Catholic authorities in the United States. [18]
The embassy cabled the President and the Secretary of

State on May

9

that while Orlemanski came to the Soviet

Union "primarily interested in the Polish question," he now

believed the letter he was bringing back from Stalin "moved
into the much broader field of general relations between the

Kremlin and the Catholic Church." The Embassy reported that
Orlemanski did not feel capable of dealing with

a

subject of

that magnitude and would submit the letter to Catholic

authorities in the United States. Salisbury believed the
letter represented "a definite manifestation of a desire to

bring about improved relations between the Soviet government
and the Catholic Church and to remove a present source of

friction not only in Soviet-Polish relations but also in
relations with the United States." The cable concluded by
saying,

"The Embassy agrees with this estimate."

[19]

Stalin seems to have been using the visit of Father

Orlemanski, arranged by FDR, to send

a

message that he was

willing to compromise on the issue of religious freedom

in

the areas of Eastern Europe that the Red Army would soon

have under its control and that FDR had already acknowledged
to Spellman would remain under Soviet control. Perhaps
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Stalin felt this was the type of statement which Myron
Taylor had requested through Ambassador Maisky in London
back in October of 1942, or at least a starting point for

negotiating such

a

statement. Stalin was well aware of the

President's preoccupation with the question of freedom of
worship in the Soviet Union, dating back to the original

negotiations over recognition in 19 33.
Clearly, Stalin was as aware as Roosevelt that

Catholicism could be the key to the Polish problem. Polish
nationalism and Polish Catholicism went hand- in-hand

.

The

staff at the American embassy in Moscow apparently believed
that Stalin was sincere in this effort to rel ieve the

mounting tension over the Polish issue. Spellman noted

in

his memo to the Vatican the President's hope "that the

Russ ian intervention in Europe would not be too harsh." With
this in mind, and the President's repeated efforts to assure

some measure of freedom of worship in the Soviet Union,

it

seems fair to conclude that FDR would view the possibility
of a rapprochement between the Vatican and the Kremlin as a

step in the right direction in terms of relieving the
"harsh" Russian intervention in Europe

.

Domestic Cathol ic

reaction to such an arrangement could also be expected to be
less harsh in terms of possible defections from the

Democratic coalition.
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However, the State Department soon had reason to doubt
the supposed importance of Orlemanski's letter. On May 24

Charles (Chip) Bohlen, Chief of the Division of Eastern

European Affairs, reported to the Deputy Director of the
Division the gist of

conversation between Andre Visson of

a

the New York Herald Tribune and Vladimir Pravdin, head of

the Soviet Tass Aqencv

.

According to Visson, Pravdin told

him it was the intent of the Soviet government to support

a

"well organized, dynamic and state-controlled Orthodox

Church which would have great influence throughout the
Balkans and the Near East" after the war. Pravdin doubted
the Vatican would respond favorably to the Orlemanski letter

because it was too "well informed" not to recognize Soviet
backing of the Orthodox Church as

a

much greater "threat to

Catholicism than Atheistic Communism had ever been." Pravdin
concluded by saying

it was

necessary to have "some force to

combat the Vatican" and as Protestantism was too divided to
do so "the only force capable of doing so was the Greek

Orthodox Church controlled by the Soviet Government

."[ 20

In the meantime, military events were rapidly changing

the context within which the political discussions were

taking place. On June

4

Allied forces liberated Rome. Two

days later Allied Armies landed at Normandy and the

long-awaited second front was finally established. Some of
Stalin's resentment seems to have given way to his
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enthusiasm over the landing on the continent. He cabled
Churchill "the landing, conceived on

a

grandiose scale, has

succeeded completely" and that "the history of warfare knows
no other like undertaking from the point of view of

scale,

its vast conception,

its

and its masterly execution." He

was obviously pleased to have some of the pressure taken off

the eastern front. [21]
On June

5,

the very eve of the Normandy invasion,

Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, premier of the Polish government
-in-exile, arrived in Washington for talks with FDR. The
first meeting took place on June

7,

and Jan Ciechanowsk

Polish ambassador to the U.S. described FDR as being

i

in good

spirits following the successful landing the previous day.
FDR repeatedly stressed to Mikolajczyk the need for the

gover nmen t - i n-ex i le to reach an accommodation with the
Soviets.

"When

a

thing becomes unavoidable one should adapt

oneself to it," FDR said, and asked Mikolajczyk

if

he agreed

with that theory. When the Polish Premier replied that the
Soviet demands were irreconcilable with the concept of

Polish independence and sover e ignty, FDR

r

epl i ed

:

"remember

there are five times more Russians than Poles" and that

Russia "could swallow up Poland

if

she could not reach an

understanding on her terms." Clearly, Roosevelt was trying
to impress on the Polish Premier the seriousness of the

situation facing the Poles. In his memo to the Vatican,
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Spellman recorded what FDR told him regarding the Soviet
position on Poland and at one point remarked: "Poland,

reestablished, would get Eastern Pruss ia

.

"

(

if.

emphas is added)

FDR obviously feared for the very existence of Poland, and

Soviet military might was already dictating the realities of
the situation on the ground in Poland. Just as the Soviets

refused to acknowledge the Red Army was in Poland rather
than Russia in January, they could in fact, as FDR said,
just "swallow up" all of Poland. For FDR the very existence
of Poland was at stake,

and if Poland ceased to exist, what

would be the reaction of American Poles and their fellow

anti-Communist Catholics? To succeed in reestablishing the
Polish state would be
if some

a

major diplomatic achievement, even

territorial concessions were needed to compensate

for Soviet security fears. FDR was giving the Poles the same

message in June that Churchill gave them in January. [22]
FDR then said he thought it would be construe tive for

Mikola jczyk to meet persona lly with Stalin. However

Polish Premier

r epl

,

the

ied that without the support of the

President Stalin would insist on acceptance of his

conditions prior to any meeting; he asked Roosevelt to tell
Stalin he supported the government- in-exi le

Roosevelt replied that as

a

's

position.

politician himself, Mikolajczyk

could understand that in his "political year" he could not

intervene with Stalin on the Polish issue. Both men were
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obviously concerned with the impact of American public
opinion

.

Mikola jczyk was hoping to force the Pres ident

hand into public support of the government-in-exi le

'

'

s

position on the frontier issue by playing to the large
Polish electorate he knew FDR needed in November.
Roosevelt, having already agreed to much of Stalin's

position on the frontier issue at Teheran, was trying to
preserve some semblance of

a

Polish state and reach

a

compromise acceptable to Poles in the United States as well
as Poland.

One way to do that would be to insure the

reestabl ishment of the prewar Polish state after the war. A

possible alter native would be to insure that Poles would be
able to practice their Cathol ic

r el

igion

Subsequent conversations between Roosevelt and
Mikolajczyk revolved around the efforts of the Polish Home
Army and the need to supply them now that the Soviets were
in Poland.

The President agreed that the underground army

was performing vital services to the Allies by disrupting

German activities behind the front. FDR used this issue to
stress again the need for Mikolajczyk to meet personally

with Stalin and inform him of the strength and activities of
the Home Army. He felt Stalin would be impressed and would

agree to coordinate Red Army plans with the Poles in order
to defeat the Germans.
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The conversation then took an interesting turn. FDR

brought up Father Orlemanski's visit to Moscow. He said he
had been asked to meet with the priest but had not yet

decided

if

he would.

It

is

interesting to note FDR's comment

that he had not yet decided on meeting with Orlemanski. On

June

2

the President was sent a memo by Secretary Hull

advising against such

a

meeting. Hull disagreed with the

idea that the offer brought back from Stalin represented a

"real departure from the position of the Soviet government."
He referred to the "criticism from Polish-American and

Catholic circles." Hull believed all the information that
could be gathered on Orlemanski's visit with Stalin had been

obtained in the OSS interview conducted with him on his
return and that an "off the record" meeting could not be
kept secret and would generate more "unfortunate publicity."

Besides, Orlemanski had been summarily suspended from his

parish duties and ordered to the Passionist Monastery in
West Springfield by Bishop Thomas O'Leary of the Springfield

Diocese. Bishop O'Leary had been contacted by the Apostolic

Delegate Archbishop Amleto Cicognani wanting to know "what

provision had been made for the parish of Father
Orlemanski." The reasons given for Orlemanski's suspension
were that he had left his parish without permission and that
he had consorted with Communists
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in

violation of Pius XI

's

1937 encyclical.

It was obvious the reaction of the American

Catholic Church was not what Orlemanski had expected
In any case,

.[

23

FDR told Mikolajczyk he was interested in

the part of the priest's meeting with Stalin in which they

had discussed freedom of religion in Russia, particularly

freedom for the Roman Catholic Church. Stalin was reported
to have said he had no objection to freedom of religion,

only to the fact that there were so many religions in the
world. He added that to give religious freedom to one or two

denominations would result in dozens more applying and felt
"it might be better to unify religions." According to Jan

Ciechanowski, the President felt this statement "might be an
indication that Stalin would favor a union between the

Russian Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches," and he might
even be willing "to admit the Pope's leadership and allow

him to become head of the two united churches

President was making quite

a

.

"

The

leap from the note concerning

cooperation with Pi us XII to all owing the Pope to head
united church in Russ ia

.

a

Perhaps the Pres ident had in mind

Bohlen's memo outlining Stalin's postwar plan and the

possibility of working around that problem. The Pres ident
then asked Mikolajczyk what he thought of Stalin's comments
and the Premier replied that Stalin could indicate his

sincerity by releasing the Catholic priests imprisoned

in

the Soviet Union. The President then turned the conversation
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to other matters. FDR did not divulge to the
Polish Premier

that the American embassy in Moscow believed Stalin's

remarks were intended as

a

gesture "to remove

a

source of

friction" in Soviet-Polish relations. Neither did he attempt
to ascertain the potential threat to Polish Catholicism of a

revitalized Orthodox Church under Soviet domination,
expressed in Bohlen's memo.
On June 14 Mikola jczyk

[24]
,

having failed to extract

a

public commitment from FDR to support the government-inexile's position on the frontier issue, returned to London.
The following day Roosevelt lunched with Archbishop Spellman
and made arrangements for the Catholic prelate to fly to

Rome on an Air Force plane. The President quickly informed

Stalin that the visit of Mikolajczyk to Washington would
have no bearing on their Teheran agreements. FDR cabled the

Soviet Premier on June 17, and in what may have been a

reference to the upcoming U.S. elections he stated

"I

deemed

his visit at this time as desirable and necessary for

reasons which Ambassador Harriman had already explained to
you." The President expressed the opinion that Mikolajczyk
was most concerned about the cooperation of the Red Army

with the Polish Home Army and the need to coordinate their

activities to defeat the Germans. He stated that Mikolajczyk
would be willing to go to Moscow to discuss the problems

between the Soviet Union and his government-in-exile but
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took no position favoring the Polish viewpoint as
requested

by the Polish Premier. FDR concluded by saying, "You will

understand,

I

know, that

I

am in no way trying to press my

personal views upon you in a matter which

concern to you and your country."

is

of special

The President was

acknowledging the special significance attached to the
Polish situation in terms of security to the Soviet Union
expressed by Stalin. [25]
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CHAPTER

8

CULTS AND VOTES
On July 1,1944, Averell Harriman notified the State

Department of an announcement in Moscow concerning the

creation of

a

Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults

under the Council of the Commissars of the USSR. The council
was to provide liaison between the government and religious

cults in the USSR,

including the Catholic and the Greek

Catholic churches. Bohlen was quick to recognize one
possible implications of the new council. He viewed

potentially positive step giving

a

it as a

"greater degree of

recognition than heretofore accorded" these religions and
said the council should be viewed in connection with the

"assurances given by Stalin to Father Orlemanski concerning
the Catholic Church." He concluded that the council was

"undoubtedly related with the Polish question and

is

probably designed to provide machinery to handle questions
involving the Catholic population of eastern Poland which
the Soviet government intends to incorporate in the Soviet

Union." [1]
The Orlemanski mission was continuing to influence

State Department thinking in spite of Hull's rejection of
the letter from Stalin as offering nothing new to

Soviet-Polish relations. Bohlen had not forgotten the
Pravdin conversation, however, and pointed out that "the
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Greek Orthodox faith ...has virtually been recognized as
the
State religion and unquestionably will be utilized in that

guise as a political instrument of the Soviet State." No
other religion was going to be allowed to "develop to a

point where they might threaten the position of the official

Orthodox church."

[2]

On July 12 the Pope's most recent concerns over the

Soviet Union were revealed to Myron Taylor in

a

lengthy

audience. The Pope raised three issues with Taylor: the

spread of Communism in Europe and "its development in

a

strong way in Italy," the "Russian attitude toward Poland"
and the "Russian attitude re:

freedom of religion

generally." Taylor had told Joseph Davies that he was

disappointed the Vatican had not responded favorably to the
Orlemanski mission. Now he presented to the Pope
a

a

draft of

statement which evolved following his discuss ions with

Ambassador Maisky in London in 1942 dealing with the form of
"assurance to be made by Marshal Stalin [that] would be

acceptable." He also informed the Pope that he had
"discussed the subject with the President of the United
States, with Secretary Hull and others,
the Catholic hierarchy in America."

including members of

[3]

The statement Taylor provided to the Pope contained
two elements. The first called on the Soviets to publicly

proclaim "complete freedom of religious teaching and freedom

140

of worship in all Soviet territory." This would
be in accord

with article 124 of the Soviet constitution and an

acknowledgement of "the loyal participation in the defense
of the Fatherland by all Russian people," supposedly

including Catholics. The second stipulated that "any abuse
of these privileges,

whether to organize movements or incite

the people to overthrow the Government, will be dealt with
in each case

according to law." Taylor said both Pius XII

and his political advisor Monsignor Tardini accepted the

first point but rejected the second. Following his audience

with the Pope, Taylor met with Tardini who presented him
with a lengthy memorandum outlining the Vatican's objections
to Soviet behavior toward the Catholic Church in Russia,

which Tardini said showed no significant improvement since
the war began. The memorandum concluded "in view of what has

been stated above and after the sad experience of the past,
it is necessary to follow a policy of watchful expectation

and

r

eser ve

.

"

[

4

]

The Vatican did not rule out the possibility of

reaching an agreement with the Kremlin but preferred to
watch developments unfold. Taylor suggested to FDR raising
the issue at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, which had just

convened in Washington. FDR returned

a

message to Taylor

telling him he had reached "the reluctant conclusion that at
this particular moment it would be unwise to raise the issue
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[religious freedom] openly." He said the Russians were
"most

sensitive" and might consider such

a

request an "affront" to

the various statements they had already made concerning

"freedom of worship in the Soviet Union." Instead, FDR
wanted to pursue

a

policy of exerting U.S. "influence

quietly and constantly

"

to obtain "practical tests of

Soviet respect for that principle." This, he believed, was
more in keeping with the Vatican's position that they were
"wary of statements and intent upon concrete application."
[5]

By late July, events were coming together on all
fronts. FDR was overwhelmingly renominated by the Democratic

Convention to seek

a

fourth term; Archbishop Spellman was in

Rome where the Amer ican press was speculating on his "real

mission" as he had been granted several private audiences
with the Pope, and Polish Premier Mikolajczyk flew to Moscow
to talk personally with Stalin.

On the same day the Pope

gave a speech encouraging Poles to work with the advanc ing

Soviet armies

.

In an address to 500 Polish soldiers,

the

Pope "asked that Poles not seek vengeance aga inst the

Germans or Russians that overran Poland in 1939, but in fact
should collaborate with the Russians." Pius said he was
still seek ing an independent Poland

.

Members of the

diplomatic corps, commenting on the speech, said they
believed it was extremely cautious. This speech takes on new
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meaning when seen in the context of the conversations held
on July 12 with Myron Taylor. Pius was publicly

acknowledging Catholics' ability to cooperate with the
Soviet Union within days of being told the President of the

United States was still working to produce

a

satisfactory

agreement which would guarantee the church freedom of

movement in eastern Europe, even
On August 1,

if

under Soviet control. [6]

with encouragement from radio broadcasts

from Moscow, the Polish underground in Warsaw began open

resistance to the Germans occupying the city. The Red Army
was only 10 miles from Warsaw and the Poles expected

a

quick

Soviet advance to liberate the city. By early September,

however , it was clear that the Red Army was not going to
assist the uprising. It remained exactly where it was when
the uprising began. Pleas for assistance from Stalin met

with excuses that military necessity prevented resupplying
the underground or allowing the Red Army to advance on

Warsaw. He also refused permission for U.S. planes to land
at Soviet bases if they attempted to drop supplies.

Churchill was furious and tried to get FDR to agree to send

American planes to drop supplies to the Poles regardless and
land at Russian bases without permission. While the

President complained to Stalin along with Churchill about
the lack of help to the embattled Poles, he was not willing
to follow the Prime Minister's latest plan. To do so would
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have destroyed the basis of trust which FDR was
trying to

establish with Stalin. FDR finally notified Churchill
that
he was informed the underground Poles had left Warsaw
and

"there now appears to be nothing we can do to assist them."
The fighting continued, however,
in what Robert Dallek

for another month. Finally,

has termed "an apparently cynical

effort to refute accusations that they wished to see

Poland's non-Communist underground destroyed," and after yet
another British appeal, the Red Army resumed its advance on
Warsaw, dropped supplies to the Poles and agreed to let

American planes land at Soviet bases after dropping
supplies. It was too late, however, and the rebellion was

crushed with some 250,000 Polish casualties.
In the meantime,

[7]

the President was involved in a

bitter reelection campaign. Polls conducted in August and

early September showed Republican Party candidate Thomas

Dewey holding

a

E.

narrow lead over FDR overall, but in key

electoral vote states Dewey was ahead by large margins:
Illinois,

54 to

46 percent;

Ohio,

54 to 46 percent;

Michigan, 57 to 43 percent; Wisconsin, 56 to

44

percent.

These were the same states cited by Ciechanowski where the

Polish vote could make the difference. By early October FDR
was clinging to a narrow 51 to 49 percent lead nationally.
[8

]
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It was beginning to appear that the
President's fear,

expressed to Stalin at Teheran, was becoming a reality.
Events in Poland were driving American Poles to seek
answers
from the President. Just what was his position on
Poland?
Jan Ciechanowski claims he was repeatedly being asked by

various Roosevelt campaign operatives his opinion on what
would be the most effective way to ensure the "Polish vote."
And it cannot be forgotten, as Secretary Hull pointed out

during the Orlemanski affair, "Catholic circles"

in

general

were also showing a great interest in Poland.
On August 15,

Secretary Hull forwarded to FDR

a

memorandum from Taylor dealing with the source of the
information which had led to the Pope's belief that American
Catholics supported

a

negotiated settlement to the war.

Taylor had heard from the British Minister to the Holy See,
Sir D'Arcy Osborne,

that Archbishop Spellman had made the

same comment to him. Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal,

currently in Rome, indicated that Spellman told him the same
thing prior to leaving for Rome. Taylor felt these

disclosures "may indicate

a

movement to bring about a

negotiated peace, along lines undisclosed to us directly."
It seems entirely possible that Spellman was advocating to

the Pope a policy that would bring an end to the war before

Russian armies could occupy the areas of Eastern Europe that
FDR had told him

a

year earlier would certainly remain under
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Soviet domination. He may also have been attempting
to raise
the prospect of a potential revolt of 30,000,000
Catholics

against FDR's foreign policy in the midst of

a

heated

campaign, not just the possible loss of six or seven million

Polish voters. Whatever his motives, Taylor was spending
much of his time trying to convince the Pope that "there

is

no possibility of a negotiated peace and that the only terms

that will be offered to the German Army are unconditional

surrender

.

"

[

9

]

On October 11,

the White House issued

accompanied by photos, of

a

a

press release,

meeting between FDR and members

of the Polish American Congress

(PAC),

the same group that

had led the attack against Orlemanski's visit. The Poles

were at the White House to get the President's vi ews on the

continued application of the principles of the Atlantic
Charter, specifically how those principles applied to
Poland. According to Ci echanowsk

i ,

the Polish language press

in the United States was not satisfied with the President's

answers. Roosevelt knew of the continued dissatisfaction and

arranged another meeting with Charles Rozmar ek of the PAC
aboard his campaign train in Chicago on October 28, seven
days before the election. Ciechanowski says the President

promised Rozmarek that he would "take active steps to insure
the independence of Poland." The next day Rozmarek endorsed
the Democratic ticket. The President was being disingenuous
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with Rozmarek. He was indeed pursuing

independent Poland,

it was

a

policy for an

just not the same Poland the

Poles were talking about. But, as the President had told

Premier Mikolajczyk, "when a thing becomes unavoidable one
should adapt oneself to it." [10]
Meanwhile, Republican candidate Dewey was doing his
best to revive with voters the anti-Communist theme of

Father Coughlin. In a speech at Boston, Dewey told his

audience that FDR had put his party on the auction block,
and the highest bidder was the Communist Party.

"Now the

Communists are seizing control of the New Deal," Dewey said,
"through which they aim to control the Government of the

United States." He suggested that FDR pardoned Earl Browder
in time to help organize for the fourth term bid.

Roosevelt

was furious, but his advisors were telling him he had to

answer the charges because "the voters were more afraid of

communism than fascism." [11]
The Polish vote held, however , and the President won

reelection on November

4

,

but although the electoral vote

count was overwhelmingly in Roosevelt

'

s

favor , the margin of

victory in the nine key states identified earlier as having
strong Polish or Catholic votes, was narrow indeed

.

In most

cases FDR won these states by the narrowest of any of his

previous elections, and his ability to hold the Catholic
vote could indeed be pointed to as the margin of victory.
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The President won Pennsylvania with 51 percent
of the vote,
and his plurality of 105,000 was over 500,000 less
than his
1936 victory.

Illinois was virtually the same, 51.5 percent.

New York 52.3 percent, Michigan 50.2 percent. In California
the President won with 56 percent of the vote, down from 67

percent in 1936. Ohio and Wisconsin went Republican for the
first time since 1928. James MacGregor Burns pointed out
that it was "remarkable that a forty-two-year-old governor

with experience in neither war nor diplomacy could come so

close to toppling
war."

a

world leader at the height of a global

Soon after the election the Catholic hierarchy served

notice that it might not be so easy to maintain the Catholic
vote in the future.

[12]

On November 13,

a

week after the election, the

American Catholic Bishops released

a

resolution on eastern

Europe passed by the administrative board of the National

Catholic Welfare Conference. The resolution noted the
"sufferings, misery and fears" of their fellow bishops,

clergy and religious throughout all of Europe and "the

circumstances of the moment excite

in

them

a

particular

anxiety for the fate of religion among their fellow
Chr ist ians in Poland, the Baltic States, and neighbor ing

Cathol ic lands

.

"

The resolution concluded,

"Amer ican

Cathol ics would ever resent their country 's being made
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a

party to the de-Chr istianization of historic Catholic
peoples

.

"

[

13

Three days later, on November 16, the bishops released
a second,

more lengthy statement on "International Order."

With victory in the war seeming more certain each day the

statement opened: "We have met the Challenge of War. Shall
we meet the challenge of Peace?" The bishops statement was
in

response to the recently concluded Dumbarton Oaks

Conference. The State Department had asked for comments from
the public on the establishment of an international

organization aimed at securing future peace. The New York
Times carried a page one story on the bishop's statement and

reprinted the entire text on an inner page. The Times
concluded the bishops were not opposed to the creation of
such an organ i zat ion but were putting forward moral

principles on which

it

should be guided. The statement said,

"we have no confidence in a peace which does not carry into

effect, without reservations or equivocations the principles
of the Atlantic Charter." This seems a direct reference to

the previous statement on conditions in eastern Europe.

[14]

Proper organization of the international community was

essential to establishing

a

just peace, according to the

bishops, and "to do this we must repudiate absolutely the

tragic fallacies of 'power politics' with its balance of
power, spheres of influence in a system of puppet
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governments, and the resort to war as

a

means of settling

international difficulties." Without specifically mentioning
the Soviet Union the bishops said,
in its

internal life is

a

"the ideology of a nation

concern of the international

community" and stipulated that as a condition of membership
"every nation guarantee in law and respect in fact the
innate rights of men,

families and minority groups in their

civil and religious life." In essence the bishops were

continuing to call for

a

statement guaranteeing religious

freedom in the Soviet Union and the countr ies of eastern

Europe

.

[

15

The bishops had just raised the stakes. Poland was no

longer an isolated ethnic pol
been.

i

t

ical issue,

It was now a Catholic issue,

if

it

ever had

as was the fate of all

eastern Europe. FDR could not have been mistaken about what
the bishops were saying

.

The statement was

s

igned by Edward

Mooney, Archbishop of Detroit; Samuel Stritch, Archbishop of

Chicago; Francis Spellman, Archbishop of New York ; John

McNicholas, Archbishop of Cincinnati and John Noll, Bishop
of Fort Wayne.

These were all the President's old friends,

the men who defended him in his battle over Mexico and

against the charges leveled by Father Coughlin; the men
whose pos ition on Spain had influenced his pol icy
Just what effect was all this having on American

public opinion? A poll conducted that same November revealed
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that

a

majority of the American people still believed Russia

could be trusted to cooperate with the Allies after the war
by a margin of 47 to 35 percent, while 18 percent did not
know. The poll was further broken down by income groups and

religious affiliation. Trust in continued Russian

cooperation was highest in the upper-income group, with

56

percent overall believing in continued cooperation. However,
there was a 14 percent difference within this group between

Catholics and Protestants; 44 percent of Catholics believed
Russia could not be trusted compared to only 30 percent of

Protestants. The margin of distrust narrowed in the
mi dd le- income group where 34 percent of Cat ho lies distrusted

the Russ ians and 31 percent of Protestants

.

Among

lower-income groups 48 percent of Catholics distrusted
Russ i a compared to 34 percent of Protestants

.

Clearly,

although still not a majority, distrust of Russia

*

s

postwar

cooper at ion was running high as the war drew to a close, and

American Catholics were far more likely to distrust Russian
intentions than their fellow Americans. Just as in the
thirties the periphery was far more distrustful of Communist

intentions than American core groups. The question was could
the periphery's opinion come to dominate the pol i t ical

discussion on postwar issues as it did on the Spanish
question. FDR believed it could, and was about to take

action to try and prevent it.

[16]
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CHAPTER

9

"SAUL ON THE ROAD TO DAMASCUS"
As 1945 opened it was becoming increasingly
clear that

Stalin intended to have his way on the Polish
question. On
January 3 he formally recognized the Polish
Committee of

National Liberation, known as the Lublin Committee,
as the

provisional government of Poland. This was

a

move that both

FDR and Churchill had been attempting to forestall
until the
Big Three met at Yalta. Anglo-American forces in the
west

were just beginning to regain the offensive following the

breach of their lines in the Battle of the Bulge. And the

public was beginning to have serious doubts regarding the

conduct of the president's foreign policy. Pollster Hadley
Cantril reported to the President in early January that his
polls showed "a significant decline since the previous June
in public

confidence that the President and other officials

were successfully handling the nation's interests abroad."
[1]

The President knew he was faced with a potentially

disastrous domestic political situation as he prepared to
leave for Yalta. The polls showed Catholic opinion in the

country at much higher levels of distrust

in

continued

postwar cooperation with Russia, and overall opinion on the

President's policies was now down as well. The Catholic

hierarchy had called into question the cornerstone of the
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President's peace plan and challenged
him to live up to the
principles of the Atlantic Charter.
According to Edward J.
Flynn, the situation of Catholics in
eastern Europe was on
FDR's mind as he prepared to leave for
Yalta. Flynn, a

Tammany associate of Al Smith and political
boss of the
Bronx, tied his political future to FDR
following the

disastrous 1928 election. Smith never forgave him,
and when
FDR wanted New York Governor Herbert Lehman to
appoint Flynn
to the U.S.

Senate seat being vacated by Roosevelt's

nomination of Senator Royal Copeland as ambassador to
Germany, Smith effectively blocked the nomination. Lehman

would not make the nomination without Smith's approval,
as
he felt he owed his election as governor to Smith's backing,

and Smith would not give his approval.
In the long term,

[2]

however, the backing of a powerful,

popular President proved more beneficial to Flynn than the
lack of approval from the ex-governor and defeated

presidential candidate. Flynn was named Democratic National

Chairman by FDR in 1940, and now, in 1945, would be thrust
into the international limelight. According to Flynn, FDR

raised the issue of the "position of the Roman Catholic

Church in Russia and the Balkans after the war" during

a

conversation in the White House. Flynn said FDR told him
"there could never be

a

permanent peace unless the large

Catholic populations in Poland, Lithuania and the Balkans
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were permitted to practice their faith
freely." He then
asked Flynn to accompany him on the trip
to Yalta and take
up the problem with Stalin and Molotov.
The thrust of the

conversation described by Flynn seems to indicate
that FDR
had not changed his position on Russian
domination of

eastern Europe that he outlined to Spellman in September
of
1943, but was continuing to try to find a means of making
it

"less harsh," especially for American Catholics.
On January 22,

[3]

as the President and his party were

boarding for the journey to Yalta,

a

single page document

was prepared in the White House for the President's

signature. It was addressed: "To all diplomatic, consular,

army and navy officers of the United States Government." The
document said the bearer, "the Honorable Edward

J.

was "engaged in

a

a

mission for me which involves

Flynn,"

visit to

Moscow, with the approval of Marshal Stalin, and also

visit to Italy before returning to the United States."

a

It

then instructed all personnel coming in contact with Flynn
to "permit him to pass, without let or molestation" and to

extend to him all courtesies normally associated with

diplomatic personnel. The President, apparently with the
approval of Stalin, was

in

effect granting Flynn

a

personal

passport allowing him to travel anywhere in Europe under
U.S. military control.

[4]
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While FDR seems to have been embarking
on yet another
attempt to resolve the divisions
between the Vatican and the
Kremlin, Stalin was apparently embarking
on his own plan.

While the Big Three were negotiating
at Yalta, George
Kennan, now back in the Moscow Embassy
as Charge
was
,

sending a flurry of cables to the State
Department dealing
with some rather remarkable events taking
place in Moscow
surrounding the Russian Orthodox Church. A
Holy Synod of the

Russian Orthodox Eastern Church had been
convened for
purposes of electing

a

new Patriarch of Moscow. Invitations

had been extended "through official Soviet
diplomatic

channels" to the patriarchs of Constantinople, Antioch,

Alexandria and Jerusalem. The Patriarchs of Antioch and
Alexandria accepted personally and the others sent "rather
imposing delegations of Metropolitans, Archbishops and

Bishops." The visitors were treated as official dignitaries
and shown great hospitality by the Soviet government

(including a performance of the Moscow Ballet).

[5]

The Synod elected Alexei, Metropolitan of Leningrad
and Novgorod, as Patriarch on February

2,

and an elaborate

coronation ceremony was planned for February

4,

which Kennan

described as "in effect the ceremonial climax to the

reestablishment of the Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union."
Kennan followed his first cable with

a

second,

interpreting

the events and placing them in their political context. The
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revival of the Moscow Patriarch had
nothing to do with "any
spontaneous movement on the part of the
church but [of] a

deliberate policy on the part of the
Soviet Regime." The
move was seen as an attempt to promote
an "all-Slav" policy
based on the religious sentiments of
the Slav populations in
areas coming under Soviet control. Also,
the
revival would

provide the Soviets a channel of communication
"to all
believers of the Eastern Church.... An iron
in the

fire of

Near Eastern politics through Russian Church

property.

..

[and]a means of disarming cr iticism.

religious circles." Kennan

is

.

.

in

western

describing the opening phase

of what Vladimir Provdin had predicted earlier
would result
in a "well organized,

dynamic and state-controlled Orthodox

Church..." as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy.
On February

8,

[6]

Kennan sent another cable on the

implications of the recent religious activity in Moscow,

dealing with the Soviet attitude toward the Roman Catholic
Church. He thought the fact the Soviet government was

sponsoring the reemergence of the Russian church might be
the result of "the unfruitful outcome of Father Orlemanski's

mission." Kennan felt the failure of Moscow and Rome to
reach an agreement following Stalin's statement to

Orlemanski resulted in the ability of the Russian Church to
emerge from "its former obscurity." He added, "Today, all
things indicate that the Kremlin is prepared to do open
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battle against the influence of the
Vatican." The Soviet
press was currently attacking the
Vatican openly, but "how
this anti-Catholic tendency will affect
Soviet policy in
Poland, Hungary and Croatia is however
still not apparent."
He felt the Soviets'

policy toward Catholics in Central

Europe would present a "highly delicate
problem for Russian
Church diplomacy."
[7]
When William Bullitt wrote to FDR in early
1943, he

warned the President against the widespread
assumptions

taking hold that Stalin had "changed his political

philosophy" that he "has abandoned all idea of world

communism" and wanted to "have the Soviet Union evolve in
the direction of liberty and democracy, freedom of speech

and freedom of religion." To accept such a view, he said,

"implies a conversion of Stalin as striking as the

conversion of Saul on the road to Damascus." As Ed Flynn
flew to Moscow with Averell Harriman following the Yalta

Conference he was embarking on

a

mission that was directly

contrary to the most recent evidence of Soviet intentions
expressed by Kennan,

a

policy that had been revealed to the

State Department eight months earlier.

[8]

On February 14, The New York Times reported that Flynn

had flown to Moscow with Ambassador Harriman. The story said

Flynn had taken no part in the Crimea Conference but had

simply accompanied the President "as an old friend and
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associate." in conclusion, the story
said, "it was
emphasized that there was no significance
in Mr. Flynn's
mission to the Soviet Union." The
following day The Times
reported on Flynn's activity in Moscow,
saying he sat next
to Soviet Foreign Commissar Molotov
at a performance of the

Bolshoi Ballet. The story said,

"While Mr. Flynn said he had

no official mission here he was much
interested in Poland."

Only after several weeks did The Times begin
to suspect that
Flynn was up to more in Moscow than a simple
vacation.

In a story datelined Rome on March
6,

The Times

confirmed that Flynn would visit the Pope after
leaving
Moscow. According to the report,

Roosevelt's bypassing of

a

"Despite President

press conference question

concerning Mr. Flynn's mission to Moscow, the impression
prevails that Mr. Flynn has been selected to provide the

preliminary liaison between Moscow and the Vatican and that
he may become the key figure in an eventual rapprochement."

The story concluded by saying Archbishop Spellman of New
York was expected in Rome at the same time as Flynn.

By the time Flynn reached Rome his mission was front-

page news. On March 23, as the war in Europe was raging

toward its conclusion. The Times reported Flynn had been

granted an audience with Pius XII which lasted "far longer
than the usual personal pilgrimage." It also reported that

Flynn met with bishops Montini and Tardini of the Vatican
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Secretariat of State. According to The
TimP.
smiled and said 'no comment' at

a

.

"Mr.

Flynn

press conference when

asked if he had discussed with Premier
Stalin efforts toward
a rapprochement between Moscow
and the Holy See. 'l don't
think I ought to discuss it until I get
home and discuss it
with him [Roosevelt],

speculation

.
'

"

[

10

•

but admitted reports

'were quite fair

]

By this time FDR had received a preliminary
report

from Harriman indicating there still might be
of success.

a

possibility

On March 14 Harriman sent a top-secret dispatch

to the President telling him that Flynn had concluded
the

Moscow portion of his mission and had left for Rome by way
of Teheran.

Harriman said Flynn met twice with Molotov, and

"although he declined to give Ed a message to the Vatican,

Molotov showed undisguised interest in the subject." He said

Molotov was pessimistic about the possibility of success,
but "he indicated without saying so directly that he was

open to suggestions." He believed, however, that while the
door was still open, the ending of hostility would have to

begin with Rome.

[11]

While in Moscow, John Melby,

a

Foreign Service officer

assigned to the U.S. Embassy, was given the task of

accompanying Flynn on his travels in the Soviet Union.
According to Melby, Flynn told him in the course of their
weeks together that FDR "hoped to get some kind of Kremlin
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-

Vatican concordat, to end the feud
between those two great
power bases." Melby confirmed that
Molotov felt the Vatican
would be more troublesome on the issue,
but told Flynn "...
go ahead and talk with the Pope and
see how he feels about
it." He said he believed Flynn already
knew the Pope would
"if not enthusiastically,

still go along with the idea."

Melby said Flynn was so confident an agreement
would be
reached that Flynn asked him if he would be
interested in
being his assistant in Rome when Roosevelt
appointed him to
serve as liaison between the Vatican and the Kremlin.
At the
same time Flynn told Melby not to discuss what he had
told

him with anyone from the State Department "because neither

Stettinius nor anybody else in the State Department knows

anything about it." According to Melby, Flynn said, "This
a

is

straight White House operation." The only one who would

have any information was Harriman.

[12]

In the meantime, the State Department was attempting
to get some idea of what Flynn's mission was about.
8,

Grace Tully, the President's secretary, placed

a

On March

memo on

the President's desk informing him that Mr. Bohlen of the

State Department telephoned with

a

message from Harriman

that Flynn was about to leave Moscow, and was seeking

authorization to make travel arrangements and to pay for
them.

She said Bohlen told her "the State Department says

they do not know the nature of his work but
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if

he is on an

official mission all they ask is that
you send a chit over
authorizing them to pay for his expenses."
Bohlen may have
been seeking to get some hint from FDR
on the nature of what
Flynn was up to in Moscow, but FDR was
not about to divulge
any information before he was ready. On
March
10 he sent a

simple memo to Secretary Stettinius stating:

"I

hereby

authorize the State Department to take care of
all expenses
in connection with Honorable Edward
J. Flynn's confidential
mission abroad." [13]
On the same day the press was reporting on
Flynn's

audience with the Pope, Flynn prepared

a

lengthy memorandum

for FDR that was sent to Washington with Taylor's
diplomatic

correspondence. He outlined for the President his

conversations with Molotov which centered, as FDR's

conversation with Stalin at Teheran, on the domestic
political reaction of American Catholics to Soviet
activities. Flynn told Molotov "there are many millions of

Roman Catholics in the United States" and that "the
President was extremely anxious to create as good feelings
as possible between the people of the United States and the

Soviet Union."

He pointed out "that a rapprochement between

the Soviet Union and the Vatican would do much to improve
the relations between the two countries." Molotov repeatedly

stressed the Soviet position that the Vatican was openly
hostile to the Soviet Union and at one point commented that
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the "Vatican had often made favorable
steps towards Germany,
even Hitlerite Germany; but that it
rarely had a good thing
to say about the Soviet Union."
Harriman raised the issue of
the Roman Catholic Church in Poland
and the Soviets'

intentions there. Molotov replied that "the
Red Army had
liberated Poland and that he had never heard
that its

presence there had any effect on the religious
feeling of
the Polish people." [14]
Molotov claimed that the Soviet Union respected all
religions as long as they did not "interweave their
policies

with policies hostile to the Soviet Union." He was dealing
with politics and not religious dogma and "the attitude
of
the Vatican is not only not friendly towards the Soviet

Union, but unneutral." Flynn said Molotov thanked him for
the frank exchange of views and promised to give the matter

further consideration. He then said he would inform his

colleagues of their conversations. This left Flynn and
Harriman to believe "the door was deliberately left open for
further conversations or for further action," He concluded
it was

his personal opinion "that some sort of rapprochement

might be worked out." [15]
The Flynn mission had attracted the attention of

more than just the western press. Writing in his diary on

March 23, Joseph Goebbels also commented on the Flynn

mission to the Pope, noting: "Clearly Roosevelt wants to win
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the Catholic Church over to his side."
Goebbels claimed the
Pope had been displeased with the
results of the Yalta

conference but that other considerations
were at work as
"The Americans are working actively in
the background to
cheat not only the Soviets but also the
British out of the
international game." Goebbels at this point was
grasping at
any straw which might indicate a breakdown in
relations

between the Allies. He still held out, even at this late
date,
a

for a miracle which would allow the Reich to conclude

separate peace, and his main hope still rested with the

Soviets.

[16]

On March 23 Taylor wired Secretary Stettinius that he

presented Flynn that morning to Pius XII "following which
there ensued for forty-five minutes

a

full review of Mr.

Flynn's recent visit to Russia, the details of which are

pledged to be strictly secret and as there

urgency

in

the situation

I

is

no apparent

am convinced that it would be

more appropriate for Mr. Flynn to report to you in person
than through me by message." In spite of the widespread

speculation in the press concerning the state of the
President's health, there was "no apparent urgency"

in

sending a diplomatic wire on the results of Flynn's talk
with the Pope. This view was reinforced on March 29 when

Flynn cabled Harriman that nothing had happened requiring
immediate attention but that

if

165

something did Taylor would

contact him. Flynn concluded by saying:
"Will write after
talk with President." [17]
Flynn arrived in London on April

3,

for discussions

with Churchill and other British leaders.
While in London,
he learned of the President's sudden
death on April 12. He
left immediately for Washington,

faced with the task of

informing a new president of "a straight White
House

operation" of which the new occupant knew nothing.
In his
memoirs, Truman says he met with Flynn almost immediately
upon his return to Washington but that Flynn brought
up

domestic politics which he felt inappropriate to discuss
under the circumstances. He told Flynn they would get

together at a later date. For Flynn to have brought up

domestic politics

is

entirely consistent with the nature of

his mission. FDR had framed his discussions with Stalin on

Poland at Teheran in terms of domestic political

considerations. Flynn's discussions with Molotov revolved
around FDR's concern about acceptance of Soviet policy in
terms of American public opinion, particularly Catholic
opinion. The entire mission revolved around domestic

politics. Truman, however, had no idea what FDR was thinking
when he sent Flynn to Moscow, and neither did anyone in the
State Department.

[18]

Melby said Flynn sent word to him that he felt "pretty
sure that Mr. Truman, once he got used to the idea of being
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President and got caught up on his
homework, was going to
tell him to go ahead and do it, carry
through with it."
Flynn was right. Truman's appointment
calendar for July 3,
as he was preparing for the upcoming
Potsdam Conference,

lists an appointment with Flynn arranged
by Democratic

National Committee Chairman Robert Hannegan.
Hannegan

apparently "thought [it was] important for the
President to
talk with Hon. Edward J. Flynn before going
to Big Three

meeting." By this time Melby was back in the United
States,
having returned to attend the San Francisco conference

opening the United Nations. He met Flynn in New York who
told him "he was still very confident that the thing

[Kremlin-Vatican concordat] was going on." Melby also
confirmed that in Flynn's meetings with Pius the pope, while
not enthusiastic, had expressed interest and told him,

"go

ahead and see what you can do. See what we can work out."
The available evidence suggests then that Flynn had

commitments from both Molotov and Pius XII to continue to
seek a resolution.

[19]

Roosevelt's death probably ended what little chance of
success that existed for achieving

a

rapprochement between

the Vatican and the Kremlin. Stalin had already set in

motion his plan to make the Russian Orthodox Church an
instrument of Soviet policy, and without the influence of
FDR to attempt

a

compromise

in the
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Soviet attitude "to do

open battle against the influence
of the Vatican," the
result could only be a hardening of
American Catholic
anti-Communist opinion. Catholics were not
the only

Americans with an aversion to Communism.
However, their
growing political strength combined with the
official

anti-Communist position of the church led to the
series of
policy conflicts outlined here. In turn FDR's
postwar

planning took into account early

in

the war Catholic

attitudes and the prospect, which he tried to head
off, of
renewed charges of Roosevelt sympathy for Communism.

We must

now turn to postwar events with this in mind.
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CHAPTER 10
"...WORK FOR RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY"
The rapid breakdown of the wartime alliance
among the

Big Three has been examined from virtually every
perspective

except the one which FDR outlined to Edward

J.

January of 1945: "...there could never be

permanent peace

a

Flynn in

unless the large Catholic populations in Poland, Lithuania,
and the Balkans were permitted to practice their faith

freely.

"

[

1

Generally, cold war historians have not looked at

developments from this perspective. Rather, they have been
lumped into two schools, orthodox or revisionist, largely

dependent on whether they viewed Soviet or American
intentions as the source of the confrontation. Michael
Leigh,

in an attempt to sort out the "revisionist thesis,"

states that the "most contentious element of the revisionist
thesis... is the claim that certain features of the American

economic system limited the options of American

decision-makers in their dealings with the Soviet Union."
Ronald Steel describes
r

"general agreement" among

a

evis ionists "that Amer ican policy after the death of

Roosevelt caused the Soviet Union to tighten its hold on

Eastern Europe," in spite of the fact "there was no
objective threat [italics added] to American security to
account for the uncompromising anti-Soviet attitude of the

Truman administration

.

"

[

2
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These economic interpretations of
the origins of the
Cold war assert that "the United
States could not recognize
legitimate Soviet interests in Eastern
Europe, Germany or
elsewhere," because the "survival of the
capitalist system
at home required the unlimited
expansion of American

economic influence overseas." Thus, the
outcome of "open
Door" diplomacy described by William Appleman
Williams

is

the heart of the Cold War.

at

[3]

While these arguments of Williams, D.F. Fleming,

Gabriel Kolko, Gar Alperovitz, David Horowitz and
others are

certainly compelling, they do not take into account the
more
s"t)tle subjective threat to the Truman administration,

and

indeed to subsequent administrations as well. This was the

potential threat of

a

political revolt of Catholic voters

that FDR worked so hard to prevent in 1944 and which he

hoped to stave off in future elections by sending Flynn on
his mission to Moscow and Rome.
One of the principal arguments put forth by

revisionist historians is that

a

dramatic change in policy

occurred with the ascension of Truman to the Presidency.

Ambassador Harriman had been urging FDR to take

a

harder

line with the Soviets since the previous September.

Relations had steadily worsened over the Polish issue and
the question of the makeup of the Polish government since

the end of the Yalta Conference. Harriman now reported that

Stalin seemed genuinely shaken by Roosevelt's death but
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said he assumed there would be no changes
in policy. He
agreed to Harriman's suggestion that Molotov
attend the

opening ceremonies of the United Nations in
San Francisco as
a gesture of respect for the dead
President. In mid-April
Truman gathered his foreign policy advisors to
assess the

situation regarding U.S. -Soviet relations.

[4]

The record of this meeting reveals there indeed
would
be a change in policy.

expressed in
September,

a

Harriman restated his concern,

personal memo to Harry Hopkins the previous

that the Soviets viewed the American attitude
of

"generosity and cooperation" as

a

sign of weakness and

approval of their policies. Terming the current Soviet

activity

a

"barbarian invasion of Europe," Harriman said

Soviet control of

a

country meant the extension of the

Soviet system complete with secret police, extinction of

freedom of speech and other freedoms. Truman repeatedly
expressed his intent to be "firm" with the Russians. The new

President said the Russians needed us more than we needed
them and that while he did not "expect to get 100 percent of
what we wanted... on important matters he felt that we should
be able to get 85 percent."

[5]

President Truman did not share FDR's belief that
giving the Soviets their way in eastern Europe was

a

method

for establishing an atmosphere of trust. More importantly,
he did not share FDR's belief,

as expressed to Spellman in

September of 1943, that the United States would not play an
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important role in Europe after the war.
Truman, and the new
circle of advisors he was gathering around
him, were
believers in the concept of the "American Century-

proclaimed by Henry Luce

in

1941.

While Truman brought a

more nationalistic viewpoint to the Presidency
in contrast
to FDR,

was not simply

it

a

more provincial attitude nor a

simplistic anti-Soviet outlook.

Revisionists point to the confrontational atmosphere
that charged the first meeting between Truman and Molotov
less than two weeks after FDR's sudden death. The issue of

course was Poland

-

Catholic Poland. Virtually all accounts

of the meeting center around the climax of the conversation

after Truman pointedly told Molotov the U.S. would never

recognize

a

government

in

Poland that had not been freely

elected. According to Truman's later account, Molotov

responded by saying

"I

have never been talked to like that

in all my life," to which the President replied,

"Carry out

your agreements and you won't get talked to like that."

However, Charles "Chip" Bohlen, who served as Truman's

interpreter during the meeting, claims the final exchange
never occurred. Bohlen says Truman simply cut the

conversation off by saying: "That will be all Mr. Molotov.

I

would appreciate it if you would transmit my views to

Marshal Stalin."

Perhaps

a

[6]

more important aspect of the conversation

occurred earlier in the meeting when Truman informed Molotov
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that "he hoped that Moscow would
bear in mind how greatly
American foreign policy depended on
public support" and
that "American economic assistance
programs after the war
would require the vote of Congress."
This is virtually the
same argument Molotov had heard less
than a month earlier
from Flynn during their discussions in
Moscow, it seems
logical to conclude that Truman, President
for less than two
weeks, was acutely aware of the atmosphere
in the Senate
where he had spent the last ten years. And
that atmosphere
was increasingly hostile toward the Soviet
Union. Moreover,

"public support" for American foreign policy was
rapidly

diminishing as Polish groups and the Catholic hierarchy
continued to focus attention on the situation in Poland and
Eastern Europe.

[7]

Thus, while it may have been Truman's natural

disposition to take

a

tougher line with the Soviets, he was

also fully conscious that in doing so he would have the

political support of the Senate, public opinion, and the
great majority of FDR's former advisors. Truman was first
and foremost a politician.

In many respects that was why he

was where he was. A product of the Pendergast machine in

Kansas City, he in large part owed his nomination as Vice

President to none other than the man FDR had sent to Moscow
and Rome, Edward J. Flynn.

Flynn, Bob Hannegan of St. Louis, Edward

J.

Kelly,

Mayor of Chicago, Frank Walker of Michigan and George Allen
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were uncomfortable with the prospect of
Henry Wallace being
renominated for Vice President in 1944. The group
had been
formed at FDR's request to select his running
mate.

Flynn's own words James

F.

In

Byrnes of South Carolina was the

"strongest candidate," but he "wouldn't do because he
had
been raised a Catholic and had left the Church when
he

married, and the Catholics wouldn't stand for that." Flynn,
Kelly, Hannegan and Walker, all Catholics, eliminated the

incumbent Vice President, Wallace, and the "strongest

candidate" to replace him, Byrnes, and settled on Truman,
again demonstrating the power of the Catholic periphery in
the political process.

[8]

Meanwhile, the Catholic hierarchy was doing its best
to keep the issue of what was happening in Poland before the

public. Throughout 1945 Catholics flocked to churches and

cathedrals to hear their leaders praise Poland as

a

"Christian Democracy" and call for her "spiritual

liberation." A high Mass "for the cause of Poland" was held
in San

Francisco during the discussions of the United

Nations Charter. When the United States finally recognized
the Soviet-sponsored government of Poland in the summer of
1945, Charles Rozmarek of the Polish-American Congress

declared it was "a tragic historical blunder" and the
product of a "shortsighted policy of appeasement." Believing
his last minute endorsement of FDR in 1944 had kept
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Polish-American votes
felt betrayed.

in the

Democratic column, he may have

[9]

The meeting at Potsdam did nothing to
assuage mounting

Catholic fears concerning Eastern Europe. And
while the
major focus of attention remained on Poland,
other Catholics
were concerned about the effects of the Yalta
agreements on
eastern Germany and the Balkans. This may have been
one of

Truman's concerns as well. Gar Alperovitz has argued
that Truman was conducting

a

deliberate policy of delay

confronting the Soviet Union at this time hoping that

in

a

wartime demonstration of atomic power would give the United
States the upper hand in dealing with the Russians.

According to Alperovitz, the first fruits of this policy
were realized with Soviet concessions on elections in

Hungary and Rumania.

[10]

Nonetheless, in September, with the war in the Pacific
over, and relations with the Soviets becoming increasingly

acrimonious, Truman approved a resumption of the Flynn
mission. The New York Times reported on September 12 that
Flynn, after meeting with Truman at the White House,

return to Rome and Moscow to complete

a

"would

special diplomatic

mission he undertook for President Roosevelt." However,
Flynn suffered

a

heart attack in early November and was

never able to reopen the discussions. The episode does

demonstrate, however, that Truman was not relying

exclusively on atomic weaponry in attempting to deal with
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the Soviets as Alperovitz would have
us believe.

In

addition, as Flynn stated to Melby, Truman
was used to the
idea of being President and had "got caught
up on his

homework," especially the idea that millions
of Catholics
were not pleased with what was going on in Eastern

Europe .[11]
The end of the war in Europe also produced a flurry
of

activity and rumors surrounding the Vatican and its wish
to
tie itself to U.S. power. Harold Tittman, a State

Department official in Rome, reported that the Pope was

considering naming Spellman as Papal Secretary of State. The
Pope wanted to demonstrate his gratitude to America and the

American Church for its assistance and material aid during
the war, as well as to strengthen the Church in the battle

against Communism and to begin a process of

internationalizing the Curia. Tittmann reported that the
Pope "was emphatic that the Holy See must 'look to the

United States

.

'

"

[

12

]

By November, however, the Pope had changed his mind,

both because Spellman did not want to go and the Pope

realized he could be more important to him in the United
States. The Pope made the importance of the American church

clear in February of 1946 when he raised four Americans to
the College of Cardinals.

Spellman, along with Archbishops

John Glennon of St. Louis, Edward Mooney of Detroit, and
Samuel Stritch of Chicago would join Cardinal Dougherty of
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Philadelphia, giving the American
church five Cardinals for
the first time. [13]
Pius XII

's

American church

recognition of the importance of the
in the

effort to fight Communism was again

clearly demonstrated during the Senate
hearings on the issue
of a $3 billion dollar loan to
Great Britain. Many scholars
have viewed the conditions under which
the loan was granted
as evidence of United States
determination to "exact the

price of opening the British imperial markets
to all on

nearly equal terms." What

is

largely overlooked

is

the

protracted fight in the Senate to approve the loan. The

question hung in the balance for nearly six months. Hugh
Dalton, Chancellor of the Exchequer in the British Labor

government, was fearful that the loan would not be approved
until late in March 1946 at which time Lord Keynes reported
that he believed it "was in the bag." Keynes believed the

"recent troublesome attitude of Russia" had been helpful,
but more importantly "the Roman Catholic Church was now

strongly supporting it." According to Keynes, "The Pope
recently instructed all Cardinals that nothing was to be
done which would weaken British power to resist Communism."
The Pope's instructions apparently had the desired effect as

both Joseph Kennedy, former Ambassador to Great Britain, and
Leo Crowley of the State Department reversed their previous

opposition to the loan. Kennedy, who had been publicly
critical of the loan, was now calling for an outright grant
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to the British. Overall,

according to Dalton, "the Irish

Americans had been told to keep
quiet." The periphery was
again demonstrating its ability
to define the parameters of
public debate in the United States,
and the episode is a
clear example confirming Truman's
admonition to Molotov
about the role of public opinion on
foreign
policy.

This,

I

[14]

believe, gets to the crux of the matter.
Much

of what has been written about
American Catholicism in the

immediate postwar era attempts to place
events within the
context of a developing American Catholic
nationalism. The
pride American Catholics took in the large numbers
that
served in the armed forces during the war was
seen as proof
that Catholics would finally have to be accepted
as part of
the mainstream of American life.

charged that Catholics had
and Rome.

In addition.

a

No longer could it be

split alligence between America

Catholic postwar ant i -Communism

is

generally viewed in the same perspective. Catholic
anti -Communism was a perfect fit with American

ant i -Communism and therefore made Catholics better

Americans, or so the argument goes. But as we have seen
above (Chapter

6)

American anti-Communism, at least as

represented by the Protestant core was not as virulent in
the 1930s or early 1940s as it would soon become.
The very idea of Catholicism as an international

religion with political ambitions provided the pretext for
much of the American anti-Catholicism of the nineteenth and
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early twentieth centuries. Just as
the Protestants of
Northern Ireland could proclaim "Home
Rule means Rome Rule,"
many American Protestants could
believe electing a Catholic
like Al Smith to the presidency in
1928 would mean that the
chief executive would be taking his
orders directly from
Rome.

It was

this aspect of American an t i -Cat ho 1 i
c i sm which

led many Catholics to assume an ul
tra- isolat i on

i

st

position

during the critical period of the 1930s. Many
Americans
feared

a

return to prewar isolationism would follow the

breakdown of the peace process just as

it

had after WWI

Catholic internationalism rather than Catholic nationalism
would play

a

leading,

if

not decisive role,

in preventing

this.
"The recent troublesome attitude of Russia" alluded to

by Lord Keynes

in

March of 1946 would seem to be in

reference to Stalin's February speech in which he declared
that war with the capitalist powers was inevitable and that
the Soviet Union would begin preparing for it immediately.
He told the Soviet people that consumer goods "must wait on

rearmament" and that the basis of
be a tripling of defense spending.

William

0.

a

new five-year plan would
Supreme Court Justice

Douglas pronounced the speech the "Declaration of

World War III." Stalin's comments took on additional meaning
for official Washington in light of a military analysis

conducted by U.S.

intelligence in November of 1945. The

report detailed the devastation wrought by the war on the
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Soviet union and its capacity to
fight
near future.

In several key areas:

a

major war in the

losses in manpower and

industry; lack of technicians; lack of
strategic air force;
lack of modern navy; conditions of
railway and military
transport systems; lack of atomic bomb and
other vital

shortcomings led the authors of the report to
conclude the
Soviets would not be prepared to fight a major

war for some

fifteen years. Yet now, within six months of the
report,

Stalin was announcing plans to undertake preparations
for
just such a war.

[15]

In light of Stalin's speech Walter Lippmann concluded

the United States had no alternative but to match the Soviet

arms buildup. Truman meanwhile was faced with a Congress and
a

nation that was increasingly unwilling to move in that

direction. It was in the aftermath of the furor created by

Stalin's speech that Truman traveled to Fulton, Missouri in
early March with former British Prime Minister Winston
Churchill. On the train the night before Churchill was to

deliver his speech Truman read and approved the final draft,

commenting that it would "do nothing but good" and "make
stir

.

"

It did

.

[

16

a

]

The President, Churchill said, had given him "full

liberty to give my true and faithful counsel in these
anxious and baffling times." He noted his admiration for
both the Russian people and his wartime ally Marshal Stalin.

Nevertheless it was clear that "From Stettin in the Baltic
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to Trieste in the Adriatic,

an

iron curtain had descended

across the Continent." All the
major capitals of Eastern and
central Europe lie behind the
curtain in what Churchill now
called the "Soviet Sphere." He
did not believe the Soviets
wanted war, only "the fruits of
war" and the "indefinite
expansion of their power and doctrine."
Churchill proposed
an "English-speaking union of
the United States and Britain"
to stand against the common
threat. Reaction to the speech
was almost universally hostile.
Stalin referred to
it

Hitlerian terms as

a

in

"racial theory" in which the English-

speaking peoples "should rule over the remaining
nations of
the world." The Wall Street Journal h.^i^..^
the United
States did not need alliances with any other
nation. The

believed Truman had been "remarkably inept" in

associating himself with the speech. Walter Lippmann saw
the
speech as an "almost catastrophic blunder." Truman was
shocked by the reaction, even though he had predicted it
would "make a stir." The President now denied having prior

knowledge of the contents of Churchill's speech. He offered
to send the battleship Missouri to bring Stalin to the U.S.

where he could speak at the University of Missouri as freely
as Churchill had.

[17]

The effort to move the British loan through Congress

must be viewed against this nascent neo-isolat ionist

tendency demonstrated by the hostile reaction to Churchill's
speech and the suggestion that the United States ally itself
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with a European power. If the Irish
Americans had been told
to keep quiet in order not to
"weaken British power to
resist Communism," as Dalton suggests,
it would mark one of
the rare times indeed that Irish
Americans placed British
interests before their own agenda. All
the American

Cardinals -- Spellman, Mooney, Stritch,
Glennon and

Dougherty were of Irish extraction. Irish
nationalism was
never easy for the Catholic hierarchy to put
aside
when

British interests were at stake, as witnessed by
the efforts
of Cardinals Gibbons and O'Connell to

include the Irish

question at the Versailles Peace Conference and the Irish

desertion of Wilsonian idealism in the 1920 presidential
election. So this move to an internationalist position

marked

a

turning point for the American church which would

have far-reaching effects on U.S.

foreign policy.

Another attempt to influence public opinion was

underway in early 1946. As mentioned above many American
Catholics were also concerned about the fate of Germany with
its large Catholic population. Allen Dulles circulated
a

confidential memo to certain influential members of the

foreign policy community, including Laird Bell, the Chicago
banker and president of the Chicago Council on Foreign

Relations. The memo dealt with the problems being

encountered by the de-Nazi f icat ion process and the need to
convince Truman or Secretary of State Byrnes that to
"continue to ruin Germany by indiscriminate de-Nazif icat ion
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and unrelenting deindustr ial
ization can only confirm Europe
as a liability." Bell told
Dulles he was in contact with a
group from Notre Dame University
"headed up by some of the

Catholic hierarchy" that had formed

Committee." The group was

in the

a

"Save Europe Now

process of convening

a

congress to discuss the problem. Bell's
core instincts wer e
at work as he told Dulles he dreaded
the prospect

of such a

congress "but apparently something will
have to be done to
create public opinion" on the issue, and
he hoped to "do

something through the Chicago

i

1

y n.^..

»

of Bell's response seem clear. Reluctantly,

The implications
the Protestant

core was being forced to accept the leadership
of the

Catholic periphery on questions dealing with developing
public opinion on foreign policy matters. [18]
By late 1946 Truman seemed in disarray politically. He

had not as yet, at least publicly,

entered into the cold war

rhetoric of confrontation as had Churchill and Stalin. His
attempt to steer

a

middle course erupted in controversy in

mid-September when Secretary of Commerce Henry
delivered

a

A.

Wallace

speech personally cleared by the President. The

speech called for American understanding of Soviet security
needs in Eastern Europe: "...we should recognize that we
have no more business in the political affairs of Eastern

Europe than Russia has in the political affairs of Latin
America, Western Europe and the United States." In addition

Wallace declared,

"Whether we like it or not, the Russians
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will try to socialize their sphere
of influence just as we
try to democratize our sphere of
influence." [19]

Elsewhere in the speech Wallace declared,
"We must not
let our policy be influenced by
those inside or outside the
United States who want war with Russia
but this
does not

mean appeasement." Just who were those
elements "inside or
outside" the United States that wanted war with
Russia?

Herbert Feis argues that Truman approved the
text of

Wallace's speech in an effort to reach out to the
liberal
wing of the Democratic Party to which Wallace
appealed. He
claims,

"There still sounded in Truman's spirit echoes of

Roosevelt's wariness of British diplomacy." In his Memoirs
Truman also claimed that he approved the speech because
Wallace told him "he intended to say that we ought to look
at the world through American eyes rather than through the

eyes of a pro-British or rabidly anti-Russian press." [20]
But Wallace also had other than "American eyes" in

mind.

In late December of 1945 he confided to his diary his

speculations about just which groups were interested
promoting war with Russia: "In addition to

a

in

small group in

the Catholic hierarchy there is also a small group among the

English Tories and

a

small group in the American army...

small group among the American big-business hierarchy,

a

substantial group among the Chinese Nationalists, the London
Poles... and a very strong element in the Republican Party."

Wallace was optimistic in the short run because "these
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various groups that want

a

third world war in order to

li ck

Russia are not at the present
time working together." In
the long run, however, "as time
goes on they will tend more
and more to coalesce"; and
concluded: "This is the great
danger of the future." [21]

Although Wallace's speech dealt with
foreign policy,
it must be remembered that it
was a political speech
and

part of the kickoff for the November
congressional

elections. Wallace was taking aim at the
Republican Party
and its spokesmen Thomas E. Dewey,
Arthur Vandenberg and

John Foster Dulles, who were calling for

a

tougher stand

against Soviet expansion. Vandenberg was at
that moment in
Paris with Secretary of State James Byrnes
attempting
to

negotiate peace treaties with Molotov. Both Vandenberg
and
Byrnes saw Wallace's statements as undercutting their

negotiating position, particularly over the difficult
issues of German occupation and partition. Byrnes demanded

Wallace's resignation, and Truman reluctantly complied by
asking Wallace to step down.

[22]

Such disarray within the administration did not bode
well for the coming elections. Liberals within the

Democratic Party, who substantially agreed with Wallace,
were now left without

a

spokesman within the administration.

The Catholic hierarchy, however, could only express

a

satisfaction at the results. Well aware that Wallace's
"sphere of influence" for Russia in Eastern Europe
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accurately reflected FDR's sentiments
as expressed to
Cardinal Spellman, they were actively
opposing
such

a

policy. In effect, two of the most
important segments of the
New Deal coalition were alienated
and parting company with
the President over the same issue
but for different reasons:
liberals because the President was being
too tough on the

Russians; Catholics because he wasn't being
tough enough.
The day before Wallace's New York speech
Archbishop

Aloysius Stepinac of Yugoslavia was arrested by Josip
Tito's

government on charges of having collaborated with the
Germans and Italians during the war. Stepinac was "widely

regarded as one of the leading spokesmen for worldwide

Catholicism," and American Catholics were outraged at his
arrest. The National Council of Catholic Women called on

Secretary of State Byrnes to personally intercede on
Stepinac's behalf with the "atheistic Communist forces"
Yugoslavia. The Bishop's trial began on October

1,

in

in the

midst of the congressional elections and, perhaps by

coincidence, on the same day the Nuremburg Court announced
the convictions of Goring, Hess and Von Rippontrop. But the

public trial of one of Europe's leading Catholic Archbishops
on charges of collaborating with the Nazis on the very day

the leading Nazis were convicted of war crimes may be more

than coincidental.

[23]

The New York Times carried a story on the opening of
of the trial at which Stepinac denied being guilty of the
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charges. The Times headline also
pointed out that Bishop
Joseph Hurley of St. Augustine,
Florida was present at the
trial representing Pius XII. Thus
the American Church was
associated with Stepinac's trial from
the beginning. The
Times also noted that the official
Vatican publication

L'Osservatore Romano carried

a

story on the opening of the

trial saying the "verdict and sentence
have already been
decided."
[24]
The Boston Evening

story that dealt with

a

ni

nh^ of the same day reported

a

very different aspect of the trial

than Nazi collaboration. Under a headline which
announced
"Abp.

Stepinac Tells Court His Conscience

is

Clear," the

Globe reported Stepinac "denied knowledge of the
alleged
forced reconversion of 230,000 Serbs from the Orthodox
to
the Roman Catholic Church during the Ustashi
in Croatia,

a

(Puppet) regime

part of Yugoslavia." As we have seen earlier

George Kennan in dispatches from Moscow in early 1945 had
warned of just such an attempt to promote an "all-Slav"

policy based on the religious sentiments of the Slav
population in areas coming under Soviet control. While
Kennan noted that "all things indicate that the Kremlin

is

prepared to do open battle against the influence of the

Vatican," he did not know "how this anti-Catholic tendency
will effect policy in Poland, Hungary and Croatia." The

break between Tito and Stalin would not be complete until
1948,

and although the relationship between the two
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Communist leaders was already strained
in 1946, it is
conceivable that Tito had knowledge of
Stalin's "all-Slav"
policy, just as Kennan did, and was using
it to further his
own objectives in Croatia.

[25]

Only days after the opening of Stepinac's
trial
Cardinal Spellman addressed
on October

6

a

World Peace Rally in New York

and called on the Catholic faithful to pray
for

Stepinac "whose only crime is fidelity to God and country."

Spellman went on to say "the confidence and conscience of
the American peopl e

.

.

.

have again been outraged by this

latest infamy and affront to human dignity and decency."

Catholics, and the American public in general,

in the

midst

of a national election were witnessing an administration

seemingly in disarray over its policy toward Russia and
helpless in the face of religious persecution taking place
behind the "Iron Curtain." The 200,000 member Catholic War

Veterans repeatedly attacked "the silence of President
Truman," and the State Department's failure to act on the

Stepinac question.

[26]

The 1946 mid-term elections were nothing short of

a

catastrophe for the Democrats. Republicans gained control of
both the House and Senate for the first time since 1928. In
the House they had a majority of 246 to 188 Democrats.

In

the Senate their majority was 45 to 41. But that was not
all. The Republicans gained a majority of state

governorships as well, including Thomas
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E.

Dewey's

reelection as Governor of New York
by the largest margin
ever recorded. The big city
machines, longtime home of the
catholic bosses and their Catholic
constituents, went down
to defeat in Detroit,

Jersey City, Chicago and New York.
The

very elements that had secured the Vice
Presidency for Harry
Truman in 1944 now seemed repudiated.
The Republicans had
made anti-communism a key issue in the
campaign, including
charges of widespread communist infiltration
of domestic
organizations. [27]
Despite the hardening of public opinion toward
the

Soviet Union the election results seemed to
portend, the new
year opened with a sense of optimism. The Council
of Foreign

Ministers convened in New York in November following the
elections, and by mid-December five peace treaties had been

worked out for Italy and the satellite East European

governments. The increasingly thorny issue of peace treaties
for Germany and Austria was put off for a later meeting.

This "brief season of euphoria" quickly dissipated in

January of 1947, and once again Poland was at the center of
controversy. On January 5,1947 the State Department formally

protested the manner in which the Polish Peasant Party had
been forcibly excluded from recent elections as

a

violation

of the Potsdam Agreement. Party leaders had been arrested,

and some even killed, others were fired from their jobs, had

their homes searched and papers sympathetic to the party

were closed.

[28]
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Hungarian events also widened the
breach between the
two powers. In February the
Hungarian National Assembly
refused to withdraw parliamentary
immunity of Bela Kovaks,

Secretary of the Small Holders Party.
When the communist
Minister of the interior accused Kovaks
of

"counter-revolutionary conspiracy," the Russians
arrested
him.

If

the Soviets had made concessions to U.S.
wishes in

Rumanian and Hungary

in

as Alperovitz suggests,

deference to American atomic power,
they were now clearly beginning to

reassert themselves. At virtually the same time,
February
21,

1947,

the British communicated to the State Department

they could no longer afford their attempt to restore
the

monarchy in Greece or to provide aid to Turkey whose control
of the Dardenelles was being challenged by Stalin.
of State George C.Marshall concluded,

Secretary

"It was tantamount to

British abdication from the Middle East with obvious
implications as to their successor." [29]
The opportunity was at hand for Truman to make his

public foray into the Cold War. On March 12 he went before

Congress with his request for $400 million in military and

economic aid to Greece and Turkey. "It must be the policy of
the United States," Truman declared,

"to support free

peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed

minorities or by outside pressures." The President of
course knew beforehand that he would have the support of the

leadership on both sides of the aisle. But it had not been
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an easy sell. The GOP was already
trying to fulfill its

campaign promises to cut taxes and
reduce spending. They
were calling for some six billion
dollars
in cuts to the

federal budget,

in their meeting with Truman
and

administration foreign policy planners the
initial reaction
to assume British obligations in
the Mediterranean
was cool

at best.

Then Dean Acheson spoke up and framed the
issue,

not in terms of a Greek civil war,

but rather as Soviet

expansion. The Russian goal was nothing less
than the

control of the Middle East, South Asia and Africa
with the

ultimate objective of Germany and all Europe. "The
Soviet
Union was playing one of the greatest gambles in history
at

minimal cost," according to Acheson, and "we and we alone
are in a position to break up the play." Senator Arthur

Vandenberg, now Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, told Truman he must frame the argument for the

American public just as Acheson had done at the meeting.
[30]

Roosevelt's policy of cooperation with the Soviet
Union and granting them

a

"sphere of influence" in Eastern

Europe was now publicly buried. It would be replaced by one
of

"containment" first outlined by George Kennan

in

an 8000 word telegram to the State Department almost a year

earlier. Kennan argued in his long telegram that the Soviet

Union was "committed fanatically to the belief that with the
U.S.

there can be no permanent modus vivendi,
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that it is

desirable and necessary that the internal
harmony of our
society be disrupted, our traditional
way of life destroyed,
the international authority of our
state be broken,
if

Soviet power is to be secure." [31]
The contest then was not just economic
or military but

also cultural and spiritual,

a

test of our national values.

The test was not long in coming. On March
21,

less than two

weeks after announcing what would become known as
the Truman
Doctrine, the president issued an executive order
providing
for the loyalty investigation of all government
employees.

Thus, within a matter of ten days, the President had
pulled
the political rug from under two of the most prominent

Republican campaign themes of 1946. He and his

administration were now at the forefront of confronting

Communism at home and abroad.
While Assistant Secretary of State Acheson and Senator

Vandenberg were telling the President that public opinion
needed to be cultivated for the fight against Communism, at
least one segment, the Catholic periphery, was already in
it.

sent

On March 5,
a

1947 Archbishop Richard J. Cushing of Boston

letter to all the pastors of the Archdiocese which

was "to be read at all the Masses in all the churches of the

Archdiocese on Sunday, March

9

and Sunday, March 16." The

letter was an exhortation to the Catholic faithful to

contribute to
Relief Fund.

a

special collection for the Bishop's War

It was also a

remarkably revealing document on
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the developing trend of thought
spreading through not only
the American Catholic hierarchy,
but also the Vatican
itself. Gushing acknowledged past
generosity of American

Catholics to war relief in Europe through
the Red Cross,
UNRRA, "and to the several National
Relief Campaigns for
Greece, Italy, France, Poland and elsewhere."
Fund-raising
now, however, would go to the Emergency
Relief

Committee of the American hierarchy; "The agencies

in

Europe and elsewhere which will handle the money
raised

in

this collection are both Catholic and American
(emphasis in

original)" but the money would be distributed "without

reference to race, creed or class." [32]
Cushing went on to say that the new relief program was
"one which is doing

a

work which can be done only by

Catholics and by Catholics who are Americans," and that

it

was "a work for Religion and Democracy." The Archbishop was

warming to his topic. "It might just as well be recognized
that in many areas of Europe the work of Relief will be

either Catholic or Ant i -Cathol ic, either Democratic or

Communist." Cushing was not making

a

giant or unprecedented

leap in linking religion and democracy in American thought.

After all America was the "City on

a

Hill." But he was

linking America and Catholicism with democracy in the fight

against communism in the city of John Winthrop. It would be
the height of conspiracy theories to suggest that Truman

announced his new doctrine smack in the middle of this new
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national Catholic Bishop's effort to
raise funds for
European relief. But it was certainly
fortuitous that the
presidential speech asserting that only
America could
prevent the spread of Communism coincided
with this message
to some 35 million American Catholics
that "...the future of
Faith and Freedom in our generation is dark
indeed."

[33]

How did Catholics respond to this new call for

American Catholic internationalism? Lavishly, its
apparent.
On March 26 Cushing again sent a letter to all
pastors

informing them that "the response to the diocesan appeal

in

behalf of the Bishops' War Relief Collection was so generous
that

am asking you to express to all your people at Mass

I

next Sunday my personal gratitude..." In addition, the

Archbishop instructed the clergy to submit the names of
those parishioners who had made "more conspicuous

contributions" along with the amount of their gift so that
he might "acknowledge by personal letter" their part in

making "this important collection so outstanding
success

.

"

[

34

a

]

Cushing's letter was dramatic evidence that the policy
shift of the Vatican "to look to the United States" for

leadership in postwar Europe to battle communism was

beginning to show results. The policy of the Vatican was
also becoming clear to individuals other than State

Department personnel.

J.

Alvarez Del Vayo, the last Foreign

Minister of the Spanish Republic, lamented the resurgent
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political power of the Vatican in Italian
politics in an
article entitled "Vatican Versus Left in
Italy" that

appeared in the April

5,

1947 issue of The Nation

to Del Vayo "Italian leaders,

.

According

asked to explain the rapid

resurgence of Catholic political power, invariably
answer,
•the United States.'" Del Vayo saw the shift
in Vatican

policy as

a

break with "centuries" of Vatican policy

"oriented toward the Catholic countries of Europe."
The

hierarchy's main efforts were now "concentrated on America,"
and the Pope viewed "that predominantly Protestant
country
as the Vatican's chief future ally..."

[35]

The Pope had even gone so far as to skip over Italian

candidates when elevating American prelates to the college
of cardinals.

In addition,

he named Americans as his special

envoys to Yugoslavia (as in the case of Hurley at the

Stepinac trial), Rumania and Germany; positions that in
the past had "traditionally been entrusted to the Italian

members of the Sacred College." According to Del Vayo, these

appointments were meant not only to "flatter American
Catholics" but also "to create the impression that the

Vatican's policy is linked with that of the United States:
the envoys speak as representatives of the church and as

citizens of the strongest country in the world (emphasis in

original)." Convinced that only the United States could
confront "the political advance of the Soviet Union," and
that 80 million Catholics already lived in countries "within
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the Russian sphere of influence"
the Vatican was drawing on
"the experience of twenty centuries
in its effort to follow

militantly ant i -Communist policy" while
still conciliating
Russia's neighbors. The result presented
a
a

"curious zigzag

strategy, but examination reveals
-

a

a

fixed central objective

Western Christian coalition against godless
Russia. "[361
Clearly, FDR's prescient observation to Flynn

that there could be no permanent peace

if

in

1945

Catholics in

Eastern Europe were denied freedom to practice their
faith
under Russian rule was beginning to take shape.
Catholic

immigrants with strong ties to their native lands were more

concerned with family and friends left behind than with
"open door" diplomacy, and they carried that concern

with them into the voting booth. They were constantly being

reminded of what was happening in their old homelands, both
by the secular press detailing the difficult negotiations

with the Russians over control of their homelands and by
their clergy and the church hierarchy. On April 30, 1947,

John

J.

Wright, Cushing's Secretary, directed

a

letter to

the fifteen Polish-speaking parishes of the Archdiocese

announcing that "... the most Reverend Archbishop has been
asked to declare the first Sunday in May, May

4,

as a day of

prayer for Poland in the Polish-speaking parishes...."
Wright went on to ask "for special prayers at all the Masses
in your church next Sunday and

if

you will at the same time

bring to the attention of the faithful the work of the
198

Relief for Poland Committee." Such
appeals were constant
reminders to Polish-Americans of the
fate of their homeland.
In like manner French and
Italian-speaking parishes were
reminded of the potential threat Communism
posed to those
countries. [37]
The same issue of The Nation revealed
still another

aspect of the role American Catholics were
playing,
and would continue to play,

in

international affairs. Del

Vayo was dismayed by the breakdown of the Left

particularly

a

Italy

in

split within the Socialist Party over the

issue of relations with the Communists. The split
resulted
in the formation of the Italian Socialist Workers
Party and

weakened the left to such an extent that

possible for De Gasperi

[a

it

"made it

Catholic] to set up

a

new Cabinet

along more conservative lines." Del Vayo quotes from

a

letter sent by the Italian Socialist Party to other European

Socialist parties explaining the split which occurred at the

party congress: "Saragat and his scissionists were inspired
by the Italian American Luigi Antonini, president of the

Italian American Labor Council and

a

member of the

International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union... He financed
and is still financing ant i -Communist movements of every

descr ipt ion ..."

[

38

Antonini's ant i -Communist efforts in Italy must be
seen against the background of Catholic ant i -Communist

activity in the American labor movement in general. The
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Church had been extremely active in
the American labor
movement during the 1930s and was
supportive of labor's
right to organize, which in that decade
was still the

primary struggle of American labor. Unlike
Europe, where
separate Catholic trade unions were developed,
American
Catholics were encouraged by so-called "labor
priests" to
work within the already established labor
unions, but with
the objective of promoting "parallel"
associations of

Catholic workers. This was the method prescribed by Pius
in his

1931 encyclical Quadraaesimo Anno

.

XI

The Association of

Catholic Trade Unionists evolved from this teaching and
played an active role in union organizing, especially in the

rising industrial unions of the Congress of Industrial

Organizations (CIO).

[39]

By 1947 Philip Murray, President of both the CIO and
the United Steelworkers of America,

was taking an

increasingly ant i -Communis t position in regards to Communist

activity

in

the labor movement. Murray was both a committed

trade unionist and

a

devout Catholic "friendly to the

Association of Catholic Trade Unionists." In May of 1947
he gained unanimous approval for a statement by the United

Steelworkers that "This union will not tolerate efforts by
outsiders

-

individuals, organizations, or groups

-

whether

they be Communist, Socialist or any other group to
infiltrate, dictate or meddle in our affairs." Later that
same year,

in November,

Murray managed to have the eighth
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constitutional convention of the CIO adopt
stating:

a

resolution

"We ... resent and reject efforts of
the Communist

Party or other political parties [Republican?]
and their
adherents to interfere in the affairs of the
CIO.
This

convention serves notice that we will not tolerate
such
interference." [40]
Murray's increasingly ant i -Commun i st position was
consistent with the developing theme of the ACTU
.

In fact,

Antonini's method of isolating the Communist faction
of the
Italian Left as described by Del Vayo followed

a

similar

pattern used by the ACTU in eliminating Communist influence
in the Michigan

Industrial Union Council in 1943. This

alliance of Socialists and ACTU activists resulted in

victory for John Gibson,

a

a

"socialist" leader of the Dairy

Worl^ers and a protege of UAW President Walter Reuther,

over

Patricia Quinn an independent leftist who worked with the

Communists as President of the lUC. The ACTU activists were
also instrumental in Reuther

's

rise to the presidency of the

UAW, and in convincing the clergy that he and his brother

Victor were "sound leaders, whose socialism, we think will
be mitigated by events."

[41]

As mentioned above Truman was more than a little aware
of the need to marshal public opinion on foreign policy

decisions, as he had alluded to Molotov. Scholars have

traditionally contended that Truman and his policy advisors
were manipulating public opinion by creating
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a

"crisis"

atmosphere in the relations between the
U.S. and the Soviet
Union. This work demonstrates that
the Catholic periphery
was more instrumental in marshaling
public opinion and

dominating the discussion over issues such
as Poland,
Hungary, Italy and France. While Truman may

indeed have

desired to manipulate and manufacture
it was not

a

crisis atmosphere,

necessary for him to do so. It was already being

done for him by the Catholic periphery. The
center/core
groups, which had initially hoped for postwar
cooperation

with the Soviets were indeed being pushed into, as Del
Vayo

remarked, "a Western Christian coalition against godless

Russia." Public distrust of the Soviets had been steadily

growing since late 1945. "This distrust fed into the

policy process -- via the Office of Public Affairs Public
Studies Division," according to political scientist Michael
Leigh. Truman's personal popularity with the public jumped

dramatically with the announcement of the Truman Doctrine.
Approval of his "handling of his job" increased from

48

percent in February to 60 percent in late March 1947.

Distrust of the Soviets' willingness to cooperate with us
reached a postwar high of 63 percent the same month. Leigh

concludes that Truman, faced with

a

Republican Congress, and

little chance for innovative domestic policies, "viewed

foreign policy as the realm within which he might best

establish his authority." The bipartisan consensus on

containment Truman was able to forge with the Republican
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leadership, especially Arthur Vandenberg
of Michigan with
his large Polish Catholic constituency,
would not break down
until after the 1948 election. [42]
In the meantime events

in Europe were tending toward

further mobilization of the American periphery.
In Hungary
the freely elected Smallholders Party Government
was coming
under increasing communist pressure and slowly

disintegrating. In June, Secretary of State George

Marshall advocated

a

C.

plan for massive economic assistance to

the war shattered economies of Europe.

It was quickly dubbed

the Marshall Plan. A conference was called at the end of

June in Paris at which the European nations were to discuss

Marshall's offer. The Soviet delegation was headed by
Foreign Minister Molotov, but he walked out of the

conference after three days when it became clear the Western

European nations were willing to make agreements that would
"cut across national lines." The Soviets, however, argued
for national sovereignty over interdependence. After the

Soviets left the conference both Poland and Czechoslovakia
indicated an interest in the plan, but "Russian pressure
forced these two nations to retreat from the Paris talks."
[43]

By August the Soviets had officially rejected

participation in the Marshall Plan and brought Hungary fully
under Communist control. The Communist parties in both

France and Italy "launched intense campaigns of hindrance
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and

vilification. In France strikes in one
branch of
industry after another occurred."
late September the
Soviets called together a secret conference
of nine European
Communist parties
seven from Eastern Europe along with
France and Italy. The French and Italians came
under severe
criticism for their "timidity" and were urged to
act more

m

"combatively" They were in effect accused of allowing

capitalism to survive

in

Western Europe due to "Their

faltering and erroneous respect for parliamentary

institutions

.

"

(

44

By November

a

triumvirate was in place that could have

represented "the Western Christian coalition against godless
Russia" envisioned by Del Vayo

.

In France Robert Schuman was

named Prime Minister and would oversee French policy during
the crucial period to mid-1948. Herbert Feis describes him
as

"the stabilizing leader in French politics," and a

"creative and effective sponsor who abandoned constricting
foreign policies shaped by fear and hatred for one guided by
a

vision of

a

United Europe in which France and Germany

would cooperate." According to Feis, the rise of Schuman to
power in France "along with Alcide de Gasperi's leadership
in Italy and Konrad Adenauer's

in Germany,

is

one of the

rare wholesome and healing coincidences of history." For
this work it is significant that all three were devout

Catholics and maintained close relations with American
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catholics. It should not be overlooked
given the Vatican's
effort to tie itself, and thereby Europe,
to American power
[45]
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CHAPTER 11

"...HUNGARIAN CATHOLICISM COULD COUNT ON SUPPORT FROM

CATHOLIC AMERICANS"
The presidential election year of 1948 would provide
a

crucial test of whether or not the Catholic periphery would

maintain its loyalty to the Democratic Party. That Catholic
attention was focused on events in Europe

is clear.

This

attention would increase as events unfolded in 1948.
The European situation took on a decidedly new tone in

January when British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin notified

Secretary of State Marshall that Britain, France, and the
Benelux countries were about to begin discussions on

a

common defense plan. This was not entirely unexpected as
Bevin first raised the matter with Marshall the previous
summer. The Soviets were concerned enough about the prospect
of joint Western defense initiatives for Molotov to issue a

warning that such

a

move would have dire consequences,

"particularly for France." Molotov was certainly alluding to
France's difficulties, with its large Communist Party,

already upset over participation in the Marshall Plan, and
the prospect that the difficulties would increase.

11]

When the matter came before the House of Commons in
late January, Bevin placed the issue squarely in the context
of the continued threat of Soviet expansion.

He declared the

process of Communizat ion "goes ruthlessly on in each
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country" and "the game [is being] played out
in Poland,
Bulgaria, Hungary, more recently in Rumania."
But that was
not all, according to Bevin, "
f r om information
.

.

.

in our

possession, other attempts may be made elsewhere."
However,
the treaties with France and the Benelux countries
were not

enough: "We have then to go beyond the circle of our

immediate neighbors.

...to consider the question of

associating other historic members of the European
civilization, including the new Italy... We are thinking now
of Western Europe as a unit."

[2]

That "other attempts may be made elsewhere" to expand

Soviet influence was not surprising. The Soviets were in the

process of pressing both Finland and Norway to sign

agreements that would bring them closer to the "Soviet
sphere." The next move, however, came in February in

Czechoslovakia where

a

coalition government headed by

Communist Prime Minister Klement Gottwald fell before

a

successful coup while Red Army units were camped on the
border. The coup was precipitated by a cabinet vote which

defeated an attempt by the Communist Minister of the
Interior to influence upcoming elections by replacing

Prague's non-Communist police with Communists. The Communist
Cabinet Ministers refused to go along with this vote causing

non-Communist members of the cabinet from the Populist
(Catholic), Czech Socialist and Slovak Democratic parties to
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resign. Their resignations led to
Communist charges that

a

conspiracy existed to undermine the
republic headed by
United States Ambassador Laurence
Steinhardt. Opposition
leaders were arrested and jailed. Two
weeks later the

mysterious death of popular Foreign Minister
Jan Masaryk
compounded the animosity toward the Communist
coup. The

Communists claimed Masaryk committed suicide by
leaping from
a third floor window into a stone
courtyard. Truman
and

other Western leaders believed Masaryk was the
victim of
"foul play."

[3]

The Czech coup resulted in further solidifying

American public opinion against the Soviet Union. Rumors of
a

potential outbreak of hostilities were rampant in the

press. More ominously. General Lucius Clay, the American

representative on the Allied Control Commission for Germany,
reported to Washington

in

early March that he had changed

his mind regarding the prospect of war with the Soviets.

Recent activities left him feeling "a subtle change in
Soviet attitude which
a

I

cannot define but which now gives me

feeling that it (war) may come with dramatic suddenness."

Clay's message alarmed Washington and resulted in

a

special

CIA analysis which concluded that war "...was not probable
within sixty days."

[4]

The impact of the Czech coup on America's domestic

politics was instantaneous and enormous. Taken together with
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the pressure the Soviets were bringing
to bear on Finland
and Norway; the solidifying of
Soviet-dominated governments
in Poland,

Hungary and Rumania; and the activity of the

large Communist Parties of France and Italy,
the appearance
of an aggressive Soviet Union bent on
dominating all of

Europe seemed only too real.
The Marshall Plan, meanwhile, had been languishing
in

Congress. Senator Robert Taft of Ohio was arguing that
tax

dollars should not be spent on

a

"European TVA.

March the Senate approved the Plan by

a

"

But by

vote of 69 to 17.

The Republicans seemed on the brink of repudiating the

bipartisan foreign policy developed under the leadership of
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Arthur

Vandenberg of Michigan. In February Republican Presidential
hopeful Thomas

E.

Dewey, while not abandoning containment,

attacked Truman's policies "which resulted in surrendering
200,000,000 people in middle Europe into the clutches of
Soviet Russia...." In the midst of the war rumors in March

Representatives Charles Kersten of Wisconsin and Richard
Nixon of California introduced

a

resolution calling for

a

"solemn warning to the conspiracy in the Politboro" that the
U.S. would fight to stop Soviet aggression. Truman's

popularity, after surging with the announcement of the

Truman Doctrine, plummeted again to an all-time low of
percent.

[6]
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Henry Wallace, campaigning for
President on a third
party ticket, appeared to excuse the
coup as "evidence that
a

'get tough-

policy only provokes

a

'get tougher'

policy...." In addition, Wallace seemed
insensitive to the
fate of well-respected Masaryk. He
compared the rumors
of

Masaryk's suicide with the rumors of the
suicide of John G.
Winant whose house he owned declaring that
"Maybe Winant had
cancer. Maybe Masaryk had cancer... Who knows?"
[5]

In the midst of the fallout over the Czech
coup Truman

again undercut the Republican political initiative.
He made
a

special appearance before

joint session of Congress on

a

March 17, St. Patrick's Day, telling the assembled lawmakers
that he came to "report to you on the critical nature of the

situation in Europe." Three years had passed since the end
of the war

in Europe but the

desire to achieve

a

"just and

honorable peace" had been frustrated, not by the "natural

difficulties" that follow any great war, but rather "chiefly
due to the fact that one nation has not only refused to

cooperate in the establishment of
peace, but

-

even worse

-

a

just and honorable

has actively sought to prevent

it." That same nation had undermined the value of the United

Nations by vetoing 21 proposals

in a

two-year span.

"The

Soviet Union and its agents have destroyed the independence
and democratic character of a whole series of nations in

Eastern and Central Europe." This "ruthless course of
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action" and the desire to "extend it to
the remaining free
nations of Europe" were the source of
Europe's problems. The
tragedy in Czechoslovakia had "sent a shock
throughout the

civilized world," and "the hazard of the entire
Scandinavian
peninsula" was the latest threat by the pressure
being
brought against Finland.

[7]

Recent events were heartening, he declared. The Senate
had approved the European Recovery Act and the prospect
of

speedy action in the House was encouraging. That very day
five nations in Europe were signing a plan for common

defense, and it "deserves our full support." It was time, he

continued, that "the position of the United States should be

made unmistakably clear." In addition to quick passage of
the European Recovery Act the President called for universal

training legislation and the "temporary reenactment of
selective service legislation in order to maintain our armed
forces at their authorized strength."

[8]

Truman then moved to cut off the growing partisan
attacks on his administration. The world situation was "too

critical" and the nation's responsibilities "too vast" to

allow "party struggles to weaken our influence for
maintaining peace." The people, he stated, had "the right to
assume that political considerations will not affect our

working together" and that "...we will join hands,

wholeheartedly and without reservations,
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in our

efforts to

preserve peace in the world." The President
followed up this
appeal for bipartisanship by moving immediately
to shore up

his own political base.

He flew to New York City to address

the annual dinner of the Society of the
Friendly Sons of St.

Patrick. There may have been

a

friendly son of St. Patrick

in New York who was a Republican,

but most of the attendees

were likely to have roots in Tammany. The President
followed

Cardinal Spellman to the rostrum. The Cardinal had warmed up
the audience with a "rousing ant i -Communist speech" of his
own

.

[

9

The President's address was in the same vein.

Reiterating major features of his speech to Congress that
afternoon, he spelled out in greater detail, however, the
"tragic record" which had left "Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia,

Poland Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, Hungary. And
now Czechos lovak ia .... under the domination of that one
nation" that was obstructing the search for peace. "Nor
this the whole story," Truman continued,

is

"For that nation is

now pressing its demands on Finland. Its foreign agents are
fighting in Greece and working hard to undermine the freedom
of Italy." The President was warming to his task,

encouraged

by the enthusiastic response of the audience prepared by

Spellman. In a departure from his prepared text he left
little doubt this was a campaign speech.
I

"I

do not want and

will not accept the political support of Henry Wallace and
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his communists.

If

joining them or permitting them to join

me is the price of victory

I

recommend def eat

.

.

.

.

any price

for Wallace and his Communists is
too much for me to pay.

I'm not buying." The President was obviously
moving to

repair the damage left by the 1946 off-year
elections. By

appearing on the same platform with Cardinal Spellman
he was
associating himself and his administration with a newer,
tougher stand against the Soviet Union the Catholic

hierarchy had long called for. The Catholic ethnic voters
who had deserted the big city machines in 1946 were being

called back. This was

a

pattern that would be followed right

up to the end of the campaign.

[10]

Truman needed and wanted the cooperation of the

Catholic hierarchy for both domestic and international
reasons. The situation in Italy which Truman referred to

repeatedly was of particular moment. New elections were
scheduled to take place in early April and the entire

administration was concerned about the prospect of

a

Communist victory. The Italian Communist Party enjoyed

especially strong support in the industrial north. The
prospect of a Communist victory in the elections followed by
a total

seizure of power, which had been the pattern in the

Eastern European countries, and the prospect of Italy

collaborating with neighboring Yugoslavia, still

in the

Soviet orbit, alarmed the State Department. According to
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Clark Clifford, the President,

a

veteran of tough Missouri

politics, was "very practical and approved use
of every
means to influence the [Italian] election."
The American

embassy publicly advocated the reelection of the
government
and hinted that Marshall Plan funds would be
withheld if the

Communists won. The Pope reminded Italians that Catholic

cooperation with Communists had been prohibited by his
predecessor in the encyclical Divini Redemotoris

.

in

February several Italian-American newspapers urged readers
to write

relatives in Italy urging

a

vote against the

Communists. The idea was picked up by Cardinal Ameleto
Cicognani, the Apostolic Delegate to the United States who
urged American Bishops to encourage pastors of Italian

parishes to participate in the letter writing campaign.

[11]

The letter sent to all pastors in the Archdiocese of

New York framed the issue in much the same manner that
Archbishop Gushing had used the year before. "[T]he fate of
Italy depends upon the forthcoming election and the conflict
is

one between Communism and Christianity, between slavery

and freedom." All persons "of Italian origin living here and
all friends of Italy" were encouraged "to write to relatives

and acquaintances first of all to urge all to exercise their

right of the ballot and to warn them of the dangers of

a

communistic victory." Letter writers were instructed to send
their letters airmail and "to emphasize the help which has
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been extended to the Italian
people through Amer lean
generosity...." Spellman went so far
as to use radio to
broadcast a personal message to Italy.
The campaign
contributed to a victory for the Christian
Democrats and
their centrist party coalition members.
[12]

With the Italian elections out of the
way the focus

began to shift back to the domestic
election campaigns. The
Republican Party frontrunner. Governor Thomas
E. Dewey of
New York, was being challenged by former
Minnesota Governor

Harold Stasson. Stasson won surprising victories

in the

Wisconsin and Nebraska primaries, eliminating Douglas
MacArthur in the process and putting great pressure on
Dewey's campaign. The climax came in the Oregon
primary in
mid-May. Dewey used the opportunity of the primary to attack
the Truman administration foreign policy, accusing the

president of "wavering between appeasement and bluster." He

promised to "wage peace with all of the energy and

determination and force with which we waged war." Nor was
the issue of domestic Communism forgotten. When Stasson

advocated outlawing the Communist Party, Dewey countered by

arguing it was better to keep the "worms" above ground
"where we can see them and lick them as we have in New

York." Dewey managed

a

narrow victory over Stasson,

eliminating him from the race but leaving many observers to

218

conclude the Republican nomination was in
no sense locked up
for the New York Governor. [13]
The man many regarded as posing the
most serious

darkhorse threat to Dewey's nomination was the
party's chief
foreign policy spokesman Senator Arthur Vandenberg
of
Michigan. The President had enlisted Vandenberg's
support
for possible American involvement in a European
defense pact

following the successful negotiation of the Brussels Pact
in
March. The Michigan Senator introduced what became known
as
the Vandenberg Resolution to the Senate in early
May.

In

it,

the United States pledged continued support of the United

Nations but allowed American participation in regional

collective security arrangements such as the Brussels Pact
which were permitted under the U.N. Charter. The resolution

placed the isolationist elements within the Republican Party
in a difficult position.

They opposed U.S.

involvement in

European defense arrangements but were hesitant to attack
their leading foreign policy spokesman. Vandenberg produced
a

unanimous vote of approval on the resolution from his

Senate Foreign Relations Committee. With the isolationists

abstaining from the vote the Senate passed the resolution
to

4

on June 11,

only two weeks before the Republican

national convention.

[14]

National polls, meanwhile, continued to demonstrate
the schizophrenic nature of American public opinion on the
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international situation. A Gallup poll
taken in mid-April
asked what was "the most important problem
facing this

country today?" The response showed 65 percent
most
concerned with "preventing war and getting along

with the

Soviet Union." Only

8

percent cited inflation and the high

cost of living. An earlier poll, however, found
73 percent

believing the Truman administration was "too soft"
on the
Soviets. Perhaps more alarmingly, the April Gallup survey

showed

a

majority believing the Republicans would be better

at handling foreign policy issues than the Democrats.

Private polls conducted by the Democratic National Committee
produced similar results. The public message seemed clear.

International tensions and the threat of war was the most
serious problem facing the nation, more so than any domestic
issue. The best way to deal with the international situation

was to take a tougher stand against the Soviets. The

American public, not coincidentally

I

believe, was sending

the same message to the administration as the Catholic

hierarchy.

[15]

While the Senate was debating the Vandenberg

Resolution, the President was leaving on

a

mini version of

his fall campaign tour. The trip was billed as

"nonpolitical,

"

as the purpose was to receive an honorary

degree and speak at the commencement exercises at the

University of California at Berkeley. Toward the end of the
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trip at Eugene, Oregon, the President
remarked on his
negotiations with Stalin at Potsdam. "I got
very well

acquainted with Joe Stalin," he told the crowd,
"and
old Joe." He went on to say Stalin was a
"decent

I

like

fellow. But

Joe is a prisoner of the Politboro." This
was

President had expressed repeatedly

in private,

view the

a

but it

stunned the majority of the nation's press and the State

Department as well. Robert Lovett, Under Secretary of State
and a Republican, put through an emergency call to Clark

Clifford who was accompanying the President. Clifford

"tactfully advised the President not to repeat the remark
again." The President told Clifford he "goofed."

Republicans, however, "filed it away for future use." [16]
At least one historian,

Robert Divine, attributes

Truman's "goof" to "an apparent effort to attract Wallace

supporters." From the very beginning Wallace's campaign was
dogged by charges that it was Communist controlled, that

Wallace was

a

"dupe" of the American Communist party and

merely spouting the Soviet line on foreign policy. Labor was
the segment of the American public where Wallace expected to

find considerable support. A friend of labor throughout his

career, he had the very considerable assistance of CIO

President Philip Murray in
on the ticket in 1944.

a

losing effort to keep Wallace

Later that same year Murray had
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presented Wallace with
the CIO

.

[

a

"distinguished service medal" from

17

Communists had long been involved with the
American
labor movement, and held key leadership
positions

in many of

the ClO-aff iliated unions. But by 1947,
with Taft-Hartley

hanging over its head, coupled with the activity
of the ACTU
and an increasingly active government program
of harassment,
the CIO was moving to purge Communists from
positions of

power. Walter Reuther had won the presidency of the
United

Auto Workers in 1946 with "a campaign in which he pledged
to
oust Communists from the union payroll." In February of 1948

Reuther told an audience of Americans for Democratic Action
that Wallace was "Joe Stalin's American agent" and was

"separating the forces liberalism and leading them to
Stalin's rustlers." A month earlier the CIO Executive Board
voted 33 to 11 not to support

elections. While

a

a

third party in the fall

blow to the Wallace campaign, the vote

did not seem to preclude individual union leaders or their

unions from endorsing or supporting Wallace. Philip Murray,
however, moved to quell any such effort by writing to union

officials that they "should be governed" by national CIO

policy in favor of the Marshall Plan and against Wallace.
When Harry Bridges of the International Longshoreman's and

Warehouseman's Union continued to support Wallace
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in

California, he was fired as CIO regional
director for
northern California. [18]
The attacks by and on labor leaders
associated with
the Wallace campaign continued throughout
Spring 1948 as the

Czech crisis unfolded and rumors of war with
the Soviets
were rampant.

In March the

UAW declared that Wallace's

Progressive party was "a Communist Party maneuver
designed
to advance the foreign policy interests of the
Soviet Union.
In April Murray declared "this

charge

...

is

no time to mince words.

I

that the Communist party is directly responsible

for the organization of a third party in the United States."

Murray further charged that the party was "inaugurated at

a

Communist party meeting in the City of New York in October
of

1947." In July the ACTU officially announced the

Progressive party "a new front for American Communists."
This was

a

particularly difficult blow for the Wallace

campaign which was directing its appeal to labor over the
heads of the hostile union leadership to the rank and file,
and "a high proportion of the rank and file was Catholic."
[

19

]

Clearly, public opinion on events in Europe and at

home was strongly being shaped by Catholic attitudes. The

success of the letter writing campaign in influencing the
outcome of the Italian elections; Truman's decision to make
a

Catholic event the kickoff for gathering public support
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for his proposals to reinvigorate the
armed forces with

universal military training and selective
service, as well
as to attack Wallace's Communist connections;

and the

activities of Philip Murray and the ACTU in both
attacking

Communist leadership in the CIO and the Wallace campaign.
The Catholic hierarchy. Catholic politicians. Core

politicians with large Catholic constituencies such as
Arthur Vandenberg,

influential Catholic labor leaders and

Catholic intellectuals were calling for

a

tougher stand by

the president virtually since the end of the war in Europe.

With each successive step; the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall
Plan;

the containment policy;

the call to arms; the

involvement of the church in the Italian elections with the

consent and cooperation of the government the president was

regaining the confidence of American Catholics. The tougher
his stance the more popular he became. As mid-1948

approached he was again about to be offered an opportunity
to demonstrate his toughness.

All three of the major contending parties --

Democrats, Republicans and Wallace's Progressive Party -had scheduled their conventions for Philadelphia. The

Republicans were the first to arrive in mid-June. Senator

Vandenberg was again parrying isolationist thrusts within
his party. On June 3rd the House Appropriations Committee

had cut $1 billion from the first-year appropriation for the
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Marshall plan. With the approval of Speaker
Joe Martin, a
Catholic from Massachusetts, the full house
passed the bill.
The Democrats counterattacked, charging the
Republican
isolationists with playing "directly into the hands
of the
Communists." When the bill came before the Senate

Appropriations Committee, Vandenberg appeared to argue

in

favor of restoring the cuts. Similar appeals came
from GOP

candidates Stassen and Dewey. The Senate restored virtually
all the original request, and the Senate version
prevailed

when the bill went to

a

conference committee.

[20]

Vandenberg simultaneously feared that the Republican

platform would depart from the spirit of bipartisanship he
was promoting. He had been corresponding with Dewey's

foreign policy advisor John Foster Dulles, who recommended

inclusion of language in the platform "stressing the need to
roll back the Iron Curtain" and accused the administration
of following policies that made the U.S.

inefficient, vacillating and unr el iable

.

incorporated some of Dulles' language in

"appear uncertain,

Vandenberg

"

a

platform draft

and submitted it to Resolutions Committee Chairman Henry

Cabot Lodge, Jr. of Massachusetts. The final platform

approved by the convention reflected Vandenberg's attitude
toward bipartisanship. There were no attacks on "Democratic

appeasement at Yalta or Potsdam." Rather, in conclusion
"invite[d] the Minority Party to join us under the next
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it

Republican administration

in

stopping partisan politics at

the water's edge." The convention itself
was testimony to

bipartisanship. Only one speaker, Clare Booth Luce,
convert to Catholicism and

a

a

close friend of Cardinal

Spellman, attacked Truman on foreign policy by
bringing up
his "goof" in telling the country

old Joe," Luce exclaimed,

"I

like old Joe." "Good

"Of course they liked him.

Didn't

they give him all Eastern Europe, Manchuria, the Kuriles,

North China, coalitions

in

Poland,

Yugoslavia and

Czechoslovakia?" Nevertheless, the party had removed foreign
policy from the campaign agenda. Polls continued to show,
however,

"that the American people still gave foreign policy

issues

priority over domestic concerns" and that "a slight

a

majority felt that the Republicans were better equipped than
the Democrats to handle the delicate international

situation." In effect the Republicans were staking the
future on the belief that the disaffected urban ethnic, and

largely Catholic, voters that seemingly deserted the
Democrats in 1946 would continue to support the Republican

Party on domestic bread-and-butter issues

if

given no real

difference between the parties on foreign policy issues.
[211

On June 23 the Republicans nominated Governor Dewey
for the presidency. On the same day the Russians cut all

overland and water routes to Berlin, leaving only air
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traffic as the means of supplying the

2

million residents of

the western-occupied districts. The
President was faced with
open hostilities breaking at any moment.
Truman remained

silent, preferring to let others speak for
the

administration. General Lucius Clay, American military
Governor of Germany, announced the Russians could
not drive
the U.S. out of Berlin with any action "short of
war." The

President apparently agreed with him. When Secretary of
Defense Forrestal began reviewing the advisability of

staying in Berlin at
28,

a

briefing for the President on June

Truman interrupted him to say,

on that point,

"there was no discussion

we are going to stay period." Truman's

military advisor Admiral Leahy thought the situation
"hopeless," but the President authorized an increase

in the

airlift that had already begun to bring supplies to the
city. On June 30 Secretary of State Marshall announced

publicly that the United States "would not be driven out of
Berlin" and that the airlift was already proving more

successful than had been expected. Marshall was obviously
speaking to reassure the public, for General Hoyt
Vandenberg, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, doubted the

effectiveness of the airlift and the additional exposure of
the Air Force to danger. Supplying the necessary number of

planes to support an effective airlift, he believed, would

cripple the Air Forces's strategic capabilities elsewhere.
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Nevertheless, planes were directed to Berlin
from as far
away as Alaska and Hawaii. [22]
The President's political position was
certainly

strengthened by his stand on Berlin. A strange
combination
of conservative southerners and liberal
Democrats were

appealing to Dwight Eisenhower to accept

a

draft from the

Democratic convention. The southerners appealed to Ike
"to
lead the people of this nation in their fight
against

communism, tyranny and slavery and to maintain peoples
of
the world at peace." The liberals took a different approach,

claiming that Eisenhower was the only Democratic candidate
that could "keep Republican isolationists in line." In the

midst of the Berlin crisis, on July

statement in which he declared,

"I

5,

Eisenhower issued

a

will not, at this time,

identify myself with any political party, and could not
accept nomination for any public office or participate in

a

partisan political contest." The liberals turned briefly to
Supreme Court Justice William

Douglas in the face of

0.

Eisenhower's rebuff, but Douglas issued
own in which he said,
a candidate,

"I

am not

a

a

statement of his

candidate, have never been

and don't plan to be a candidate." With the

opposition fragmented and no clearcut candidate willing to
step forward Truman for all intents had the nomination
locked up when the convention opened in mid-July.
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[23]

The Democratic Platform Committee,
however, took

a

more belligerent attitude on foreign
policy than its
Republican counterpart. In a departure from
the spirit of
bipartisanship the committee approved language
that took

credit "for resisting Communist aggression"
through the
Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan and
criticized the

Republicans for "reluctance to provide funds to
support...
the greatest move for peace and recovery made
since the end
of World War II." Candidate Dewey in turn
criticized the

Democrats for this "extremely partisan and provocative

assertions concerning foreign affairs." Truman, however,
restored the essence,

if

not the spirit,

of bipartisanship

in his acceptance speech to the convention.

In a rather

backhanded manner the President claimed, "We have converted
the greatest and best of the Republicans to our viewpoint."

Giving the Republicans full credit for supporting the Truman

Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, he went on to say "foreign

policy should be the policy of the whole nation and not the

policy of one party or the other" and that "partisanship
should stop at the water's edge; and

I

shall continue to

preach that through this whole campaign."

[24]

When Henry Wallace and his Progressive Party delegates

arrived in Philadelphia in late July, they made it clear
that they at least disagreed with the concept of

bipartisanship. Employing populist rhetoric typical of an
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was "surrender," concluded Bevin,

"and none of us can accept

surrender." [25]
The Berlin crisis,

following as

it

did on the heels of

the Czech Coup, helped to solidify the the
perception within
the center/core groups that the Soviets were
intent on an

aggressive course

in

Europe. While these events were

unfolding, the periphery was beginning to focus on

developments in Hungary which would solidify

a

developing

religious bipartisanship over the issue of religious
persecution.

In April

the Hungarian Minister of Religion and

Education proposed the nationalization of the country's
Catholic Schools. The Primate of Hungary, Jozsef Cardinal
Mindszenty, responded with

a

pastoral letter critical of the

minister for reversing his position of February in which he

declared that "the Catholic Church had played an enormous
role in the educational development of our country" and that
"the Hungarian democracy does not want to deprive the

denominations of their schools." Mindszenty had been openly
critical of the increasing influence of what he termed
"Marxist" elements within the government which carried far

greater weight than their numbers due to the presence of Red

Army occupation forces.

[26]

In spite of the fact that a peace treaty had been

negotiated and signed with Hungary in January of 1947, the
Red Army maintained large forces in the country. Because no
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treaty had yet been agreed on with either
Germany or Austri a
the provisions of the treaty with Hungary
permitted Soviet

occupation forces to remain in place "for the
maintenance of
the lines of communication of the Soviet army
with the zone
of Soviet occupation in Austria." Efforts
first by Secretary

Byrnes and then Secretary Marshall to reduce Soviet

occupation forces in both Hungary and Rumania

in

early 1947

had been rejected by Molotov. The Soviet position toward the

Hungarian church was made clear by Georgi Pushkin, chairman
of the Allied Control Commission for Hungary.

Newly

appointed Minister to the Italian Republic Stephen Kertesz

approached Pushkin about the possibility of renewing
official Hungarian relations with the Vatican. Kertesz

argued that "Hungary had

a

large Catholic population and it

would be advisable for the new regime to settle Church-State

problems by the intervention of an experienced papal

diplomat." Pushkin responded that "The Vatican
of American

is

an agency

interests in Europe, financed by American

capitalists. The new Hungarian democracy does not need the

representative of such reactionary forces." This alleged
interplay between Vatican and American interests would play
an important role in subsequent events in Hungary.

[27]

The crisis brewing in Hungary over the nationalization
of the parochial schools came to a head in early June just

as the House and Senate were taking up the Marshall Plan
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appropriation bill and the major parties were
preparing for
their conventions. The Hungarian cabinet
voted in favor of

the secularization bill and sent it to
the parliament where
it was

approved by

Under the new law

nationalized,

a
a

vote of 230 to 60 with 70 abstentions.
total of 4,885 schools were

3,148 belonging to the Catholic Church.

In his

memoirs Mindszenty later accurately observed that the

"Bolshevist persecution of the churches," together "with

dismay over the coup in Czechoslovakia that had just taken
place, gave the ant icommunis t movement in the free world a

tremendous impetus." [28]
The post-convention atmosphere of international crisis

building over Berlin and Hungary took
early August. On August

Committee

(

HUAC

)

4

a

dramatic turn in

the House UnAmerican Activities

heard Whittaker Chambers,

a

repentant

Catholic, former Communist and editor at Time magazine^

testify that Alger Hiss, president of the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace and a former State Department

official, had passed government secrets to the Soviet Union

during the 1930s. Hiss had served as FDR's interpreter at
the Yalta Conference, and the implication, soon widely

understood, was that he had deluded the president on the

importance of the Soviet position regarding Eastern Europe.
Once again the image of

a

deceitful Communist minority,

unable to gain its ends through legitimate democratic

233

processes, but rather through cunning,
manipulation, spying,
and treason was reinforced in the
public's mind. This was
precisely the message the Catholic periphery
had been
warning against throughout the 1930s when
the Protestant
core "saw no threat at all." Catholic writers
had then

argued "the millions of unwitting 'dupes' of the
communists
-- mostly

'liberals' and most of these consisting of

teachers, writers, and assorted union activists," posed
the
real threat to the republic by advancing the Communist
cause

thereby allowing the relatively small number of real

Communists to maintain "low visibility" and to keep "their
activities largely undercover." The Communists' ability to
gain power through deception, manipulation of the electoral
process, and outside assistance from the Soviet Union was

now thoroughly documented by events in Eastern Europe. Yet
another lapsed Catholic and former Communist had contributed
to the growing belief that the Soviet Union was committed to

the overthrow of the United States by all means fair and
foul. Louis Budenz,

former editor of the Daily Worker and a

member of the CPUSA national committee, had returned to the

church in 1945 under the guidance of Monsignor Fulton
Sheen.

In

J.

1947 Budenz published the account of his years

within the Communist Party which graphically detailed the
twists and turns of the party at the direction of Moscow.
Budenz'

"confession" convinced many of the monolithic nature
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of Communism directed from the Kremlin.

The accusations

against Hiss now demonstrated to many Americans
that the
threat to America itself was real. [29]

Truman attempted to belittle the spy charges
against
Hiss, declaring them "a red herring" at

a

news conference

the day after Chambers made his allegations.

"The American

people," as historian Robert Divine notes, "already
deeply
concerned over the Soviet threat as a result of
Truman's

containment rhetoric, took the spy charges much more
seriously, viewing them as revealing a new front in
the

already dangerous Cold War." While the charges against
Hiss
contained "political dynamite" according to House minority
leader Sam Rayburn, the question for the public to answer
was whether or not the charges of a domestic Communist

conspiracy would negate the hard line being taken by Truman
in foreign policy.

His advisors warned against associating

"the containment policy with the Communist problem at home."
But the president refused to follow their advice in this

instance. He denied there was a domestic Communist threat,

declaring "the greatest danger has been that communism might
blot out the light of freedom in so much of the rest of the

world that the strength of its onslaught against our

liberties would be greatly multiplied."
In this

[30]

instance the President's political antennae

appeared more sensitive than his advisors'. His appeal to
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the Catholic ethnic voters on the strength
of his resistance
to the spread of Communism abroad
succeeded.

The famous

whistlestop campaign featured repeated attacks on
the
Republican 80th Congress on the bread-and-butter issues
so
important to working class Catholics. At the same time
the

President took full credit for the Truman Doctrine and
Marshall Plan, which to ethnic Catholic voters demonstrated
the President's commitment to resisting the Communist

takeover of their homelands. This combination succeeded

handsomely for the President. On October 27 as the campaign
neared its conclusion this fact was overtly demonstrated in
Boston. As the President was winding up his campaign swing

through the Northeast he paid an unscheduled visit to

Archbishop Gushing. Following

a

fifteen-minute private talk,

the two men appeared before reporters, and Cushing virtually

endorsed the President's reelection effort by telling him,
"I

think you are making one of the greatest and most

courageous fights in history on behalf of the people."
Cooler heads within the archdiocese attempted to blunt the

Archbishop's statement by amending
[Truman and Dewey] are putting up

it
a

later to read:

"Both

great fight." But the

Archbishop made no public comments the following day after
meeting with candidate Dewey.

[31]

Clearly the President wanted to associate both himself
and his policies with support from the Catholic hierarchy.
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as he did with his St.

Patrick's day speech with Spellman in

attendance and this end-of -campa ign appearance
with Gushing.
In his Boston speech before meeting with
Gushing the

President stressed "his administrations record in
checking
Gommunist aggression." He concluded, "the whole world
knows
of

the success of this policy," and "now,

the Communists

will never forgive me for that." Truman departed from the

spirit of bipartisanship in the closing days of the campaign

declaring in New York Gity, "We must never withdraw to the
Republican isolationism of the 1920s" and that

if

we did

"communism will become so powerful that the security of this
nation will be gravely endangered." Dewey responded

in kind,

charging that "Millions upon millions of people have been

delivered into Soviet slavery while our own administration
has tried appeasement one day and bluster the next." In

Chicago Dewey resurrected the

"I

like old Joe" statement by

Truman and again charged the administration with vacillation
between appeasement and bluster. But it was too little and
too late to make administration foreign policy a critical

campaign issue for Dewey,

[32]

The periphery, which was largely defining the issues
of

the Cold War both at home and abroad, maintained its

loyalty to the Democratic Party one more time. Catholics had
voted for Truman in large numbers; according to David

McCullough,

"in some predominantly Catholic wards of Boston
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and Pittsburgh the vote for Truman
exceeded past tallies for
Al Smith and FDR." The President's
hard line approach to the
Soviet Union, according to Robert Divine,
"won back many of
the Catholic groups [which had seemingly
deserted the party
in

1946] notably the Irish and Italians,

who had been

antagonized by Roosevelt's intervent ionism.
stand on Berlin brought Germans,
were Catholic,
Poles,

a

"

Truman's strong

large percentage of whom

back to the party in large numbers. Only the

resentful of the treatment of Poland, defected in

large enough numbers to reduce traditionally large

Democratic majorities in cities like Buffalo, Chicago and
Detroit. Vandenberg's effort to attach Republicans to the

popularity of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan did
not succeed.

The only foreign policy alternative to

containment offered to the votes was Henry Wallace's, and
that seemed to offer only more "appeasement" of the Soviets.
[

33]

The election was barely concluded when events in

Hungary again focused Catholic attention on that country.
One day after the election Hungary's bishops issued a

statement acknowledging that they were "deeply disturbed and
grieved by the recent disgraceful attacks made against
Cardinal Mindszenty." The bishops,

"speaking in the name of

religious freedom, protests against this campaign," On
November 18 the Voice of America broadcast to Hungarians
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a

pastoral letter written by Mindszenty
in Esztergom and
smuggled out of the country to be published.

The letter

asserted that Mindszenty was being "blamed
for counter
revolutionary plots and activities hostile to
the people."
The Cardinal complained that Hungary "is
condemned to
silence and public opinion

is

Democratic 'freedom of speech'

made

a

mere frivolous jest.

in this

country means that

any opinion that differs from the official one

is

silenced."

He claimed that Hungary stood alone "an orphan in the
whole

world" and that he stood "for God, for the Church and for

Hungary." Mindszenty was saying things that the government
did not want said, he admitted, but, he continued,

only because

"I

it was

am compelled to speak out from time to time

and to state the facts as they are,

it

is

only the misery of

my people and the urge of truth which force me to do so."
[34

]

The next day Mindszenty's personal secretary was

arrested returning from Mass. The Cardinal's own arrest
seemed imminent. While the situation remained strained and
further arrests of priests ensued,
and archivist of the archdiocese,

including the treasurer
the government took no

direct action against Mindszenty. Then, on December 26 some

eighty police surrounded the Cardinal's residence in
Esztergom, and he was placed under arrest. No public

announcement of the Cardinal's arrest was made until the
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following day. The New York Times of
December 28 carried
page-one story of the arrest along with a
picture of

Mindszenty with

a

a

subhead declaring "Catholic Primate

Charged with Plotting Against the Government
and Spying."
The announcement of the arrest carried no
details, according
to The Times

,

but, quoting "a high Hungarian authority who

requested that his name not be used, it reported that "the

government would issue

a

"detailed statement" within

48-hours which would "contain some surprises." The Times

source said the government had "indisputable evidence"

against the Cardinal. The Times described Mindszenty as "an

outspoken champion of the Catholic Church" and "considered

probably the only remaining powerful enemy of the present
Hungarian Government." [35]
The leader of the Parliamentary Opposition to the

Communists in Hungary, Istvan Barankovice, was said to be
"not surprised" by the announcement of Mindszenty's arrest.
He alluded to recent speeches of Premier Istvan Dobi and

Deputy Premier Matyas Rakosi which, he stated, "showed the
Government had been determined to get rid of the Cardinal."
The Times reported there had been other "hints" of action

against Mindszenty in recent months, including
then Premier Lajos Dinnyes declaring Mindszenty

speech by

a
a

"reactionary" and proclaiming the Hungarian people "are

determined to break reaction whether in the form of the
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purple of Bishops or the sabotage of kulaks
[rich

peasants]." In addition, Rakosi's speech of the
previous

January was cited in which he declared that it was
"the task
of democracy this year to settle the relationship
between
the Church and the Republic.

It cannot continue that a

majority of the enemies of the people should hide behind the
cloak of the churches, especially the Catholic Church." The

year-long battle then was seemingly drawing to

a

close.

[36]

Interestingly, The Times did not carry a reaction to

Mindszenty's arrest by New York's Cardinal Spellman. Rather,
it

cited the reaction of Boston's Archbishop Cushing and

Boston Congressman John F. Kennedy. Cushing declared that
any conviction of Mindszenty would come on "manufactured

evidence." "No one will be surprised," he continued, "by the
latest outrage against religion perpetrated by the Red

fascists in Hungary. The only shock will be because of the
added cynicism with which the Soviet puppets chose the

Christmas season to strike their blow at religious

resistance to tyranny." Cushing asked for "the prayers of
all our people and all who love God for this heroic priest."

Kennedy, meanwhile, released the contents of a telegram sent
to Secretary of State Marshall in which he said,

"The report

of the arrest of the distinguished Cardinal of Budapest has

alarmed and shocked all lovers of both religion and
freedom." The telegram went on to say "it
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is

hoped that our

state Department will urge the
United Nations and religion
loving people of the United States
that no crime we can
prevent will be permitted against
this great patriot and
world figure."
[37]
The periphery was once again at
center stage in the

fight against Communism. Both the
nation's Catholic press
and secular news media gave considerable
coverage to the

Mindszenty arrest. Kennedy, ever the politician,
and in this
instance a realist as well, left himself and
the government
protected with his phrase "no crime we can prevent."
In any

case Catholics were once again perceived as bearing
the

brunt of Communist hostility in Eastern Europe.
Mindszenty,

recounting the early days of his interrogation, recorded
the
charges that he planned to overthrow the Republic and

reinstall the monarchy by crowning Otto von Hapsburg with
the Crown of St.

Stephen, all with the assistance of the

United States to stir up a third world war. He told his

interrogators that he had indeed met with von Hapsburg in
1947 during a tour of America but only to secure help in

"obtaining and transporting charitable gifts from America."
He said he was heartened by the assurance that "Hungarian

Catholicism could count on support from Catholic Americans."
Indeed they could. And Mindszenty would become the leading

martyr of American Catholicism's fight against godless
Communism. A fight that, as FDR had foreseen, would continue
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to have repercussions on American
foreign policy. There

could be no permanent peace as long as the
Catholics of

Eastern Europe were denied the ability to practice
their
faith.

[38]
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CHAPTER 12

"REBELLION TO TYRANTS IS OBEDIENCE TO GOD"
The hail of protest resulting from the arrest
of

Cardinal Mindszenty serves to highlight the impact of
the

periphery in focusing American public opinion. The ability
of members of

the Catholic hierarchy, such as Archbishop

Gushing, and Catholic Congressmen, such as Representative

John

F.

Kennedy, calling for some type of American response

to Mindszenty's arrest generated press coverage which no

other American religious denomination seemed capable of

achieving

.

And non-Cathol ics noticed it.

The Protestant journal The Christian C entury took more

note of the disparity of attention given Mindszenty's arrest
by both the American press and, more importantly, by the

government. "Protestants may be struck by the difference

between the excitement created by the arrest of Cardinal

Mindszenty and the lack of

it

when Bishop Ordass, the

Lutheran primate of Hungary, and other Lutheran leaders were
arrested," the Centur y noted with some sarcasm. The Lutheran
press and "a few other church papers" protested the

"travesty of justice" which had taken place against Ordass.
"But there was no eagerness by the U.S. department of state
to come charging into the arena.

.

.

.And the world's press let

Bishop Ordass go to his cell without making much fuss over

blow to religious freedom." The editors were apparently
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a

upset by the double standard employed
by Undersecretary of
State Robert Lovett. He described the
charges against
Mindszenty as "patently false" at a news
conference and
found that the legal process observed by
the Hungarian

Government was

a

"sickening sham." The difference in the

treatment accorded Mindszenty's arrest could be
ascribed to
the fact he was "a 'prince' of a church with
a worldwide

organization and

a

publicity 'apparatus'

(if we may venture

to use in this connection a term popularized by
Whittaker

Chambers) that commands instant attention from press and

radio everywhere."

[1]

The editorial went on to describe the Communists'

position on Papal activities; "In Communist thinking, the
Roman Catholic Church

is

now everywhere at war with

Communist governments," and from their viewpoint

it was

understandable that such terms as "treason" and "spying"
should be invoked in the charges against Mindszenty. If the

church is at war with Communist governments' "any

communication ... between the Cardinal --

a

Hungarian citizen

-- and Church authorities outside Hungary is communication

with the enemy. Hence, treason. Hence, spying. Hence,

plotting." The Christian Century argued that the Pope's
Christmas allocution of 1948 amounted to "war to the hilt

between the papal church and the Communist states" and
concluded that "with the Roman Church thus committed by its
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head to relentless warfare against
Communist aggression, and
holding it the moral duty of nations to
back that warfare if

necessary by force of arms, the part played

in

influencing

national policy by faithful members of that
church

—

as

diplomats, as legislators, as government
executives and

administrators, as soldiers, as journalists, as
educators
is

—

something to be held under constant and careful

scrutiny." For the editors of The Christian Centnry.
at
least, the issue of who presented the greater threat
to the

nation -- Moscow or Rome

—

was still in doubt. [2]

The liberal Catholic periodical Commonweal on January
7,

1949 presented a rather measured response to the

Cardinal's arrest.

"The position of Hungary is fluid and

complex," it editorialized, so "that it would seem an almost

desperate job to describe the frame and pattern of the
quarrel between the Hungarian Communist Government and the

Primate of the Church in Hungary." However, noting that

Mindszenty was an "ancient concentration camp dweller,"
having been jailed by Hitler, there could be no doubt that

"Communism is an enemy of religion, of the Church." In the
final analysis there could be no doubt that "the great issue
is

the worship of God and the persuasion of souls .... There

is

spiritual battle." [3]

Coincidental ly, the editors of Commonweal seemed to
take up the challenge of The Christian Century to keep
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"under constant and careful scrutiny"
Catholics who were in
a position to influence national
policy. In its January 14,
1949 edition Commonweal

ran an article examining the voting

record of Catholics in Congress. The Cmnrnonweal.
article,
however, was aimed at disproving the charge that
Catholics

represented "a reactionary force in the United States."
Noting the charge of critics that "Catholics are puppets
who
must follow the leadership of their Church" the editors

examined the voting record in the 80th Congress of 11

Catholic Senators and 45 Congressmen. They concluded that
while "the votes of Catholics in the House and Senate did
take a definite trend," it was not the conservative trend of
the 80th Congress but was decidedly liberal.

In order to

prevent being charged with "chos(ing) our own issues and own

designations" of what constituted

a

"liberal" vote the

author employed the criteria of the New Republic

.

For the

purposes of this study the votes of Catholic members of
congress reflecting Catholic anti-communism will be
examined. In the Senate

a

vote against cutting funds for the

Marshall Plan was regarded as progressive. The Senate as a
whole voted 65 percent liberal while Catholics voted
percent.

81

In a somewhat surprising combination the two

Catholic Senators voting in favor of cutting Marshall PLan
funds were Denis Chaves (D), New Mexico, and Joseph McCarthy
(R),

Wisconsin. The vote in the House was narrower where

249

a

vote to restore Marshall Plan funds
previously cut was
counted as progressive. Overall the House
voted 83 percent
liberal, while Catholics voted 85 percent.
[4]

A vote in the House against the Mundt-Nixon
Bill was

considered progressive. Overall, the House voted
only 15
percent liberal, while Catholics voted 61
percent.
Interestingly, Minority Leader John McCormack

(D)

Massachusetts voted in favor of Mundt-Nixon while his
colleague John F. Kennedy
a

Massachusetts did not vote. On

(D)

vote to provide new funding for the House Un-American

Activities Committee

a

vote against was considered

progressive. The House voted only

9

percent liberal, while

Catholics voted 40 percent. In this instance both McCormack
and Kennedy voted to provide new funding for HUAC. Thus,

Catholics seemed to present

a

much more united front in

terms of dealing with international Communism. Catholic

support for measures dealing with domestic anti-Communism
drops off considerably but may reflect more the partisan

nature of the attacks on Communists in government. After
all,

the administration was Democratic. But even here 16

Democrats voted in favor of new funding for HUAC, while five
more abstained. This seems to suggest strong Catholic

congressional support for the fight against domestic

Communism even among Democrats.
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[5]

The Catholic hierarchy moved to
keep the Mindszenty

arrest at the forefront of public
attention. Archbishop
Gushing sent a circular to all parishes
calling for a day of
prayer for Mindszenty the week his trial
was to open. The

Archbishop asked for prayers "during the
counterfeit trial
of the Cardinal, whose crime has
been the defense

of freedom

of religion and of human rights."

In addition prayer was

sought "...that the Cardinal may be delivered
from the power
of his enemies,

and that his people, delivered from the

bonds of Communistic slavery, may be free once
more to

worship God."

[6]

In New York as well Cardinal Spellman designated

February

6

as a day of prayer for Mindszenty,

and 4,000

Catholic Boy Scouts marched down Fifth Avenue to St.
Patrick's Cathedral as part of the overall protest. Inside
the Cathedral the Cardinal took to the pulpit for the first

time since V-E Day and urged the American government to act.

Denouncing "the Satan inspired Communist crimes" against the
church in Eastern Europe, he called on the government "to
raise their voices as one." Jesuit historian Donald Crosby
in attempting to place American Catholic anti-Communism

within the spectrum of

a

broader American ant i -Communist

persuasion has focused on the strident rhetoric of
Spellman

's

coming as

speech rather than the overall message which,
it did

in the midst of the
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emerging debate over

U.S. participation in NATO, could
only be construed as an

endorsement of American participation
in keeping with the
Pope's Christmas message. As pointed
out earlier (see
Chapter

6)

Catholics were virtually alone in the mid-1930s

in calling for an ant i -Communist
awareness.

The Christian

Century opposed and continued to oppose mainline
Protestant
denominations falling in line behind Catholic
leadership in
such an undertak i ng 7
.

[

Spellman was hardly discouraged. Calling for vigorous

American leadership to halt the spread of "atheistic

Communism," he asked "when will the American Government,
the
American public, the leaders in all phases of American life,
religious, educational, political, labor, industrial,

communications, yes, and entertainment, when will all free
men raise their voices as one and cry out against and work

against Satan inspired Communist crimes." This call from the

periphery to the core to take up the fight had immediate
results. The New York Times reported Protestant reaction in
the same page-one article on Spellman's speech.

Washington the Rev, Dr. Frederick

B.

In

Harris, chaplain of the

Senate, told his Foundry Methodist Church congregation in

words seemingly lifted from The Christian Century that

Mindszenty's trial "was the signal for 'war to the hilt"
between Catholicism and Communism." In contrast to The

Century

'

position, however, Harris said that "though he was
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Protestant he felt he should 'speak
out' against the
"so-called trial."
Boston the Rev. Dr. Daniel L. Poling,
President of the World Christian Endeavor
a

m

Union,

"characterized the Mindszenty trial as
and a

'a

rape of justice'

'super crime against freedom'." And, he
continued

"this anti-God totalitarianism does not discriminate
between

Catholic and Protestant."

[8]

Mindszenty's gaunt figure at his public trial raised
the question of whether torture had been employed
and his

"confession" coerced. The Hungarian Communist regime
produced letters Mindszenty wrote to American Ambassador
Arthur Schoenfeld in 1946. Mindszenty cited the

"responsibilities toward the nations of Europe" assumed by
the Allied Powers at the Yalta Conference. The Cardinal

declared that while "Hungary may appear to be

a

democratic

nation," in reality it "is not a true democracy." "There

is

no room in the country for anything but a Marxist police

force, a Marxist press, and innumerable prisons and

concentration camps." The country was ruled by "Soviet
adherents" and would so remain "as long as the Soviet army
of occupation remains in Hungary." He appealed to "the

United States and England, the defenders of freedom and
justice the world over, to come to our aid.

I

ask them to

rescue us from the oppression and corruption overwhelming
our land." While Mindszenty's letters were probably aimed at
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securing

a

more active role by for Anglo-American

representatives on the Allied Control Commission
for
Hungary, the language could be, and was,
construed as

advocating war. The state prosecution so construed

it,

declaring "Mindszenty and his cohorts led foreign
nations to
believe that there was a widespread desire in Hungary
to

abolish the Republic and restore the monarchy

The

conspirators tried to incite the American imperialists to

declare war on our country. "[9]

Mindszenty's trial and subsequent life sentence
confirmed once again for the Catholic periphery the menace
of

"atheistic Communism" and its attack on religion. It also

confirmed FDR's fear that religious persecution of Catholics
in Eastern

Europe would prevent

a

permanent peace. Contrary

to most revisionist thinking on the development of the Cold
War,

religious persecution rather than economics was the

paradigm driving confrontational public attitudes toward the
Soviet Union. And while the core -- mainstream American

Protestantism -- maintained

a

lingering ant i -Catol icism as

demonstrated by The Christian Century's reaction to the
arrest of Mindszenty, the Catholic periphery was limiting
its course of action.

As

if

to underscore the nature of the

Catholic vs. Communist threat The Christian Century returned
to this theme on February 23 in an editorial condemning the

arrest of fifteen Protestant ministers in Bulgaria. Noting
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that the Protestant ministers in
Bulgaria were charged with
the same crimes alleged against Bishop
Ordass and Mindszenty
treason, espionage and black market
operations -- the

—

editorial declared, "When the Lutheran primate
of Hungary
was sentenced to prison, the world's press
showed little
interest. But now that

given

a

a

Roman Catholic cardinal has been

life sentence, anything that can be used to
whip up

public indignation against Communist treatment of
religion
becomes front page news." While admitting the charges

against the Protestant ministers were "incredible," the
editors went on to say: "We do not believe any such

supporting documentary evidence as was introduced in the

Mindszenty trial will be forthcoming." The Hungarian
prosecutors had made their case against Mindszenty as far as
The Century was concerned.

"Some sort of official protest

from the United States government is now expected. What form
it will take,

to whom it will be directed,

or what

it may be

hoped to accomplish no one seems to know." More importantly,
the editors noted,

"No such protest against Bishop Ordass'

imprisonment is in prospect." [10]
More important, for our purposes, the trial and

conviction of Mindszenty, and the consequent publicity

surrounding these events, were thrust before the public
during the ongoing debate over United States participation
in NATO.

Discussions involving U.S. participation in
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a

collective security arrangement for
Western Europe had begun
the previous September. Indeed,
the Pope's Christmas
allocution can be seen as an endorsement
of

In the very issue

in which

it

it's necessity.

once again criticized both the

press and government for their reaction
to the Mindszenty
^""'^^ The Christian Century raised
"new questions" regarding
the advisability of such a pact. The
shifting emphasis in

Washington on whether or not the pact was in
fact

a

"military" agreement, criticism from the foreign
minister of
Denmark that the United States was attempting
"to force the

Scandinavian states into the alliance," and

a

call from

Trygve Lie not to let regional alliances undermine the

authority of the United Nations led The Century to conclude
that "a senate which ratified a military alliance under
such

circumstances would convict itself of irresponsible levity
in

its treatment of foreign affairs."

[11]

Three weeks later The Century began to take

a

different view of the religious show trials taking place in
Eastern Europe. The conviction and life sentences on the
leaders of the Bulgarian Methodist, Baptist, Congregational
and Pentecostal churches seemed to call for a reevaluation
of the trials

in Hungary.

The life sentences were "of

secondary importance," according to the editors, "The real
tragedy of the trials was laid bare to the world

in the

sight of the succession of broken men mounting the stand to
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confess to misdeeds which few outside
the iron curtain
believe they committed and to beg for
punishment

commensurate to their self -proclaimed wrongdoing."
Catholic
claims that Mindszenty's confession had been
extracted
through torture and drugs now seemed more
credible given the

appearance of these "broken" Protestant pastors.

[12]

While acknowledging the renewed attack on religion
behind the iron curtain. The Century continued to question
the need for a military alliance against Russia. Quoting

from a speech by John Foster Dulles opening the Cleveland

conference on churches and world order in which he said that
no responsible official "in this or any other government"

believed that Russia "now plans conquest by open military

aggression" and that the Soviet Union "does not contemplate
the use of war as an instrument of its national policy."
The Century concluded that only the administration's desire
to have the North Atlantic pact ratified prevented other

"such assurances" being made to the public. The security to
be achieved by the pact was being threatened by claims from

Communist Party leaders in western countries "that in case
of an

'imperialist* war, the Communists in those countries

would work for a Russian victory." With 1.1 million

Communist Party members in France, 2.3 million in Italy and
2.2 million in Germany the ability "to sabotage effectively

any military efforts by those countries" was enormous
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.[ 1 3

The editors of The Century, however,
were bucking the
trend, one which they seem to have
perceived as being

largely led by the Catholic periphery as
evidenced by their
earlier call to keep close watch on Catholics
in positions
to influence policy decisions.

demonstrated

a

Two polls conducted in 1948

dramatic shift in public opinion regarding

the idea of the U.S. defending Europe. When
asked if the
"U.S. should promise to go to war to defend W.
Europe if it
is attacked,"

43 percent of Catholics and 40 percent of

Protestants responded yes. Interestingly, large numbers of
both,

46

percent of Catholics and 48 percent of Protestants,

answered no. By late November, when asked if the "U.S.
should join W. Europe in

a

permanent military alliance,"

69

percent of Catholics and 70 percent of Protestants answered
yes. While the questions are not identical,

that the second incorporates the first.

it can be argued

It could also be

argued, and was, that a military alliance was
war. Nevertheless,

a

deterrent to

the numbers of those willing to have the

U.S. actively involved in the defense of Western Europe

jumped dramatically.

[14]

Secretary of State Acheson responded in early February
to criticism by some members of the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee that the department "was leaving so much in the
dark about negotiations." Defending the treaty on March 19,

Acheson stressed the cultural connections and ties of the
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North Atlantic community as the product
of "at least 350
years of history, maybe more." The United
States was

"connected to western Europe by common institutions
and
moral and ethical beliefs. Similarities of this

kind are not

superficial, but fundamental. They are the strongest
kind of
ties, because they are based on moral convictions,
on

acceptance of the same values in life." The Secretary's
emphasis on "common institutions," "moral and ethical

beliefs," "moral convictions," and the "same values in life"
did not overtly state that these values were Christian. But
to a Senate inundated with resolutions,

petitions,

proclamations and speeches condemning the arrest, trial and

conviction of Cardinal Mindszenty, and the continuing attack
on Christianity in general and Catholicism in particular

in

Eastern Europe there could be little doubt that "atheistic

Communism" represented by the Soviet Union presented

a

fundamental challenge to western civil ization .[ 15
In the midst of the debate over ratification of the

NATO treaty The Christian Century took up the plight of

Rumania's Greek Catholic or Uniat Church which had been
"wiped out by a decree of the Communist government." Noting
that the liquidation of the Greek Catholic Church affected

population "appreciably greater than that of persons
belonging to the Congregational Christian Churches of the
United States," this was no small matter. The Century also
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noted that "the action was in conformity
with the Kremlin's
policy toward the Uniat Church everywhere
and was

undoubtedly adopted by the Rumanian government
on orders
from Moscow." The forced inclusion of the
Rumanian
Uniat

Church into the Rumanian Eastern Orthodox Church
was

accompanied by the arrest of some 430 Uniat priests,
many of
whom were beaten in front of their families and "taken
away
with blood-covered faces." The editors applauded their

courage in resisting the forced conversion. Although noting
and condemning the actions in Rumania,

the editors of The

^^"^^^y were unaware of the "all-Slav" plan
the Orthodox Churches of Eastern Europe as

of
a

Stalin to use

bulwark against

Vatican influence. The pattern, however, had become clear
for all to see.

The Kremlin had changed its early policy of

stamping out "all religions in the area under its control"
and had decided "to use the Orthodox Church as an instrument
of state power."

[16]

While the Mindszenty case mobilized the Catholic

periphery

in

early 1949, another espionage trial closer to

home dominated public attention throughout the spring and

early summer. Once again Catholics would play an important,
perhaps a defining role. The trial involved Alger Hiss,

charged with perjury related to his activities as

a

State

Department official in the mid-1930s. As outlined earlier.
Hiss had come under investigation by the House UnAmerican
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Activities Coimnittee in 1948 when lapsed
Catholic and former
Communist Whittaker Chambers accused him
of being a member
of the Communist Party,

in late 1948 Chambers expanded
his

accusations against Hiss to include participation
in
Soviet spy ring. Chambers charged that Hiss
passed

a

classified State Department documents through him
on to
Russia. The charges against Hiss called into
question once
again the entire nature of the postwar agreements
which has
so dramatically broken down.

Hiss served as Executive

Secretary at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference

in

1944,

served

as an advisor to FDR at the Yalta Conference and held
an

important position at the conference establishing the United

Nations at San Francisco. Thus, the thread of Communist
intrigue could be seen woven throughout the entire postwar

policy which many saw as clearly

a

failure and clearly

designed to benefit the Soviet Union.
The HUAC investigation of Hiss was spearheaded by

Richard M. Nixon, a little known first-term congressman from

southern California. Nixon had come under the wing of

Congressman Charles Kersten of Wisconsin. According to
Nixon, Kersten "taught me most of what

I

know about

Communism." Kersten in turn introduced Nixon to Father John
Cronin, a labor priest in Baltimore who had been

instrumental in purging Communists from the dockside unions
in the early 1940s.

Because of his activity with the
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Baltimore unions Cronin developed something
of
as an expert on Communism,

reputation

a

both within the church and with

the FBI. Archbishop Edward Mooney of Detroit
asked Cronin to

prepare a secret report on Communism for distribution
to

Catholic Bishops nationwide. The FBI also sought out
Cronin's advice on Communist activity in the labor
movement,
and in turn FBI agents kept him informed of what they
knew.
[17]

Nixon and Cronin were to develop
and Cronin provided the congressman

a

a

lasting friendship,

copy of his report to

the American Bishops entitled "The Problem of American

Communism." It included Alger Hiss among

list of "actual

a

and alleged Communists" who were implicated in atomic

espionage or working for the State Department. Thus, Nixon
was aware of allegations against Hiss over a year and

before the public naming of Hiss set off

a

half

national furor.

a

Later, Cronin revealed that FBI agent Ed Hummer was keeping

him informed of the bureau's investigation of Hiss.
the Justice Department was sitting on the
the typewriter,

ect

.

.

.

.

I

r

esults

.

.

"Since
.

the car,

told Dick, who then knew just where

to look for things and what he would find."

[18]

Thus, as the NATO Treaty was making its way toward

ratification the attitude of the Catholic periphery was once
again dominating the public discussion of Communism.

Catholic reaction to persecution of the church in Eastern
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Europe could not help but be tied to the
allegations of
espionage against Hiss. The church was not only
defending

religious liberty in Europe but was intimately
involved with
ferreting out the traitors at home who had left the
European
church at the mercy of Communism. Whittaker Chambers,
who
had seen the error of his ways and returned to the
church,

believed he had a role to play in the divine plan. He was

a

witness to the "struggle" which was taking place across the
world. And "the turn the struggle had taken made it clear
that what most of the world supposed it to be --

between the force of two irreconcilable faiths

—

struggle

a

Communism

and Christianity..." was being played out in Europe for all
to see.

The first perjury trial against Hiss ended in a

mistrial in early July when the jury deadlocked 8-4 for
conviction. Two weeks later, on July 21, the Senate voted to

ratify the NATO Treaty by

a

vote of 82 to 13. All nine

Catholic Senators present voted in favor of ratification,
including Senator McCarthy of Wisconsin. A tenth Catholic,

Senator Ellender of Louisiana, was not present for the vote
but was recorded as prepared to vote in favor.

[19]

Against the background of the NATO debate still
another issue was emerging in which Catholic influence would

play

a

decisive role. As early as March of 1948 when the

House took up the first Economic Cooperation Act to

implement the Marshall Plan the question of what to do about
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Spain had been raised. Representative
Alvin O'Konski,

Republican of Wisconsin and

a

Catholic,

introduced an

amendment on the House floor making Spain one of
the

participating nations. The House adopted the amendment
by
almost a 3 to 1 vote, 149-52. The amendment was
defeated
a

in

House-Senate conference on the bill, but the question of

what to do with overwhelmingly Catholic, but fascist.
Franco

Spain would not go away. One historian has remarked:

"Undoubtedly, the sudden burst of support for Spain was due
in part to

the pressures of an election year." Just as Spain

had been a political thorn for FDR during the civil war,

it

would also be a political thorn for Truman. Virtually

simultaneous with the House vote Myron

C.

Taylor, first

FDR's and now Truman's personal representative to the

Vatican, met with Franco on March 30 to inform the

Generalissimo "by what means he could gain the acceptance of
the

western governments." More importantly, at least from

political perspective, "it was asserted by some that the
intention of the visit was to demonstrate to American

Catholics that the Truman Administration was in

a

conciliatory mood toward Spain." [20]
In September of 1948 Senator Chan Gurney,

Republican

of South Dakota and Chairman of the powerful Senate Armed

Services Committee, met privately for over an hour with

Franco in Madrid. After the meeting the Senator declared
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a

that he was in favor of "complete

r

eestabl ishment of all

relations between Spain and the United States."
The official
administration policy toward Spain was articulated
by

Secretary of State Acheson who pointed out that
the U.S. had
never severed diplomatic relations with Spain but
that we

honored the United Nations ban on ambassadors because
"become

a

it

had

symbol." Thus, U.S. policy toward Spain was more

symbolic than substantial. In spite of this, many Catholics
were doing their best to mitigate the image of Franco's
Spain.

In March of 1949 the Jesuit weekly America argued

that any persecution occurring in Spain, particularly any

religious persecution, was not the result of Catholicism but
the internal dynamics of the Spanish State.

"Spain is not

the Catholic Church" argued the editors of America

and

Spanish policy toward Protestants should be regarded as

specifically Spanish, not characteristically Catholic. Not
so said the editors of The Christian Century in rebuttal;

"This is the old excuse for the Inquisition:

it was

the

state that did it not the church." [21]
By May The Christian Century was asking the question

"What's Behind the Pro-Franco Agitation?" Citing

a

"new

outburst of agitation in Washington for some sort of

rapprochement with Franco Spain," The Century believed the
answer was to be found in the "consideration of the North

Atlantic Treaty." Fearing the possibility of Russian
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aggression in Europe, the Army did not want
to repeat the
"invasion of 1944." In order to prevent this
"Spain would
offer the one fairly secure base for the
American forces,

beyond the reach of the Russians' first thrust,
behind the

rampart of the Pyrenees." In spite of "all the
disavowals
that will be made before the Senate votes, we
expect that if
the North Atlantic alliance is ratified,

it won't be long

before Franco's Spain will be in it." [22]
The answer to The Century's question of what (or who?)
was behind the pro-Franco agitation could perhaps be more

accurately found in the questioning of Secretary Acheson,
not before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings
on the NATO treaty,

but before the Senate Appropriations

Committee. The Subcommittee on State Department

appropriations was chaired by Senator Pat McCarran, Democrat
of Nevada and a Catholic.

Acheson with
policy:

"I

a

McCarran opened the questioning of

specific threat to tie appropriations to

should like to ask you why

it

is

that this

country refuses to recognize Spain." Senator McKeller jumped
in to agree with McCarran

"about our nonr ecognit ion of

Spain. Spain is a Christian nation and we have had friendly

relations with her....

I

see no reason why we should not

have friendly relations with Spain." Acheson attempted to

evade the direct line of questioning by noting the U.S. was

"acting under this recommendation of the General Assembly"
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in not appointing an ambassador.

response:

McCarran jumped on the

"Are we to be enslaved to the U.N.?

I

never voted

with that in mind." Concluding his
remarks, he declared,
"Let me say to you Mr. Secretary that
so far as

I

am

personally concerned as chairman of this
subcommittee

I

am

not in favor of your policy with reference
to Spain and

until that policy is changed

appropriations with

a

I

am going to examine your

fine tooth comb." The Senator from

Nevada was not pulling any punches.

[23]

Republican Senator Leverett Saltonstall, representing
heavily Catholic Massachusetts, attempted to come to
Acheson's aide by shifting the burden for our

"nonrecognition" policy to

a

question of security based on

the "attitude of other nations in Europe toward Spain and
our wanting to work along with them." Acheson denied that

there was a policy of nonrecognition and then admitted that

Spain was indeed important to U.S. security and "that is why
it

is

so important and why we have been doing our best to

bring about what

I

call a reintegration of Spain in the

west." This open admission that the Department of State was

working for the "reintegration" of Spain was apparently not
enough for McCarran who quickly brought up the issue of

whether or not NATO could be successful unless the Iberian

peninsula and Spain were included. Acheson in turn responded
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that "the pact can be successful
without it;

it can be

stronger with it." [24]

Acheson was attempting

a

delicate balancing act. And

his efforts to reintegrate Spain into
the western community

were beginning to achieve results. The Christian
CPnt-nrv

noted in early June that "some curious things
happened when
the U.N. voted on rescinding its 1946 anti-Franco

resolution. Explaining that "the United States does
not want
to do anything that would be resented either
by western

Europeans or by the Spaniards," the U.S. would abstain on
the vote. However, when the vote came, not only did the U.S.

abstain but also "the western Europe governments who were
said to be against Franco." In spite of the substantially

reduced majority needed as

a

result of the

16

abstentions,

the resolution failed. While criticizing the U.N. action.

Franco "hailed the 'realism' of his growing closeness with
the United States.

The Christian Century did not quite know

what to make of "such

a

devious record." The Protestant

journal reported on rumors to the effect that only open

protests from Eleanor Roosevelt and John Foster Dulles had

prevented the U.S. from "casting an outright pro-Franco
vote," and that despite Acheson's public reservations,
"Franco believes he has good friends in Washington." The
fact that the major western European allies of the U.S.
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abstained on the vote clearly illustrates
that Acheson's
policy of "reintegration" of Spain was making
pr ogress

.[

25

The Spanish in the meantime had retained the
services
of Charles Patrick Clark to represent their

Washington as

a

interests in

lobbyist and public relations specialist.

Clark was a Catholic and an honors graduate of Georgetown

University. He was well connected in Washington all the way
up to the oval office.

Clark had served as an investigator

for the Truman Committee investigating the National Defense

Program during the war.

In

spite of Clark's close

relationship with his former boss, and increasing
congressional support to do something about Spain, Truman
remained adamant in his opposition to Franco. He personally
intervened to prevent inclusion of Spain under the Marshall

Plan in July, declaring that relations between the two

countries were "not friendly." [26]
By the Fall of 1949, however, the President was

willing to make informal gestures to Spain. Admiral Richard
Conolly, Commander of United States Naval Forces in the

Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, had repeatedly sought

permission to make courtesy calls on Spanish ports. Truman
finally authorized such an informal visit, and on September
3

U.S. warships entered the Spanish port of El Ferrol for a

five-day stay. This marked the first time since the Spanish
Civil War that American warships entered
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a

Spanish port.

Admiral Conolly, accompanied by
four other admirals, an Army
Major General and an Air Force
Brigadier General met with
Franco and "exchanged civilities
and discussed problems of
mutual interest." When Conolly returned
to Washington in
October, he reported to both the White
House and the House
Armed Services Committee on his meeting
with Franco. Before
the House Committee he made a strong
argument for Spanish
naval bases, citing "the strategic importance
of the Iberian
Peninsula." While Truman seemed pleased with the
results of
the visit, his opposition to Franco did not
wane.

[27]

The American warships had hardly weighed anchor
when a

virtual horde of congressional delegations, all headed by
Catholics, descended on Madrid. On September 14 Senator

McCarran departed for Spain, announcing that he intended to
discuss an American loan with Franco. Truman, whose

opposition to Franco may have stemmed in part from his

dislike for McCarran,

immediately announced that McCarran

was traveling as a private citizen and "did not represent

anyone in the Administration." New York Democrat James J.

Murphy led

a

delegation of seven house members that met with

Franco shortly after McCarran. Murphy announced after the

meeting that he found Franco to be "a very, very, lovely and
lovable character." Another Catholic New York Democrat,

Eugene

J.

Keogh, was part of a five-member congressional

delegation arriving at the same time. On November
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1

an

important subcommittee of the Senate
Appropriations

Committee headed by New Mexico's Catholic
Senator Dennis
Chavez began a five-week tour of Europe
which included
Spain. Chavez announced that Spain should
receive both

economic and military assistance from the U.S.
to "bulwark
Western Europe's security." On its return the
committee

unanimously agreed that Spain should be given full
diplomatic recognition as well as economic aid. [28]
At the same time that Spain was being deluged by

congressional committees Charles Patrick Clark was also

visiting the country and conducting his own investigation
into the nature and status of religious persecution there.

Upon returning to the U.S., Clark prepared

a

report for

Truman "as requested" which relied heavily on the testimony
of Max H. Klein,

President of the American Chamber of

Commerce in Spain. Klein, like Clark and so many others
involved in the attempt to reverse Spanish policy, was
Catholic. Klein reported that "Protestantism

is

a

not a

problem in Spain." He confined himself to Barcelona where he
lived and stated,

"I

can be quite definite in saying that

the Protestant community is not persecuted and they are free
to worship according to their beliefs." He,

and several of

his friends, had regularly attended Protestant services

"without the slightest difficulty." In conclusion, Klein

noted that Spaniards were great "individualists" and "apt to
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be very undisciplined." However,

"there is just one issue on

which they are practically all agreed
and that is their
religion. Why should we attempt to destroy
that unity?" [29]
Clark concluded his report to Truman by suggesting
a

meeting at which he could convey "an expression
of General
Franco's feeling regarding the religious situation,
as well
as other matters," and "certain conclusions"
of his own,

both of which he preferred to "give orally." While no such

meeting ever took place, Clark's report was circulated among
other influential sources, especially in Congress.

In an

apparent attempt to stem the tide of public criticism

regarding Spanish policy several administration supporters
from the House Foreign Affairs Committee left for Spain in

early December. This group also included some prominent
Catholics,

including Joseph

L.

Pfeifer, Democrat, N.Y.,

Thomas Gordon, Democrat, 111., and Clement Zablocki,
Democrat, Wisconsin. Pfeifer issued

a

statement to the

effect that the Spanish should not place too much weight on

statements of individual members of Congress as individuals
could not speak for the entire body. [30]
The issue of the "reintegration" of Spain would not be

completely resolved for several years. That story will be
taken up in later discussions of its impact on the

development of cold war ideology. Within the context of the

developing cold war atmosphere of 1949, however,

272

it

clearly

demonstrates the ability of the Catholic
periphery to
dominate the discussion of public policy,
particularly
foreign affairs. The Mindszenty trial, the
Hiss

trial, the

unanimous Catholic support for ratification of
NATO in the
Senate, and the increasing debate over the
"reintegration"
of Spain all contributed to the underlying
paradigm that

Christian civilization was at stake. Is it any wonder then,
that by mid-1950 the United States would be caught in
the

grip of an hysterical anti-Communist crusade led by Catholic

Senator Joseph McCarthy and

a

hot war in Asia that would

refocus Catholic attention to the threat of "atheistic

Communism" in that quarter? The mindset first articulated by

Archbishop Cushing of Boston in 1947 that there was "a work
for Religion and Democracy" that could "be done only by

Catholics and by Catholics who are Americans" was becoming

dominant either publicly or behind the scene.
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CHAPTER 13
"THE ATTACK OF THE PRIMITIVES"

The final months of 1949 had seen
the utter collapse
of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist
government in China. Chiang
fled to the island of Formosa leaving
Mao Tse-tung and his

Communist armies in control of the mainland.
The nation's
attention shifted instantly from the threat of
Communist
expansion in Europe to actual Communist expansion
in Asia.
On January 5,

1950, the British Government withdrew

its recognition of Chiang's government and on
the 6th

officially extended recognition to Mao. The United States
refused to follow the British lead. On January 11, while Mao
was in Moscow negotiating the Sino-Soviet Treaty with

Stalin, Senator Taft charged on the Senate floor that the

State Department had "been guided by

a

left-wing group who

obviously have wanted to get rid of Chiang and were willing
at least to turn China over to the Communists for that

purpose." The administration was again under attack from

a

variety of sources determined to find out "who lost China?"
It was

in this

atmosphere that Secretary of State Acheson on

January 12 delivered

a

speech to the National Press Club in

Washington entitled "Crisis in China -- an Examination of
United States Policy." The speech accurately reflected the
twin pillars of revolutionary nationalism sweeping Asia: the
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abject poverty of millions and the resentment
of foreign

domination.

[1]

However, the speech would soon become more important
for what it did not say than for what it did.

In outlining

what Acheson described as the United States "defensive

perimeter" in the Pacific, he said that it "runs along the

Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus

.

.

.

.

[

and

from the Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands." The absence of

Korea from this defense perimeter passed unnoticed at the
time in the generally favorable response to the speech in
the nations

's

press.

In terms of

"the military security of

other areas in the Pacific" Acheson declared "that no person
can guarantee these areas against military attack," but,

event of such an attack,

in

"the initial reliance must be on

the people attacked to resist it and then upon the

commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter
of the United Nations...." The day after Acheson 's speech

Jacob A. Malik, the Soviet representative on the UN Security
Council, walked out in protest of the continued

representation on the Council by Chiang's Nationalist
government.

[2]

At the time of his speech to the Press Club Acheson

was probably more concerned that Indochina, not Korea, could
be the site,

if

confrontation were to take place in an area

of the Pacific outside the "defensive perimeter" of the U.S.
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The Nationalist/Communist forces of
Ho Chi Minh's Vietminh
had been engaged in open guerrilla
warfare with the French

colonial forces since 1946. As Chiang's
army collapsed in
1949 and Mao's forces moved to the south
Acheson speculated
it "raised the ominous possibility
of Chinese Communist

collaboration with the Vietminh." In addition "From
late
1949 on, French officials issued increasingly urgent

warnings that without direct American military aid
they
might be compelled to withdraw from Indochina." It
must be
kept in mind that France, predominately Catholic France,
was
the centerpiece of American postwar policy for Europe. The

need to restore France to its prewar position of power and

prestige was

a

central theme of State Department position

papers prepared for both the Yalta and Potsdam conferences.
The thrust of the argument was that the U.S. should "treat

France in all respects on the basis of her potential power
and influence rather than on the basis of her present

strength." By late 1945 this policy had crystallized even
further. John

D.

Hickerson, Deputy Director of the State

Department's Office of European Affairs, stated

in a memo

to

the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee "it is the policy
of the United States Government to assist in the
r eestabl

ishment of a strong France in order that the country

may serve as a bulwark of democracy on the continent of
Europe

.
.

.

.

"

[

3
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That American Catholics were concerned
about events in
postwar France, just as they were in
postwar Poland, Italy,
and Hungary, is demonstrated by a
letter "sent to all French
pastors" on July 30, 1948 by Archbishop
Gushing of Boston.
Gushing notified his French pastors that
"the Bishop of
Lucon, France, has asked me to grant
permission to his

representative, Ganon Louis Ratier, to seek alms among
our
French speaking people in behalf of the church schools
in
his diocese." France, as well as Hungary, was a
focal point
for the preservation of Gatholic schools.

Stressing the

international nature of the appeal. Gushing went on to state
that "Archbishop Roy of Quebec has granted a like permission
and

I

am anxious to cooperate to the fullest extent

possible." Gushing's letter was to serve as an introduction
of Father Ratier to the French pastors and "to express my

hope that you will allow him to speak to your people or to

solicit contributions from them or from organizations within
your jurisdiction."

[4]

But Gatholic schools in France was not the only thing
on Gushing's agenda.

If

reviving the French economy and

gaining public support for such action was high on the

administration's agenda. Gushing was willing to do his part.
Hard on the heels of his appeal to the French pastors of the

Archdiocese Gushing led 600 American Catholics on
pilgrimage to the shrines of Paris and Lourdes
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.

a

The

publicity surrounding the pilgrimage left no
doubt

in the

public's mind about the intimate connection
between the
French and American church. But coming as it
did amidst the
ongoing debate surrounding funding for the
Marshall Plan,
the Berlin blockade and the beginning of the
presidential

election campaign,

it also

reinforced the need for American

assistance to Europe. The political and economic nature of
the trip was highlighted in Paris on August 21 when both

Gushing and Auxiliary Bishop John

J,

Wright were made

officers in the French Legion of Honor by none other than

Foreign Minister Robert Schuman

.

Cushing's smiling

countenance receiving the award from Schuman dominated the
front page of the Boston Globe on August 22. Upon receiving
his honor.

Bishop Wright proclaimed "Vive la France!"

In his remarks Schuman,

[5]

whom the Globe described as

"...the greatest foe of Communism in France," and "credited
with the major role in defeating the Communists in the last

election here," described Gushing as "a man of great
character, a great leader in the spiritual field, and

a

powerful foe of materialism." Gushing was no less laudatory
with his remarks, proclaiming he was particularly honored
that the award was presented to him by Schuman "whose

character and accomplishments we in America well know and

greatly admire." Gushing told the assembled guests: "You are
preoccupied with the staggering economic problems of
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France," and that while the principal
purpose of the
pilgrimage was spiritual "...it involves
transportation and
purchasing expenditures of every kind. And we
were not

unmindful in planning this pilgrimage that

a

venture of this

kind brings economic aid to France and the
other lands we

visit." Noting that "the political and economic
problems of
the past war have not yet been solved on higher
levels of

diplomacy and international relations," he continued,

"I

submit the chief objective of all governmental action in our

day should be the facilitation of international friendship
and knowledge on the popular level." To that end of

friendship and knowledge both Schuman and Gushing reminded
the audience, and American readers, that the first Bishop of

Boston was Jean Louis Lefebre de Cheverus who was ordained
in Paris

in 1790 and escaped the guillotine during the

French Revolution by fleeing to America as

a

missionary to

Indians and French Catholic pioneers in Maine (which was
then part of Massachusetts). Cheverus High School in Jamaica

Plain was named in his honor. So the French connection to
Boston and to the American church was underscored at

precisely the moment
purposes

.

[

it was

most needed for political

5

As historian George C.

Herring has noted, "In the

dramatically altered strategic context of 1950, support for
France in Indochina was considered essential for the
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security of Western Europe." State
Department policy makers
were already concluding that to maintain
France
as

"the

bulwark of democracy" in Europe it would
be necessary to
relieve the drain on French resources
represented by the

ongoing conflict in Indochina.

In the midst of this ongoing

policy debate concerning the extension of the
containment

policy to Southeast Asia two more events occurred

January that would tip the scales

in

in

late

favor of U.S. action.

On January 25 a New York jury convicted Alger Hiss
of

perjury in connection with his testimony that he was not
involved with passing State Department documents to the
Soviet Union during the 1930s. We have already examined the

involvement of the Catholic periphery in the Hiss case. His

conviction now added further credence to the charges that
the "loss of China" was the result of Communist manipulation

within the State Department. On January 30 the Soviet Union

recognized the Vietminh Government of Ho Chi Minh as the
legitimate government of Vietnam. Acheson immediately

proclaimed the Soviet recognition cast Ho in his "true
colors as the mortal enemy of native independence in

Indochina." The Secretary of State, who only weeks before
had spoken so intelligently about the need to recognize

Asian nationalism and the hatred of foreign domination, now
interpreted events as

a

"significant and ominous" sign of

Stalin's intentions to "accelerate the revolutionary
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process." Why the Vietnamese would be willing
to exchange
French master for a Russian master he did
not say.

a

[7]

But perhaps the most significant event to
occur in

January of 1950 amidst all the public furor was
private dinner at

Joseph

a

quiet

Washington D.C. restaurant. Senator

McCarthy was

R.

a

a

relatively inconspicuous but brash

first-term Senator from Wisconsin. He had been elected in
the 1946 Republican sweep after defeating long-time Senate

stalwart Robert LaFollette Jr. in the Republican primary.

McCarthy was looking toward the 1952 elections and seeking
an issue around which he could build a reelection campaign.

Joining McCarthy for dinner that evening were Charles Kraus,

William

A.

Roberts (attorney for syndicated columnist Drew

Pearson) and Father Edmund A. Walsh, founder and dean of

Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. As we
have seen earlier Walsh was in Russia at the time of the

Bolshevik Revolution and headed the Vatican relief effort
there in conjunction with Herbert Hoover's relief efforts.
He also played an important role in the Catholic effort to

prevent U.S. recognition of the Soviet Union in 1933. His

anti-Communist credentials within the Church were
impeccable
After dinner the conversation turned to the search for
an issue.

Roberts proposed the St. Lawrence Seaway, but
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McCarthy rejected that proposal as
not having "enough sex."
He then proposed his own project,
a Townsendesque pension
plan under which everyone over 65 would
receive
$100 a

month. All three of his companions
rejected this plan as

fiscally unsound. Walsh then asked, "How
about Communism as
an issue?" McCarthy jumped at the
suggestion, declaring "the
government is full of Communists," and "the thing
to do

is

hammer at them." At least one of his dinner
companions,
Roberts, warned McCarthy any such effort would have
to be

soundly grounded

in

facts and not unfounded charges. Writing

about the incident later. Jack Anderson and Ronald May

concluded:

"His three fellow Catholics went away with the

feeling that the sincere McCarthy would do his country

a

service by speaking out against the Communist fifth column."
[8]

There has been considerable controversy surrounding
the dinner at the Colony. Scholars generally agree that the

meeting did in fact take place, although Father Walsh later
denied having suggested anything to McCarthy and charged
that Drew Pearson, who originally broke the story in his

column in March, had "manufactured" the incident. Walsh went
so far as to offer a $1,000 contribution to Pearson's

favorite charity if the columnist could satisfactorily prove
his contentions. Still, one of the participants was

Pearson's attorney and could have served as
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a

source for the

information. The real issue seems to have
been whether or
not the story was embellished in
subsequent telling.

It

would certainly not be surprising for
four Catholics

discussing politics in early 1950 to zero in on
Communism.
But McCarthy's simplistic reaction, as if
the idea of

Communists in government had never before crossed
his mind,
is

certainly not in keeping with the facts. The Senator
had

in fact charged his Democratic opponent

in the

1946

Senatorial race with being "Communist icly inclined." He

sponsored an amendment to the Taft-Hartley Act allowing
employers to dismiss employees who had previously been

members of the Communist Party or who had Communist

"sympathies." And he had taken an active interest in the
hearings of the House UnAmerican Activities Committee. In
fact McCarthy had been engaged in an ongoing battle with the

Madison Capital Times since November of 1949 on his charges
that the newspaper was "the Red mouthpiece for the Communist

party in Wisconsin." So the Communist issue was nothing new
to McCarthy, and his earlier activities may have been the

source of Roberts' concern that future charges McCarthy
might make be well grounded.

[9]

The conviction of Alger Hiss in late January was

followed by the equally startling disclosure that the

British government on February

3

arrested physicist Klaus

Fuchs on charges of atomic espionage. Fuchs had worked on
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the Manhattan project at Los Alamos.
His arrest and

subsequent confession resulted in the later arrest
in the
United States of Harry Gold, David Greenglass,
Martin Sobel
and Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, all later
convicted of

conspiracy to commit espionage. It was within this
virtual
firestorm of interest surrounding Communist activity at home
and abroad -- the "loss of China"; Acheson's attempt
to

define the Pacific defense perimeter; the conviction of
Alger Hiss; Stalin's recognition of Ho Chi Minh's Communist

dominated Vietminh as the government of Vietnam; the arrest
and confession of Klaus Fuchs for atomic espionage

—

that

McCarthy delivered his speech to the Republican Women's Club
of Wheeling,

West Virginia on February

9,

1950.

According to press reports, McCarthy declared he held
in his hand a "list of 205

—

a

list of names that were made

known to the Secretary of State as being members of the

Communist Party and who nevertheless are still working and
shaping policy in the State Department." Amidst all the

daily news reports of spies, espionage, and Communist
advances abroad American Catholics certainly needed no
further reminders of the consequences of Communist success.

Nevertheless they got one. The same week McCarthy delivered
his speech at Wheeling the film "Guilty of Treason" opened
in theaters around the country.

The film, based on the trial

of Cardinal Mindszenty, was scheduled to open on the first
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anniversary of the trial. On February
to all parishes

2

a

circular was sent

in the diocese of Boston with
instructions

that "the following announcement be
read from all pulpits in
the Archdiocese at the Masses on Sunday,
February 5." The

announcement stated that February

8

was the anniversary "of

the imprisonment by the puppet regime in
Hungary of the

heroic Cardinal Mindszenty" and that "the film
produced in
Hollywood to dramatize the story of the Cardinal
will open

in several Boston theaters this coming week."
It continued:

"Catholics and all interested in religious freedom are

called upon to ask their local theaters when and where
the

picture will be shown," and it was "earnestly hoped that
large crowds of people will attend performances of this

important film."

The Mindszenty trial was again being

thrust before public attention at the very moment McCarthy
was leveling his charges against the State Department.

[10]

The Senator from Wisconsin was at the right place at
the right time. The initial press reports of his speech in

Wheeling were sparse; the New York Times did not even carry
the Associated Press wire service dispatch. However, when

McCarthy arrived in Salt Lake City, he was surrounded by
reporters wanting more information about his list. He now

changed his story to claim there were 205 "bad risks" in the
State Department, but of these there were fifty-seven "card

carrying communists." The Senator was now national news, but
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he had already begun to fudge on
the accuracy and fact

demanded by his dinner companions a month
earlier. McCarthy
in fact had no

list at all in Wheeling. What he held in
his

hand was a letter from former Secretary
of State James

Byrnes written in July of 1946 detailing the
results of an

investigation of some 3,000 federal employees transferred
to
the State Department from other wartime agencies.
The

investigation resulted in the recommendation
against the
permanent employment of 285 of these employees as
potential
"loyalty risks." Of these, 79 had already been terminated,
leaving 205 still employed. The entire matter became

increasingly muddled as the criteria for dismissal was
changed from loyalty risk to security risk and ultimately
choked off when President- Truman in March of 1948 issued an

executive order withholding all loyalty and security
information in all federal agencies from members of
Congress.

[11]

As William F.

Buckley and Brent Bozell correctly point

out in their defense of McCarthy this charge of fifty-seven

card-carrying Communists in the State Department was

a

classic case of the Senator's penchant for overstatement. It

permitted his critics to constantly raise the question of
"Where are their cards?" when in fact by 1950 there were no

card-carrying communists in the United States at all. The
Party had recalled all membership cards years earlier. This
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was the type of overstatement and lack
of factual

underpinning that would quickly lead to Father
Walsh
breaking with McCarthy over his methods. Nevertheless
a
Catholic Senator had suddenly been thrust to the
forefront
of America's anti-communist crusade.

Notwithstanding the

tremendous notoriety and popularity he would achieve over
the next several years, McCarthy was never

a

player in the

Senate. He had no real program other than the advancement of

Joseph Raymond McCarthy. William V. Shannon uses the

dictionary definition of
McCarthy:

a

rogue elephant to describe

"A vicious elephant which separates from the herd

and roams alone; hence any large animal with habits like

those of a rogue elephant -- sometimes used attributively of

persons." [12]
Indeed Shannon's description of McCarthy seems

appropriate. He was a lightweight in the Senate, not well

regarded and given to breaking the rules and traditions of
decorum. Nevertheless, he became the lightning rod around

which the pent-up sense of frustration many Americans felt
toward dealing with the Soviet Union and the seemingly

endless series of Communist advances and affronts. McCarthy

himself seemed taken aback by the almost instantaneous

celebrity status attached to him by nature of his charges.
Confronted by reporters in his Washington office, McCarthy
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was asked for the names on his
list by correspondent John
Dear
.

"Look you guys," Joe said,

"that was just a political

speech to a bunch of Republicans. Don't
take it seriously."
"Don't you have any names?" Dear asked.
"Oh,

one was a college professor," Joe replied,

"Where?" Dear asked.
"A professor of astronomy," Joe said.

professor of anthropology,

a

"Another was a

woman. But it was just

a

political talk."
The subsequent article failed to note McCarthy's
attitude or
the reporters' questioning;

"Newsmen at the time were

trained to report only what happened in public." [13]

McCarthy's attitude

is

critical to an understanding of

what followed. It was indeed political. The nature of what
was happening at home and abroad dictated a Republican

attack on the Democratic administration. That McCarthy was
an Irish Catholic with close ties to powerful Irish Catholic

Democrats such as Joseph Kennedy only made matters worse.
The political dynamics that FDR had foreseen and that Truman
had forestalled in 1948 seemed about to break. Truman had

barely been sworn in for his second term when Republican
critics began attacking administration policy toward China.
Much of this criticism centered around possible subversive

activity within the State Department. Once again the genesis
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of this criticism was Catholic.
Patrick J.

Hurley,

Ambassador to China appointed by FDR had given
up his
efforts to reconcile the Nationalists of Chiang

and the

Communists of Mao claiming subversive State Department
personnel were undermining his work. The Republican
effort
at bipartisanship in foreign policy had proven
disastrous

and was now abandoned.

In fact bipartisanship now seemed to

be working against the administration. Pat McCarran of

Nevada introduced

a

bill in February of 1949 to increase

assistance to the Nationalists and twenty-four Democrats
joined him. The China Lobby was in full throat by the time

McCarthy gave his speech in Wheeling, and the lecture
circuit was crowded with Catholics: McCarran,, Henry Luce
[whose wife Claire Booth Luce converted to Catholicism and

played

a

key role in influencing him]. Hurley and the

Catholic Archbishop of Nanking, the Reverend Paul Yu-Pin.
[14]

McCarthy, and the "ism" attached to his name, have
been examined from

a

wide variety of perspectives by

historians and political scientists. Much of this analysis

disregards the political nature of McCarthyism or, when

it

does attribute political themes to the movement,

misinterprets the underlying politics. Richard

M.

Freeland

argues that McCarthyism was spawned as the result of the
failed efforts of the Truman administration to implement
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what he terms "multilateral" economic
policies for postwar
Europe. He argues that Truman deliberately
introduced

anti-Communism, both domestic ad international,
as the only
available wedge to secure passage of the European
Recovery
Plan. The need for that in turn was dominated
by

the need to

keep American exports at

a

sufficiently high level to

prevent domestic recession. Domestic politics, for
Freeland,
involved traditional Republican opposition to lowering
tariff barriers. Once again we see William
Appleman
Williams' Open Door diplomacy at the heart of the
cold war.
In this

instance, however, Freeland argues that while the

administration was successful in pursuing "multilateral"
economic policies among the Western European nations,
failed to achieve the same objectives at home due to

it
a

coalition of Republican and Southern conservative
opposition. Freeland almost puts his finger on the real

political underpinning in analyzing the 1948 election when
he states

that "an essential element in the President's

victory was the unusually solid support he received from
urban Catholic voters who admired his ant i -communism.

"

He

dismisses this impact, however, by stating that "Truman's
escape from political damage on this issue during 1948 did
not represent the main current of American politics,

for it

resulted from circumstances that ceased to exist almost

immediately after the election." As we have seen, this
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is

simply not so. Catholic anxieties increased
dramatically
after 1948 with the Mindszenty trial and the
whole spectrum
of events unfolding in 1949 and early
1950. If the Catholic
periphery did not constitute "the main current of
American
politics," they were certainly dominating the public

discussion and beginning to limit the policy options as

demonstrated by the discussions on Spain.
Seymour Martin Lipset takes

a

[15]

different approach to

the conservative trend in postwar American politics. He

argues that the period of "liberal supremacy"
the decade of the thirties also marked

a

which marked

period of "great

growth in the influence of the Communist Party." This period
of

influence was characterized by "penetrating and

manipulating liberal and moderate left groups, rather than
building an electoral party. The Communists, by concealing
their real objectives, by acting positively for liberal

causes, by being the best organizers of the left, were able
to penetrate deeply into various liberal organizations and

into the labor movement." Postwar prosperity once more

restored the "legitimacy" of the free enterprise system and
at the same time created status anxiety among many groups

that had been borne upward by the New Deal and

a

resurgent

economy, especially Catholics. According to Lipset:

"As a

Catholic, McCarthy was able to embody the traditional

Anti-Communism and the growing conservatism of that
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population, without the disability of Father Coughlin's

collar." The implication seems clear: McCarthy could

represent the periphery to the traditional populist,
isolationist, and agrarian sentiment of the Midwest and
South without arousing the anti-Catholicism that an active

member of the Catholic clergy could not overcome

.[

16

Lipset and other historians in the status

anxiety school of thought see an anti-elitist,

anti-intellectual and anti-eastern trend in support for
McCarthy. Lipset does look closely at the religious nature
of support for McCarthy citing polls which indicated that

"Irish and Italian Catholics were among the most

pro-McCarthy groups."

A Roper poll indicated that Germans,

both Catholic and Protestant,

"were disproportionately in

favor of McCarthy." He goes on to cite Michael Rogin's study
of McCarthy and his political

impact.

"It is a mistake to

see McCarthyite support as rooted in the status-stricken or

among the midwestern agrarian popul ists , "Rogin contends. He
finds "that it is to be seen more simply as a conservative

Republican movement feeding on these prevalent anxieties
about Communism and the Cold War." These anxieties, we have

already seen, were in large measure religiously motivated
and represented exactly the political threat to the

Democratic Party that FDR had foreseen as early as 1942 when
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he sent Myron Taylor to the Vatican
to discuss the prospect
of Soviet domination of

Lipset, however,

largely Catholic Eastern Europe. [17]
finally errs in concluding that

McCarthy had no lasting political impact. "McCarthy
ism,

"

states,

"cannot be measured on an electoral basis. It was

never

political movement;

a

it was a

he

political tendency,

unorganized, activating certain impulses in

audience...." Of course McCarthyism was

a

a

sympathetic

political

movement, and movement is the operative word. The very thing
FDR feared most was the movement of traditionally Catholic

Democratic voters into the Republican ranks over the issue
of Communism.

As we have seen,

this is precisely what Truman

headed off with his strong ant i -Commmunist stand in 1948.
Now,

in

early 1950, with Catholics more upset than ever over

events in Hungary and in China and over seemingly clearcut
signs of espionage and subversion within the highest ranks
of government,

the potential political impact was enormous.

[18]

McCarthyism was indeed rooted in the decade of the
1930s,

not in a direct link from Father Coughlin and his

populist rhetoric but rather in the campaign conducted by
the Jesuits discussed earlier

(see chapter four). Could

McCarthy have attended (Jesuit) Marquette University from
1930 through 1934 without having become at least familiar

with Catholic teaching on Communism? Possibly. His academic

295

record was not distinguished, although
he was considered
bright and hard working. But his Senate
career as an

anti-Communist seems clearly rooted in Catholic
doctrine
that emerged during the 1930s. Thus when
Joseph R. McCarthy

stood on the Senate floor and spoke of "a
conspiracy on

a

scale so immense as to dwarf any previous such venture
in
the history of man," he was speaking in terms that
virtually

every Catholic in the country was familiar with.

[19]

As Robert Frank points out it was this emphasis
on the

spiritual origins of Communism and its deceptive propaganda

techniques during the Thirties which "helps to explain why
Catholics perceived

a

threat of enormous magnitude while

their neighbors saw no threat at al 1
1950,

.

(

emphas is added)" By

however, the Catholic periphery's position had come to

dominate the discussion. There

is

no better example of this

than the 1947 publication of the Attorney General's list of

subversive organizations. There

is

little doubt that the

Truman administration "always referred to the ability of the

communists to appeal to broad segments of the population
through apparently patriotic appeals or organizations that

concealed their relationship to the communist movement." The

President himself had expressed concern about "reds, phonies
and parlor pinks." The leading spokesman within the

administration for exposing Communist front organizations,
however, was FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover. Hoover was
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a

close friend of Cardinal Spellman of
New York, and as early
as 1946 Spellman had agreed to
cooperate with FBI agents to
help "ferret out and eliminate the
Communists and fellow
travelers who are in positions of control
in labor unions."
The FBI informed Spellman they planned
to publish a monthly
magazine "to alert the business community to the
dangers of

Communism." [20]
By late 1946 and early 1947 Hoover was speaking
and

writing about these dangers with such impact that Attorney
General Clark reversed

a

long-standing policy of the Justice

Department against the FBI Director testifying publicly
before HUAC. According to Richard Freeland, "both Clark and
Hoover endorsed the principle of publicizing communist

activities as

a

potent means of combating them." Hoover, of

course, brought to the debate the Catholic belief that

exposing these groups as "dupes" and "fellow travelers" of
the Communists was the best way of eliminating their

effectiveness to disseminate "deceitful propaganda." [21]
Both McCarthy's rhetoric and tactics fall well within

the guidelines established by the Jesuit campaign of the

Thirties and expanded on by the Catholic hierarchy in the
postwar era. Speaking on the Senate floor shortly after his

Wheeling speech, McCarthy framed the struggle in rhetoric

reminiscent of Del Vayo
engaged in

a

'

s

argument of 1947: "Today we are

final, all-out battle between Communistic
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atheism and Christianity. The modern
champions of Communism
have selected this as the time.... The
war
is

Senate wasted no time in establishing

a

on..." The

subcommittee of the

Foreign Relations Committee to investigate
McCarthy's
charges. The committee was intent on having
McCarthy name
names, and he did.

It

is

instructive to examine the cases of

the individuals named by McCarthy before the
Tyding's

Committee, not from the perspective of guilt or innocence,
but rather from the perspective of how McCarthy's

allegations conformed to Catholic perceptions of threats to
America and whether or not that perception was coming to

dominate the Protestant core within the context of domestic
politics.

[22]

McCarthy named three individuals who basically fell
within the category of "dupes" or "fellow travelers." These
persons had joined or been affiliated with

a

variety of

liberal organizations during the thirties which now appeared
on the Attorney General's list of subversive organizations.

Many of these organizations, as noted earlier, had been
infiltrated and taken over by Communists during the Popular
Front period. McCarthy named Dorothy Kenyon, Frederick

Schuman and Harlow Shapley before the Tydings Committee. He
cited Kenyon as belonging to 28 Communist front-

organizations, Schuman with 12 and Shapley with 21. None of
the three were formally employed by the State Department,
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but Kenyon,

lawyer and activist for women's issues,
was an
American delegate to the United Nations
Commission
a

on the

Status of Women. Similiarly, Schuman and
Shapley, both
academics, had both served as either lecturers
or

consultants on State Department pro jects

.

[

23

The Tydings Committee found that Kenyon's
numerous

affiliations were only "sufficient to suggest

a

high degree

of naivete and perhaps gullibility." According
to Catholic

doctrine,

"naivete" and "gullibility" were exactly the

point. Liberals were susceptible to the deceptive
propaganda
of the Communists and ultimately were duped into
supporting

Communist objectives at the expense of legitimate social
reform. Schuman and Shapley fell into the category of

"fellow travelers" rather than "dupes." In fact, William

F.

Buckley and Brent Bozell, writing in defense of McCarthy,
claimed that

if

the two professors were not "fellow

travelers," then "no one can legitimately be called

a

fellow

traveler." Both men had written approvingly of the Soviet
Union, with Schuman at one point declaring:

adventure marks

a

"The Russian

long forward stride toward human mastery

of man's fate...." Human mastery of man's fate,

of course,

was exactly the type of Anti-God sentiment which made

Communism anathema to Catholics. "In Catholic teaching,"
according to Frank, all human freedom, all individual rights
are grounded in a transcendent order that Communism would
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abolish... Human mastery of
man.s fate made man responsible
for those rights and freedoms
which came only from God.
[24]

The second group of individuals
named by McCarthy
before the Tydings Committee remain
well within the

framework established by Catholic
doctrine but take on a
more sinister character than those
already mentioned.
Haldore Hanson, Philip Jessup, John
Stewart Service, Gustavo
Duran and Owen Lattimore were all accused
of being active
participants in a Communist plot to undermine
American
foreign policy rather than simply being
travelers... Hanson,

'.dupes',

or

"fellow

Service, Jessup and Lattimore were

associated with the perceived failure of American
policy
China.

Interestingly,

it

in

through the use of deceptive

is

propaganda rather than espionage that the group was supposed
to have worked most effectively:

Hanson through his book

Human E ndeavor which according to McCarthy outlined his

"pro-Communist answer to the problems of Asia;" Jessup for
his role with the Institute of Pacific Relations and its

magazine Far Eas tern Survey

-

Service for passing classified

information to Ameras ia magazine, another publication of the

Institute of Pacific Relations and Owen Lattimore whom

McCarthy called "one of the principal architects of our Far
Eastern policy." [25]
The charge that this group was actively working to

undermine American policy in China went far beyond the
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accusations made against Kenyon,
Schuman and Shapley which
basically consisted of their
membership in various Communist
front groups. Adding to the drama
was the testimony of

McCarthy's fellow Catholic, the former
Communist and editor
of the Daily Worker
Louis Budenz. Budenz connected
,
Hanson,

Jessup and Lattimore to Communist
Party activities either as
party members or instruments through
whom other party
members carried out their directives.
Jessup, for instance
was described by Budenz as a pawn of party
member Frederick
Vanderbilt Field and that a series of articles
appearing in

Survey while Jessup was

in

charge were "planned and planted

by the American Communist hierarchy to keynote the
switch in
the international party line on China." Budenz'
testimony on

Lattimore was equally damaging. He claimed to have told
Communist Party chief Earl Browder in 1937 that Lattimore
should take over "the general direction of the move to

depict the Chinese Communists as 'agrarian reformers.'" In
addition, as late as 1943, he had heard Frederick Vanderbilt

Field report that "Lattimore had been instructed of
in the

a

change

party-line on Chiang Kai-shek." [26]
Budenz further testified that he had been instructed

by Jack Stachel, who would replace Browder as head of the

American Communist Party, to "consider Lattimore

a

Communist." His testimony did little to sway the Tydings

Committee but was given

a

far warmer reception by the
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McCarran Committee. Lattimore seems
to have served as
something of a lightening rod for
Catholic criticism. As
early as January of 1949, long
before McCarthy decided to
make Lattimore "the top Russian
espionage agent in this
country," Congressman John F. Kennedy
of Massachusetts
attacked the policies of the "Lattimores
and the [Harvard

University scholar and China expert John King]
Fairbanks."
Later,

in

September 1949, Reverend James

K.

Kearney attacked

Lattimore in an article published in Columbia
official organ of the Knights of Columbus.

M;.q ;.-.in»,

the

[27]

In virtually every case outlined above
McCarthy's

allegations followed Catholic doctrine established in the
1930s dealing with "liberals" being duped and manipulated
to

advance the cause of Communism. Buckley and Bozell in

defending him argued from much the same position. In
essence, they argued that only the China group had stepped

beyond the role of dupes to being active and knowing

participants in

a

scheme to advance the interests of

Communism. They in turn used the techniques of deceptive

propaganda in magazine articles and other intellectual
pursuits to "dupe" liberals into following the latest party
line. As Robert Frank points out:

"It is more than an

accident that the Senator from Wisconsin was

a

Catholic who

attended the Jesuit Marquette University during the 'Red
Decade

I

t

is more than an

accident that the priest in
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the Colony restaurant in early
1950 who suggested McCarthy
use communism as a reelection
issue was Father Edmund
Walsh, the Jesuit who directed the
opening Catholic campaign
against the 'red scourge' in America."
[28]

Interestingly, the one major attempt to
examine the
connection between McCarthy and Catholicism
was also

conducted by

a

Jesuit scholar. Donald F. Crosby in God.

Church, and Flag: Senator

J oseph

R.

McCarthy

;=>nri

i-h»

catholic Church 1950-19^7 argues that the phenomenon
known
as McCarthyism was little more than the
Catholic version of

the broader American "ant i -Communist impulse."
This is

essentially the same argument as Robert Griffith who used
the term "ant i -Communist persuasion" in describing the
impact of McCarthy during the second red scare. While Crosby

examines Catholic anti-Communist activity surrounding events
in Eastern Europe

in the

immediate postwar years, he does

not see it as a driving force in either domestic or

international policy development. More recent scholarship
such as Frank's, however, points to

a

direct connection

between the Jesuit led anti-Communist campaign of the
thirties, which Crosby does not mention, and the more

sweeping ant i -Communism of the late forties and early
fifties. Crosby concludes,

"One has to question whether

Catholics were vastly more concerned over the threat of

Communism to their religion than the rest of the

303

populace.... In sum, though the
Catholic population felt a
deep concern over the problem of
communism, so did the rest
of America,

and if the Catholic anxiety was
the greater,

it

was not overwhelmingly so."
That's exactly the point Frank
makes in his article, if there was
no longer a gap between

Catholic anti-Communism and American
ant i -Communism overall,
then something dramatic had occurred
since the decade of the
Thirties when "Catholics perceived a threat
of enormous
magnitude while their neighbors saw no threat
at all."

[29]

The evidence seems clear that what had
happened was
the ability of the Catholic periphery to
dominate the public

discussion of events in Eastern Europe through
of the Church hierarchy,

a

combination

influential Catholic laymen, and

Catholic politicians in forming what was essentially
Catholic Lobby. These groups interacted on

a

a

regular basis

and shared the Catholic perception that Communism posed
the

greatest threat to the church. Christian Civilization, and
to America.

They in turn interacted and supported Catholic

leaders such as Schumann in France, di Gaspari in Italy,

Adenhauer in West Germany, and Franco in Spain to form an
effective international coalition against international
Communism.

In terms of the American elements of this group

McCarthy was relatively insignificant, although he garnered
support from the more important figures such as Spellman,
Gushing, Joseph Kennedy and others at various times. His
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major contribution was extending
and expanding the
atmosphere of anti-Communism within
the context of Catholic
doctrine that "liberalism" either
unwittingly or in some

instances knowingly advanced the cause
of Communism.
However, it is by no means clear that
this would not have
happened even if McCarthy had never been
elected to the
Senate

—

and this Crosby does not address. As
Pittman has

pointed out, the term "McCarranism" briefly
vied with

"McCarthyism" for public attention. In the absence
of Joe
McCarthy, Pat McCarran would have had center

stage. And Pat

McCarran was

a

power to be reckoned with in the U.S. Senate

McCarran had not given up on his efforts to change
U.S. policy toward Spain. The Administration's Spanish

policy was again under attack in both the House and Senate.
In late April,

in the midst of the Tydings Committee

hearings, McCarran introduced an amendment to the Economic

Cooperation Act which would authorize

a

$50 million loan to

Spain. He was able to get 35 fellow Senators to cosponsor

the amendment. For the first time real money was being

discussed. Perhaps not by coincidence the previous month
Rep. Owen Brewster led off the attack in the House against

the administration's Spanish policy by again citing Max

Klein on the religious issue. According to Lowe, "by this
time, Mr. Klein's name, as an authority on Protestantism in

Spain, had become almost a household word." Four days after

305

Brewster's speech, on March 14,
McCarthy named Gustavo Duran
as one of his public cases before
the Tydings Committee.
Duran was employed by the State
Department from 1943-1946.
His name had first come up before
the Senate Appropriations
Committee in 1946 when Secretary Byrnes
denied the Duran
being looked at by the committee was the
same Duran employed
by the Department. When it finally became
clear that it was
the same person,

the Department did nothing. Duran

eventually resigned and moved on to

a

position with the

United Nations. The charges against Duran stemmed
from U.S.

military intelligence reports that he was

a

member of the

Spanish Communist Party and possibly the Russian Secret
Police. He had fought on the Republican side during the

Spanish Civil War and headed their military intelligence
service for three weeks.

[30]

The confluence between McCarran's ongoing attempt to

achieve

a

reversal of U.S. policy toward Spain and

McCarthy's effort to resurrect Duran as an example of the
State Department's failure to police itself against security
risks may have been purely coincidental. However,

unlikely.

it

is

As David Oshinsky points out, U.S. military

intelligence reports on Duran were based largely on the

Franco-controlled Spanish press, and "since Franco had
powerful friends in Washington," he kept coming under

congressional attack. One of Duran's earlier critics was
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none other than Republican
Representative Alvin O'Konski of
Wisconsin, friend of McCarthy's
and a fellow Catholic.
O'Konski in fact, in language
reminiscent of McCarthy, had
called Duran "one of the most
notorious international
communists the world ever knew." While
Duran was serving on
the staff of the Cuban Embassy,
his work was defended by
Ambassador Spruille Braden in a memorandum
to the Military
Attache in Havana in which he declared
"From my personal
knowledge based on close association, Mr.
Duran is not a

Communist, but
seen, such

a

a

liberal of the highest type." As we have

description of Duran as

a

"liberal of the

highest type" within the context of Catholic
doctrine would
in no sense be seen as an

indictment.

exoneration but as more of an

[31]

The naming of Duran would only remind both Catholics
and the Core of the religious persecution suffered by
the

Church in Loyalist Spain so similar to that

currently

occurring in Eastern Europe. Once again, the threat of
godless, atheistic Communism was being emphasized. This tied
in with McCarran's efforts to rejuvenate Franco Spain and

bring it into the Atlantic community.
In the midst of this opening round of what Secretary

Acheson referred to as "The attack of the Primitives" the

administration was moving toward decisions

in which the

Catholic Lobby, acknowledged or not, would play
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a

leading

role.

In April the National Security
Council presented to
Truman its policy document #68. NSC-68
has been described by

historian Walter LaFeber as "the
American blueprint for
waging the Cold War during the next
twenty years." The
character of international relations had
been "fundamentally
altered" since the nineteenth century,
leaving the United
States and Russia as the world's superpowers.
It described
this realignment in terms of a confrontation
between the
"slave society with the free." In
addition, "the Soviet
Union, unlike previous aspirants to
hegemony, is animated by
a new fanatic faith, antithetical to
our own,
and seeks to

impose its absolute authority." Casting the
issue in terms
of

"a new fanatic faith,

antithetical to our own" was not

simply an exercise in rhetoric dealing with the contrast
of

democratic versus totalitarian societies. No, the battle
that was raging was religious in nature, one in which no

compromise was possible. The call to protect Christian

civilization predicted by Del Vayo, and again by both the
Pope and Cardinal Spellman in the wake of the Mindszenty
trial, was becoming a reality. Acheson himself framed the

issue as he saw it in his memoirs:

"The threat to Western

Europe seemed to me singularly like that which Islam had
posed centuries before, with its combination of ideological
zeal and fighting power. Then it had taken the same

combination to meet it: Germanic power in the east and
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Prankish in Spain, both energized
by

a

great outburst of

military power and social organization
in Europe. This time
it would need the added
power and energy of America, for
the
drama was now played on a world
stage." The call for a

twentieth-century Crusade, this time to
be led by America
"The city on a hill"
comes through clearly as the
underlying theme of both NSC-68 and Acheson's

-

-

think ing

.[

32

But what of bringing together the
"Germanic power in

the east and Frankish in Spain?," both
were excluded from
the NATO alliance. The first genuine
opportunity to factor

Germany into the equation occurred in May. On
Paris prior to attending

a

a

trip to

meeting of the North Atlantic

Treaty Council in London Acheson was presented with

a

secret

initiative developed by Foreign Minister Schuman and Jean

Monnet which called for the entire German-French production
of coal and steel to be placed under a "joint high

authority" and an organization that would be open to other

European nations to join. The plan involved such great
political risk to Schumann that he had not yet proposed it
to the French cabinet. U.S Ambassador to France David Bruce

called the plan "the most imaginative and far-reaching

approach that has been made in generations to the settlement
of fundamental differences between France and Germany."

Coming as it did from French initiative, the proposal also
fit into the State Department's long held view to make
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France the "bulwark of democracy"
in Europe. The fact
that
catholic schuman in France and
Catholic Adenhauer in Germany
could find common ground to
combine the industrial might
of
both countries in the face of
the Communist threat should
not be surprising given the
situation. [33]
Thus the Schuman Plan began
to wind its way toward
becoming reality. The British
were immediately hostile to
the proposal, regarding it as
a Franco-American conspiracy.
Acheson later regretted what he
termed his stupidity in not
recognizing the problems such a
proposal created for the

socialist government of Britain. It
could not manage
Britain's economy toward the development
of a welfare state
if coal and steel were excluded,
and if they
did not join

the effort,

they could expect to lose their continental

markets. When Schuman publicly invited
six countries to join
the plan on May 25, the Benelux nations,
Germany, and Italy

accepted. Britain declined. In between the secret

announcement of the plan and the public invitation the
North
Atlantic Council meeting began to probe the more sensitive
issue of actually providing

a

common defense. The reliance

on an American atomic monopoly had been shattered the

previous September when the Soviets detonated their first

atomic device. While Acheson may have desired the inclusion
of

"Germanic" power and "Prankish" Spain in the crusade

against Russia, he clearly thought the political realities
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precluded such an eventuality for
the foreseeable future.
Only a year earlier, in April
of

1949, he told the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee that
"the disarmament and
demilitarization of Germany must be
complete and absolute,"
and "a discussion of including
West Germany in the pact is
not possible." in reality elements
in both the Pentagon and

State Department viewed the inclusion
of both Germany and
Spain as an eventual necessity. As early
as December 1948

Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall stressed
the view at
National Security Council meeting that the

a

Joint Chiefs of

Staff regarded any "commitment to the defense
of
Europe.

.

.should leave open the possibility of a later

accession of Germany and Spain. "[34]
The Schuman Plan, however, seemed to breech the
ageold hostility between France and Germany. What had
seemed

politically impossible only

a year

earlier now seemed to

take on new life. At the Big Three session of the Council

meeting Bevin raised the prospect of giving the Chinese
Communists recognition in the U.N., but Acheson argued to do
so would "increase greatly the capacity for Communist

trouble-making in Indochina, Malaya, the Philippine Islands,
and Indonesia." Bevin must have felt more Franco-American

pressure as Schuman agreed with Acheson's analysis as well
as with the proposition that France was not likely to change
its vote in the Security Council given Mao's recent
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recognition of Ho Chi Minh in Indochina.
Acheson then raised
the question of just how long the
continued occupation of
Germany could be expected to have "a useful
and beneficial
effect in reshaping Germany." He answered
his own question
by claiming a couple of years at best.
He claimed Germany's
interests lay in Western Europe and the effort
should begin

at once to "entangle and integrate"
her there.

Acheson claimed,

"Here,"

"the implications of the French Coal and

Steel Plan were particularly relevant and
important ....

m

the ensuing discussion it soon became evident
that even

Schuman had not fully appreciated that as the plan
went into
effect it would have far-reaching effects on the status
of
the occupation and the Rhur Authority."
It

is

[35]

against this background that the real

significance of NSC-68 must be viewed. The analysis called
for in the document was the result of the ending of American

atomic monopoly only several months earlier. The prospect of
the newly-created NATO presenting an effective deterrent

against conventional Soviet military strength without both
German and Spanish participation had been questioned from
the beginning. Yet NSC-68 "did not give prominence to

possible German assistance," because undoubtedly French and
British resistance to rearming Germany could only be

considered as

a

possibility in the distant future. But the

Schuman Plan opened the door to the prospect that it could

312

be accomplished sooner than
expected.

That events were

outrunning the planners was evidenced
by two speeches
presented by General Omar Bradley,
Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, in April and May,
virtually as the Schuman
Plan was being presented to Acheson.
in April Bradley
"warned that NATO plans were in danger
of outrunning the
readiness of governments to provide the
necessary forces"
and in May of "the need to establish
adequate ground forces

before Russia succeeded in her efforts to
achieve an atomic
deadlock." [39]
The decision by Acheson and the administration
to

support the Schuman Plan and France against British

resistance is consistent with Acheson's expressed desire
to
bring Germanic power to bear in the struggle against the
"new fanatic faith" of an aggressive Soviet Union. That the

Soviets were intent on an aggressive expansion of global

dimensions was confirmed in the eyes of the administration
in

June when North Korean forces attacked South Korea. As

historian Richard Freeland observed: "Had

a

mischievous

deity determined to produce an event that would bring to
fever pitch the already heated political situation in the

United States, he could have succeeded no better than did
the North Koreans in their bold attack upon an Asian area

that only six months before the American Secretary of State

had indicated would not be defended by American arms." While
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some revisionist historians
have argued the administration's
Charges that the Korean War was
a probing action initiated
by the Soviets and that South
Korean activities provoked the
North or even that the South
initiated hostilities, we now
know that both Stalin and Mao
approved of the attack
and

that the North Koreans even used
a Soviet prepared -bat t 1
plan. [37]
The fact remains that domestic
political

considerations played

a

role in the administration's

decision to intervene in the Korean situation.
Secretary of
Defense Louis Johnson admitted as much.
Domestic opinion
also influenced the decision not to ask Congress
for

authority to dispatch troops. Johnson recalled,

"

We were

scared of the Hill on this thing. If we tried to
put ground
troops in at the beginning there would have been

a

deal of trouble." The related decision to send

military

a

great

mission and increased aid to the French in Indochina would
have far-reaching consequences for American foreign policy.
The decision to support France via the Schuman Plan as

a

bulwark against Communism in Europe coincided now with the
need to support France as

aggression in Asia. This
assist

a

a

bulwark against Communist

is not

to say the decision to

Catholic country was based on religious grounds,

but rather that the influence of the Catholic periphery in

establishing the political atmosphere and the culture of

314

ant i -communism then prevailing
in the country left virtually
no other option open but active
intervention. Thus public
opinion was prepared to support
actions based on the

analysis contained in NSC-68.

[38]

The outbreak of war in Korea provided
Pat McCarran
with the opportunity to reengage his
pet project
Spain.
In July, less than a month after
the outbreak of war,

-

McCarran convened

a

"somewhat secret" meeting of Senators

and Pentagon officials in his Washington
office. He

announced his intention to introduce another bill
calling
for a $100 million loan to Spain.

Pentagon officials

restated the strategic importance of Spain to the
senators.
The official administration position,

in spite of Acheson's

personal desire to engage "Frankish" power along with
German, was not to encourage any such move, at least not
yet. McCarran was at the forefront of those convinced the

Soviet Union was behind the attack in Korea. "Korea is not
the real enemy in the conflict," he declared, "Korea is only

the buffer. We must be prepared to fight the real enemy

behind Korea -- sovietEsic] Russia." If the confrontation

should ultimately involve the Soviets, he claimed "it will
take the form of a crusade against the last bastion of evil

ideology, which has plagued the world since fascism and

nazism were conquered." The Senate was moving in McCarran's

direction on the Spanish question. Even the Democratic
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leadership deserted the administration
in the crushing 65-15
vote. "I'm a realist," proclaimed
Majority Leader Scott
Lucas of Illinois before the vote on
the loan, "and when I'm
licked, I don't hesitate to admit it."
[39]
Unlike Lucas, however, Truman was never
one to admit
defeat. Administration backers in the Senate
called for

reconsideration of the loan after Truman denounced
its
inclusion in the omnibus appropriations bill.
McCarran again
demonstrated his strength when the motion to reconsider
was

tabled by the same 65-15 vote. A House-Senate
conference

committee reduced the amount of the loan to $62.5 million
and the Senate went along with a House request to cut
the

President's Point Four program request. When the President
sent

a

strong message to the House requesting the full

amount of the Point Four program be restored. Floor Leader
John McCormack did not even read Truman's message to the
House; he simply inserted it in the record. When he finally

signed the appropriations bill Truman,

reminiscent of

a

in

language

later President, declared he did not

consider the Spanish loan provision "mandatory" only an

"authorization." [40]
The initial bipartisan support of Truman's reaction to
the Korean invasion seemed a throwback to the Vandenberg
era. That, however, was not to last. The Republicans had

learned all too well in the 1948 election that all things
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being equal in terms of foreign
policy they could not hope
to draw the big city Catholic
voters away from the Democrats
on domestic issues alone. That
the overall issue of

Communism, both domestic and international,
was political,
and by political I mean electoral
politics, was clearly
established by McCarthy backer Tom Coleman.
"The issue is

fairly simple....," he declared, "it is
now

a

political

issue, and somebody is going to gain or
lose politically

before it's over. It all comes down to this:
are we going to
try to win an election or aren't we?" [41]
The Republicans were indeed going to try and
win an

election. While the major Republican spokesmen were
praising
the President's actions in Korea, they were qualifying
the

praise with criticism of the administration's past policies,

which they claimed led to the war. Senator George Malone of

Nevada declared "...it

is

fairly clear that what happened in

China and what is now happening in Korea were brought about

deliberately by the advisors of the President at Yalta and
by the advisors of the State Department since then." Senator

Albert Jenner of Indiana proclaimed:

"The Korean debacle

also reminds us that the same sell-out-to-Stalin statesmen
who turned Russia loose are still in the saddle...."

According to Senator Taft, "the bungling and inconsistent
foreign policy of the administration" had led to the

atmosphere in which "it was not unreasonable for the North
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Koreans to suppose they could
get away with it [the
invasion] and that we would do
nothing about it." Senator
McCarthy, as usual, was perhaps the
most extreme in his
denunciation of past policies that were
developed by
"...that group of Communists, fellow
travelers and dupes in
our State Department
a group who make Benedict
Arnold

-

look like a piker

.

"

[42]

By late summer the only spirit of
bipartisanship

seemed to center around domestic ant i
-Communism. Senator

McCarran, fresh from his victory on the question
of the

Spanish loan, was pushing for passage of the McCarran
Internal Security Act. As chairman of the Senate
Judiciary

Committee, McCarran had kept alive the salient features
of
the Mundt-Nixon bill which required the registration
of

"Communist-action" and "Communist-front" organizations with
the Attorney General. Senate liberals,

led by Paul Douglas

of Illinois and Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota,

"as a

hypothet ically less drastic alternative" co-sponsored

a

bill

authorizing the Attorney General to round up and hold in

detention camps anyone he considered to be engaged

in

subversive activities in the event the President declared an
"internal security emergency." The pressures of war, an

upcoming election and the fear of being proclaimed "soft on
Communism" generated overwhelming support for the McCarran
Act.

Despite the fact that both McCarran and Mundt
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questioned the so-called "concentration
camp" features of
the bill as being unconstitutional,
the measure sailed
through both the House and Senate.
Truman promptly vetoed
the bill, declaring it "a bill which
would greatly weaken
our liberties, and give aid and comfort
to those who would

destroy us." The President's veto was overridden

in the

House 286 to 48 and in the Senate 57 to ten.
Thus, while

McCarthy's shotgun approach and flamboyant rhetoric
was

driving liberals to distraction, McCarran, the political
insider, was going about the business of getting
legislation

passed in both the foreign and domestic fields.

[43]

While the war in Korea was still going badly in late
August, General Douglas MacArthur entered the fray. Advance

copies of

a

speech prepared by MacArthur for delivery to the

Veterans of Foreign Wars appeared in U.S. News and World
Report

.

The speech attacked as "appeasement" and "defeatism"

those who criticized defense of Formosa in the belief it

would "alienate continental Asia." Such an attitude would

expose our "friends" in the Philippines, Australia, New
Zealand,

Indochina, Japan and other areas to "the lustful

thrusts of those who stand for slavery as against liberty,
for atheism as against God." Truman asked Secretary of

Defense Johnson to order MacArthur to withdraw the speech,
which he did. This action only increased Republican

criticism of Truman's conduct of the war. Senate Minority

319

Leader Kenneth Wherry attacked "the
vagueness and complete
lack of direction to the administration's
policies
in the

Far East... at a time when our boys
are fighting and dying in
Korea." It was at this time, according
to historian Ronald
J.

Caridi, that many Republicans "started to
express their

dissatisfaction with the entire concept of containment

."[ 44

The dramatic mid-September landing at Inchon
by

MacArthur, resulting in the encirclement and
destruction of
much of the North Korean army and a rapid series
of military

successes for the United Nations forces, probably kept the

mid-term election losses for the Democrats at

a

minimum.

With the war going well and MacArthur making predictions
that the boys would be home by Christmas, the Republicans

still managed to pick up 28 seats in the House and five new

Senators. In addition, the Republicans managed to capture

majority of the governorships being contested that year.

a

It

was not the overall gains, however, but rather the

individual Republicans who won, and, perhaps more important,
the individual Democrats who lost,

that made the results

significant. Both the Senate Majority Leader, Scott Lucas of
Illinois, and Majority Whip, Francis J. Myers of

Pennsylvania, were defeated. Millard Tydings, Chairman of
the powerful Senate Armed Services Committee and of the

investigation that had castigated McCarthy's charges against
the State Department, and Elbert Thomas of Utah, Chairman of
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the Senate Labor Committee, were
also defeated. As William
A. Glaser has pointed out
"The simultaneous defeat of four
such important leaders weakened the
power and prestige of
the Democrats," while at the same
time "no comparable

defeats of incumbents were experienced by
the Republican
Party in 1950." Among Republican incumbents
Senator Taft's
reelection in Ohio with some 57 percent of the
vote
"convinced him and his supporters that he possessed

heretofore-unsuspected popularity at the grass roots and
led
to his bid for the 1952 presidential nomination."

[45]

Equally important was the emergence of new Republican
leadership and the issues they used to get elected. Richard
M.

Nixon, capitalizing on the national publicity generated

by his involvement in the Alger Hiss case, won election to
the Senate by over 680,000 votes in California. Everett M.

Dirkson defeated Scott Lucas in Illinois by over 290,000
votes. In Maryland John Marshall Butler described his 43,000

vote victory over Tydings as "the largest majority that has
ever been given a Republican senatorial candidate in the

history of my state." Glaser has pointed out that along with
the emergence of new leaders came new issues which "were

tested for their vote getting effectiveness." The three big
issues that would provide the cornerstone of the 1952

Republican campaign -- Korea, Communism and corruption -"were first used widely by Republican campaigners in 1950."
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Indeed, Nixon's campaign in
California would become the

bellwether for future Republican
efforts linking both Korea
and Communism. In late October,
when the first evidence of
Chinese Communist "Volunteers" became
public, Nixon demanded
to know Helen Gahagan Douglas'
position on admitting
Red

China to the United Nations. When she
declined to answer
Nixon declared: "This is the last straw.
I
know that my

opponent was committed to the State Department
policy of
appeasement in the Far East, but I never dreamed
she would
stick to it even after we were attacked." Thus
Nixon neatly
tied his opponent both to support for the enemy
in the midst
of a shooting war and to the policy of appeasement
generated

by the Hiss gang at the State Department.

[46]

Post-election commentators tended to focus on the
effect Senator McCarthy played in shifting Catholic voters
to the Republican Party. This was particularly true in the

case of Tydings' defeat in Maryland, where McCarthy took an

active role in helping to defeat his Senate nemesis. But

McCarthy had campaigned across the country, and according to
columnist Marquis Childs, "In every contest where

it was a

major factor McCarthyism won." Later historians have

attempted to minimize McCarthy's effectiveness, citing local
issues and the personal popularity of some candidates rather

than McCarthy's influence. Donald Crosby has made

a

particularly valiant effort to downplay the role Catholics
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played in Tydings

•

defeat and to minimize the shift of

Catholic votes to Eisenhower in 1952.
Both these
interpretations,

it seems to me,

miss the larger impact of

Catholic influence not just on other Catholics
but on the
center-core groups as well. Most of the time these
centercore groups may not even have been aware that
Catholic
influence was playing

a

role in shaping their attitudes.

Californians may have been well aware that McCarthy was

campaigning for his fellow Communist hunter Nixon and may
not have been influenced by McCarthy's support for
him. But

they were certainly not aware at the time that Nixon's
overall national prestige as a result of the Hiss case had
been largely the result of efforts by Father John Cronin

acting on information from Catholic FBI director

Edgar

J.

Hoover and in turn passed on to Nixon. Thus the influence of

Catholics such as McCarthy on Catholic voters

is

only one

dimension of the politics involved. Equally important was
the influence of the periphery on the center-core.

[47]

Truman and the Democratic Party were now faced

squarely with the prospect that FDR had foreseen in early
1945. The domestic political consequences of the failure to

achieve a lasting peace in the face of Soviet domination of

Catholic Eastern Europe had seemingly driven large numbers
of traditionally Catholic voters
in the 1950

into the Republican column

mid-term elections. Historian Stephen Ambrose
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in

writing on the 1950 election states,
"This was an America ir
which paranoia ran so deep that it
was politically
profitable to charge that Truman and
Acheson, those coldest
of cold warriors, were soft on
Communism." The
irony of the

situation was clear. Truman had managed to
retain the
Democratic loyalty of Catholic voters in 1948
by keeping
foreign policy out of the political debate.
His tough

stand

against Communism through such measures as
the Truman

Doctrine and the Marshall Plan and, as we have
seen, his

ability to link Catholic support for those measures
through
the Catholic hierarchy was no longer enough.
Appeals during
the campaign by liberal Catholic Democrats such as
Secretary
of Labor Maurice Tobin,

former Governor of Massachusetts,

and Democratic National Chairman Stephen Mitchell were not
as effective against the rhetoric of McCarthy,

McCarran, and

others on charges that the administration was influenced by

Communism, as FDR's campaign against similar charges hurled
by Father Coughlin in 1936 had been. Many Catholics who

rejected Coughlin's charges now seemed receptive to the same

arguments and were willing to vote accordingly. McCarran
himself had become convinced of the validity of the charges.
An early supporter of the New Deal, he considered not

seeking

a

third term in 1944 on the Democratic ticket

because "he cannot support those who call themselves
Democrats, but who in reality are nothing but communists to
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the very core." Similarly, Joseph
Kennedy, who supported FDR
in 1936, supported Richard Nixon's
Senate bid in 1950 and
even channeled a $1000 contribution to
Nixon through his son
Jack. [48]
The 1950 election results seemed to foreshadow
the
fact that the periphery was moving to the
right politically,

and in the process dominating the political
culture of

anti-Communism. In fact. Catholic anti-Communism governed
not only the domestic political culture, but it drove
U.S.

foreign policy in directions the administration did not

necessarily want to go, such as in Spain. Crosby framed the
issue succinctly:

"In the fearful ten months that followed

the 1950 elections, the Democratic strategists in the White

House found themselves haunted by

a

nagging question --

would the Republicans be able to use the Communist issue to

capture the Catholic vote in 1952?" Stephen Springarn,

administrative assistant to Truman, wrote

a

series of

memoranda encouraging the President to appoint liberal
Catholics to various security commissions the administration
was trying to create as

a

counterpoint to McCarthy. The

electoral politics of the Catholic vote, which FDR

sidestepped in 1944 over the Polish question, and which
Truman managed to maintain in 1948 through his hardline

approach to Communist expansion in Europe, seemed about to
break against the Democrats. The issues were in place, the
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rhetoric was capturing votes and the
prospect of
realignment was in the air. [49]
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CHAPTER 14
"WE HAVE HEARD GOD SPEAK TODAY"

The Korean war was going badly in January
1951. in
fact Seoul fell to the Communists on January
of the war, we have seen,

Republican Party as

a

4.

The conduct

had been identified by the

potential domestic political issue in

the off-year election. According to Ronald Caridi the
four-

month period beginning with Chinese intervention in the war
in late November 1950 and the dismissal of MacArthur in

April 1951 resulted in Republican "resolve to oppose the

Administration's handling of all phases of foreign policy,"
and "to use the Korean War for its own political advantage,"
tl]

Walter LaFeber, respected diplomatic historian,

identifies Korea as "the war for both Asia and Europe." He

emphasizes yet again the importance of France in State
Department calculations for both areas. State Department
planners had to support the French effort in Indochina in
order to maintain access to vital raw materials and to

provide markets in Southeast Asia for a recovering Japan,
which was the "...key to the entire American position in the

Pacific." Such support, both economically and militarily,
would extract a quid pro quo, namely, French compliance with
the rearming of Germany. Such strategic and economic

arguments have validity, but the cultural aspects, in this
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instance religion, have not been
thoroughly explored.
Religious views take on added
significance in the context of
approval of these policies by American
public opinion. [2]
In Europe the dominant personalities,

Schuman in

France, Adenauer in Germany, DiGaspari
in Italy and Franco
in Spain were all Catholic. In
the Pacific a similar pattern
emerges. The Catholic Philippines and
Indochina, controlled
for the moment by Catholic France with
the support of an

indigenous Catholic bureaucratic infrastructure
[which we
will look at in more depth later], form the
bookends of

American strategic policy in Southeast Asia. In addition,
both Syngman Rhee in Korea and Chiang Kai-shek on Formosa,

while not Catholic, were converts to Christianity and thus

represented Asian nationalist alternatives to "atheistic"
Communism. To neglect this aspect of the emerging Republican

policy of "liberation" versus the Truman policy of
"containment" in terms of domestic politics has resulted,
believe,

in a skewed

I

interpretation of the origins and

subsequent maturation of the Cold War.
The National Security Council was presented with a

policy paper on Spain in mid-January at the time the

military situation

in Korea was

deteriorating. Acheson, whom

we have seen recognized the need to include "Prankish power"
in the fight against an aggressive Russia,

accepted the

long-range goals enunciated in this paper. One of these was
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"to search out the situation
for a possible military

arrangement."

m

naming Stanton Griff

is

Ambassador to Spain

Truman again raised the religious
situation,

"i

don't know

what your religion is," the President
told Griffis, "I do
not even know if you have any, but
I
am a Baptist and I
believe that in any country man should be
permitted to

worship God in his own way. The situation in
Spain

is

intolerable. Do you know that a Baptist who dies
in Spain
must even be buried in the middle of the night?"
The

strategic significance of Spain, however, and the
impact of
the Catholic Lobby in building public support
for enlisting

Catholic Spain in the fight against "atheistic" Communism
were overriding the President's libertarian objections.

[3]

While Truman expressed his displeasure at religious

persecution in Spain, American Catholics again confronted
continued efforts to undermine church authority in Eastern
Europe. Michael Busalka, Roman Catholic Suffragan Bishop of

Bratislava, Czechoslovakia was brought to trial. Busalka and

Bishops Jan Vojtassak and Pavel Gojdic were charged with
treason and espionage for wartime activities. "Sent Spies to
Russia, Bishop on Trial Says," read the headline in the New
York Times of January 12.

It

reported that Busalka "told the

court he sent spies into Soviet Ukraine shortly before the

German attack on Russia." How this constituted "treason and
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espionage" against the Czech government
at the time was left
unstated. [4]
Another story of the same day came closer
to the mark
for policy makers and those interested
in changing public
attitudes toward Spain. Archbishop Gushing
of Boston, who
led a pilgrimage to the Catholic shrines
of France in the

midst of the Marshall Plan funding debate,
now announced
plans to lead a pilgrimage to the shrines of
Spain in the

midst of growing public debate on Spain's role
in European
defense. Cushing, the Times reported, "was planning
to

accept the invitation of church and government leaders
to
lead an international pilgrimage to Christian shrines
in

that country(Spain) next summer ."[ emphas is added] The

article went on to state that Cushing received a letter from
Jose F. Leguerica, Spanish Ambassador designate to the

United States "who noted that Archbishop Cushing recently
had praised Spain for its fidelity to Christendom and its

resistance to anti-religious violence." If Truman believed
Baptists in Spain had to be buried in the middle of the
night,

the American public was being presented with a far

different picture. The pilgrimage was scheduled to sail from
Boston on July 14.

[5]

As the question of what to do about Spain slowly took

shape, the controversy surrounding military policy in Korea

exploded. MacArthur advocated taking the war directly to the
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Chinese,

including the bombing of Chinese
cities and the use
of Chiang's forces either in
Korea or in an invasion of the
Mainland. Truman, who had earlier
supported MacArthur's
drive to the Yalu with the expressed
intent of reuniting the
Korean peninsula as a political unit, now
reverted to the

limited concept of maintaining the independence
and

integrity of the Republic of Korea. Republican
policy during
this period was reminiscent of the Civil War
era's Committee
on the Conduct of the War.

No criticism of the

administration's conduct of the war was too extreme.
Much of
it

centered around the "no win" concept of limited war,
the

failure of the United Nations to support branding the

Chinese Communists as aggressors, and the failure of our
allies to provide adequate forces to the conflict and to

discontinue trading with the Chinese.
By the time Truman dismissed MacArthur on April 11 the

military situation had stabilized about the original 38th
parallel border. The reaction to MacArthur's dismissal was
instantaneous,

furious and political. The White House

received 125,000 telegrams within forty-eight hours and

admitted they "were running 20 to

1

against the President."

The Michigan legislature passed a resolution declaring that
"at 1:00 A.M.

of this day.

greatest victory of

a

World Communism achieved its

decade in the dismissal of General

MacArthur." By April 17 MacArthur was back in the country
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and a crowd estimated at over a
half-million people lined
the route from San Francisco's
airport to the general's
hotel. On April 19 "a record 30 million
people tuned in

their radios to hear General MacArthur
address Congress."
The general provided his political
supporters with all the

ammunition they needed. "In war, indeed, there

is

no

substitute for victory," he declared, and went on to
say
that the policy of not attempting to
drive China from Korea
was nothing less than "appeasement." He
claimed his plan to

carry the war to the Chinese had the support "of
our own
joint Chiefs of Staff," implying that the military

judgment

of professional soldiers was being overridden by
"a mere,

meddlesome civilian, the President of the United States.
"[6]
Republican reaction to the speech took on

a

messianic

flavor. Representative Dewey Short of Missouri proclaimed:
"We have heard God speak today. God in the flesh,

the voice

of God." Former President Herbert Hoover declared MacArthur

was the "reincarnation of St. Paul." The General's arrival
in

New York,

"hard-bitten, cynical New York, stronghold of

the Democratic party," seemed to foreshadow political doom
for the administration.

Six million people lined the parade

route in a welcome that exceeded the return of General

Eisenhower and the reception given Charles Lindbergh.
Observers noted people crossing their breasts as the General
passed. The motorcade took almost seven hours to cover the
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19.2 mile route through Manhattan. The
general got out of
his convertible only twice, "once
to pump the hand of

Francis Cardinal Spellman, who was
standing in his red robes
outside St. Patrick's Cathedral." [7]
The politics of the situation was not
lost on Senator

Pat McCarran. On April 28 the Nevada
Democrat burst into

print on his favorite subject

—

Spain. McCarran published

a

lengthy analysis of America's military situation
vis.-a-vis.
the real enemy -- Russia
in the Saturday Evening Post

—

entitled "Why Shouldn't the Spanish Fight for Us?"
A short

preface by the Post declared "A million fiery fighting
men
are ready to help us battle communists if we give them
the
nod and some guns. They are the subjects of a police state,
but,

says this distinguished senator, they can still kill

reds." The senator briefly outlined his earlier efforts to
secure a loan for Spain. In language that could only be

construed as drawing on public discontent over the

President's seeming "meddling" in military affairs, he
launched into his primary objective

—

to "bring Spain into

the Atlantic Alliance." McCarran told his readers:

"The

shirt sleeve boys in the Pentagon wanted it. Army men of

Cabinet level kept out of the argument, but one notch below
were the professionals, the men who have already fought

Russia on a hundred blueprints." These "professionals" knew
the value of Spain to the defense of Europe.
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"But the

military does not make decisions

if

political questions

intrude." In late April 1951 McCarran's
readers did not have
to be reminded what that meant.
"Political decisions belong
to the State Department and the
White House," he continued,
"and the President had made it clear
he wanted no relations
with Spain." [8]
This left the "professionals" in a bind.
They could
"not openly advocate a policy which frightened
their

superiors, let alone contradict the President,"
without

jeopardizing their careers, as MacArthur's dismissal
made
all too clear. This blundering President could
not, or would
not,

see what was clear to all, but "by the time we have

waved good-by to

a

few more boatloads of nineteen-year-olds,

the logic of Spain will be obvious." The still-ravaged

European economies, and the reluctance of the Europeans to
raise the necessary divisions for their own defense left

Americans with only one choice; "as retaliation to Russian
invasion, our trump card is air power directed at Russia
itself -- atomic war carried right to the source." [9]

McCarran went on to describe the opposition to Spain's
inclusion in the Western community as "a festering anger
with critics in many countries of the West who have been too

careless with the word 'Fascist.'" These critics failed to

understand that the Spanish Civil War "was simply Stalin's
first European inning in

a

game whose subsequent innings
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were played and won in Poland,
Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia,
Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and
China, and whose latest
inning is Korea." For most Spanish,
then, "their civil war
was simply one Russian failure in
a campaign that

subsequently was

a

success in eleven other countries now

bossed by the Kremlin." For McCarran

it

was almost

impossible to discuss the Spanish Civil War
rationally with
our European allies; "in France's Chamber
of Deputies there
are some twenty men who fought in the
Loyalist brigades.

the Italian Government -- at the cabinet level,

In

in

Parliament and in the civil service -- are some 200
veterans
of the Loyalist army," and while England did not
send as

many men as other countries, "there was

a

unit in the

Loyalist forces commonly known as the Attlee Company." Even
Marshall Tito of Yugoslavia had commanded

a

Loyalist

brigade. While McCarran's comments would certainly appear to
be those of a rigid ideologue French political scientist

Alfred Grosser describes

a

postwar European political

situation much like that McCarran saw. "Everywhere," Grosser
writes,

"in France, Denmark,

Italy, Germany and Belgium, a

push to the Left was taking place." The war had been fought
in the name of anti-Fascism according to Grosser and

"the

disappearance of the parties of the Right caused many
conservatives to vote for the least Leftist party." The
resultant triumph of socialist governments in Western Europe
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committed to the "denunciation of
monopolies, the refusal to
equate political freedom and economic
laissez-faire, the
demand for a planned economy and
participation of workers in
the management of enterpr ises
were found almost
everywhere...." The fact that virtually
.

.

.

all these

Governments were headed by Catholics, and
that the United
States was supporting them both financially
and militarily,
lends further support to the thesis that
religion rather

than economics was the underlying paradigm of
cold war

confrontation with "atheistic" Communism. 10
[

This is further born out by the fact that McCarran
had
to address his religion.

He asked readers

for

"leave to

intrude with an explanation which is personal and,

I

hope,

unnecessary." He acknowledged his leading role in the plan
to "mobilize Spain," and added,

Catholic faith." However,

"I

am also of the Roman

am certain my religious views

"I

do not enter, consciously or subconsciously,

into my

advocacy of Spain's military role." But the mere fact he
raised the issue, even as

a

disclaimer, indicates that

it

was significant and that by extension it involved the

Catholic periphery and Spain in the public's perception.
Furthermore, the disclaimer has something of

a

hollow ring

to it, given his connections with Cardinal Spellman and his

discussions of the Communist menace with Pius XII. In any
case, the article, coming as it did at the very height of
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the MacArthur controversy, further
tied the Truman

administration to what the public perceived
as failed
military policies in Korea, and perhaps
disastrous military
policies in Europe. Coming from a powerful
Catholic
Democrat, in a party largely dependent on
urban Catholic
voters, McCarran's arguments had to be taken
into account.

[11]

The MacArthur hearings before the joint Senate
Foreign

Relations and Armed Services Committees began

in early May

and ran through June 25th. Again controversy swirled
about
the conduct of the hearings, which the Democrats demanded
be

held in executive session while the Republicans sought

public hearings. Senator Dirksen, newly elected Republican

from Illinois, reminded his Senate colleagues of the result
of secrecy at Yalta.

In a Senate vote to place the bill of

Senator Homer Ferguson, dealing with open hearings at the
top of the agenda the Democrats won on

a

vote of 41 to 37,

with Senator McCarran the only Democrat to cross party
lines. MacArthur, as expected, attacked the administration's

policies as "appeasement" and used the Truman Doctrine

against Truman, declaring the enemy was not Russia but

"Communism all over the world." MacArthur was confident the
professional soldiers among the Joint Chiefs of Staff would
endorse his proposals for victory rather than the concept of
"limited war" espoused by the administration. Instead, the
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Joint Chiefs attacked virtually every
aspect of MacArthur's
plan and even the general himself.
The culmination
of the

attack came when General Omar Bradley
declared that

MacArthur's plan would involve the United
States "in the
wrong war at the wrong time with the wrong
enemy." [12]

The MacArthur hearings had barely concluded
when

Truman announced his willingness to negotiate
in Korea based

Karp,

on the 38th parallel.

a

settlement

According to Walter

"This was the appeasement peace' against which

MacArthur had hurled his thunderbolts
back in April,

[to]

... and,

so

it

seemed

the entire body of the American people."

The general's political star was declining, but
that of

another general was rising. The Republican party throughout
this period seemed to embody the contradictions inherent in
the Korean controversy. The concept of a "limited war" for

limited objectives ran against the grain of American public
opinion. To

a

nation that had so recently emerged victorious

from the greatest war the world had ever known with its

clearcut objective of "unconditional surrender," the idea of
limited war seemed preposterous. This was the appealing card

Republicans were playing: either bring the full force of
American military might to bear against the enemy or get
out. This seeming contradiction emerged early in the

MacArthur controversy when on April 24 Republican Senator

Harry P. Cain introduced two resolutions on the same day.
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The first called for a declaration
of war against both North
Korea and China. The second called
for the immediate

withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea.

[13]

The controversy surrounding MacArthur
seemed to have

been spent by July 10 when American and
Chinese negotiators
met in the Korean town of Kaesong to begin
discussions for a
truce. At the same time events were moving
toward

a

policy toward Spain. On July 12 the Boston GlohR.
in

new U.S.
a

front-page story, described the purposes of the forthcoming

pilgrimage to Spain being led by Archbishop Gushing. The
pilgrims would receive

a

historic welcome in Spain,

according to the Globe, and "be given an opportunity to
learn first hand the religious character of the country" and
"the sincere affection of the Spanish people toward the

United States." Cushing's remarks barely concealed the
political nature of the trip. "Despite the political

misgivings on every side," he remarked,
are propitious for such

friendship for Spain. It
in God.

a

"I

believe the times

strictly spiritual gesture of
is

also

a

declaration of confidence

Little by little the Western world

is

beginning to

acknowledge its debt to Spain and to understand in the light
of

its own experience with Red treachery,

the militant

resistance of the Spanish people to any compromise with

atheistic Communism." The Archbishop of Boston clearly was

thinking on the same lines as the Senator from Nevada. [14]
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On July 16 readers of the Globe
were greeted by a

front-page picture of

a

smiling Archbishop doffing a straw

hat to the 4,000 well wishers crowding
the pier to wave 'bon
voyage- to the Spanish pilgrims.
"Summing up the motives for
this historic making trip of American
Catholics to Catholic

Spain," the Globe reported,

"Archbishop Gushing told this

reporter tonite (sic) that American Catholics
are conscious
of the need of Divine Aid in the present
world crisis."

Gushing was restating his earlier theme that only
American
Catholics could perform the tasks necessary to save the
world from atheistic Communism. This time it was being
stated through the public media along with the belief that
God was on our side. The Archbishop concluded by saying "one

could consider this journey in the nature of

visit to Spain, not on

a

a

good will

high or so called diplomatic level,

but one of people to people." While Cushing's trip was

obviously for public consumption and not "on
called diplomatic level,"

it

a

high or so

did not have to be. That was

taking place separately, on the very same day. Admiral

Forrest P. Sherman arrived in Madrid on July 16 to begin
serious discussions with Franco on securing military bases
in Spain.

Secretary of State Acheson confirmed on July

18

the nature of Sherman's discussions with Franco. Noting that

"military authorities are in general agreement that Spain
of strategic importance to the general defense of Western
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is

Europe," Acheson went on to say
"tentative and exploratory
conversations have been undertaken with
the Spanish
Government with the sole purpose of
ascertaining what Spain
might be willing and able to do which
would contribute to
the strengthening of the common defense
against possible

aggression." McCarran's question of "Why shouldn't
the
Spanish fight for us?" was now being answered
affirmatively.
They should. The President confirmed the shift
in

administration policy toward Spain at
fol lowing day.

[

a press

conference the

15

Certainly geopolitical, economic, and strategic
reasons entered into the decision to reverse American policy

toward Spain. But perhaps in no other case do we have so

dramatic

a

picture of the influence of the Catholic

periphery in influencing the culture of Cold War
ant i -Communism in terms of public opinion on a foreign

policy issue. Interestingly, we do have available
statistical evidence of the change taking place in American
attitudes toward Spain over the course of the postwar years.
In May 1946 only 14 percent of American Catholics

had "a

favorable impression of the present government in Spain,
headed by General Franco." Still, this represented more than

double the
the

2

6

percent of American Protestants and seven times

percent of American Jews holding

a

favorable

impression. Much of the overall unfavorable impression was
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traced to Franco's sympathies with
America's enemies during
the war years. The numbers begin
to edge upward for all
groups following the Czech Coup in
1948, and the beginning
of what I have termed the Catholic
Lobby's efforts
to

rehabilitate the image of Spain, not as

a

fascist state, but

as a staunchly Catholic opponent of
"atheistic Communism."
In November of 1948, while still
in the minority,

of Catholics,

24

32 percent

percent of Protestants and 22 percent of

Jews approved inclusion of Spain in the
Marshall Plan. The
gap between Catholics and other religious
denominations had
not only narrowed considerably, but had also
jumped

dramatically. By the spring of 1949 Catholic opinion was

nearing

a

majority when

47

percent of Catholics favored

Spain being invited to join the UN. Catholic opinion was

more out front on this issue as only 30 percent of

Protestants and 23 percent of Jews approved of Spain's
inclusion. The Korean War pushed the numbers up even faster,
and by the time of Stalin's death, but before the Korean

armistice, 57 percent of Catholics, 53 percent of

Protestants and 50 percent of Jews approved sending military
and economic assistance to Spain. The efforts by McCarran,

Kennedy, Cushing and the numerous other Catholics actively

working for inclusion of Spain within the Atlantic alliance
had paid off in the form of a supportive public opinion.

These efforts culminated in late 1953 when 81 percent of
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catholics, 77 percent of Protestants
and 75 percent of Jews
approved the sending of military and
economic aid to Spain
in return for air and naval bases.
[16]
With truce negotiations underway in Korea
and the

administration publicly admitting its reversal
of policy on
Spain, McCarran turned his attention once
again to
internal

security. The Internal Security subcommittee of
the Senate

Judiciary Committee, chaired by McCarran, opened hearings

in

July 1951 on "the activities of the Institute of Pacific
Relations and the actions of Owen Lattimore in particular."
It should be kept

in mind that

it was these hearings which

formed the basis of Buckley and Bozell's defense of Senator

McCarthy's charges before the Tydings' Committee. Historian
Von Pittman describes McCarran's attitude during the

hearings by noting he "discussed the war [in Korea] mainly
in terms

of traitors within the United States." The fall of

China was brought about by these traitors and now American
boys were dying at Chinese hands as a result.

In language

reminiscent of MacArthur, McCarran charged the traitors were
still at work within the administration, spreading defeatist

propaganda [read "limited war"], and attempting "to inject
fear into the hearts of Americans so they will accept peace
at any price." With American negotiators sitting down with

Chinese negotiators in Korea "peace at any price" could only
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refer to the "peace without victory"
theme being sounded by
Republican critics of the administration.
[17]

The resumption of charges of traitors
in government,
this time being led by

a

powerful Catholic Democrat rather

than a Catholic Republican, could only
embarrass the

administration,

its

foreign policy and its conduct of the

war in Korea. Once again the charges were
lent credibility

when on March 30 Julius and Ethel Rosenberg
were convicted
of wartime espionage in passing

information to the Soviet

Union dealing with the construction of the atomic
bomb.
Judge Irving R. Kaufman, declaring the couple's crime
"worse
than murder," imposed the death penalty on the pair on
April
5,

less than a week before MacArthur's dismissal. Just as

occurred earlier in the Hiss case,

a

Catholic played

a

prominent role in the Rosenberg case. Elizabeth Bentley,

a

former member of the Communist Party converted to

Catholicism through the efforts of New York's Bishop Fulton
J.

Sheen,

testified about her knowledge of Julius

Rosenberg's participation in

a

Communist cell passing

information to the Soviet Union through Harry Gold. Both

Bentley and Budenz were now key witnesses before McCarran's
subcommittee. The hearings before the McCarran Committee

drew massive press coverage. Pittman notes that "this
inquiry would develop into the largest, most thorough, and
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most controversial of the efforts to
uncover communist

infiltration into the government." The following
year, in
July of 1952, The Washington Post, no
friend of McCarran's,
concluded: "It sums up the character of this
congress to
state an unquestionable fact: that its most
important member
was Patrick A. McCarran."

[18]

But the political implications of the stalemate
in

Korea was beginning to take its toll within the Republican

party itself. The prospect of victory

in

1952 was already

beginning to drive presidential politics within the party.
Efforts within both parties had long been underway to secure
the services of General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Truman

himself,

in

1948,

stepping aside as

briefly entertained the prospect of
a

presidential candidate in favor of the

general if that could have been arranged. For many the

problem was that noone seemed to know

if

Eisenhower was

a

Democrat or a Republican. Much light has been shed on this
subject which points to Eisenhower's earlier decision that
he was

in

fact a Republican and that he wanted the Party's

presidential nomination. Raymond

J.

Saulnier,

former

Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisors,
claims Eisenhower told him he "must be

a

Republican" as

early as January, 1948. Saulnier, at that time on the
faculty of Columbia University where Eisenhower had recently
been named President, was discussing monetary policy with

349

the general and in the process
concluded "it was evident as
we talked that his views on public
policy fitted him

indisputably into the Republican scheme of
things."
Eisenhower talked "with great force and
earnestness about
the qualities of self-reliance, i ndustr
i ousness
and

frugality that individuals had to have

if

an enterprise

system was to work," according to Saulnier, and
early to surmise that what

I

"I

began

was hearing (and here and there

contributing to) was oral drafting of

a

speech." Indeed,

Saulnier claims the essence of the discussion that day
was
later given in a major address by Eisenhower to the
American
Bar Association and published under the title "The Middle
of

the Road: A Statement of Faith in America."

[19]

We have clear evidence that by October 14,

Eisenhower indicated in

a

1951

letter to Senator James Duff of

Pennsylvania that he would agree "to accept the Republican
Party's nomination as its 1952 presidential candidate,
should the Party designate him as its choice." Duff was part
of a group of moderate eastern Republicans headed by former

presidential candidate Thomas

E.

Dewey that looked to an

Eisenhower nomination to head off that of neo-isolat ionist
Robert Taft of Ohio. The group also included Harry Darby,

a

Republican national committeeman from Eisenhower's home
state of Kansas, General Lucious

D.

Clay, New Hampshire

Governor Sherman Adams and Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot
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Lodge, Jr., appointed to head the
Eisenhower campaign. Along
with Dewey came his principal advisor
on foreign affairs

John Foster Dulles. Dulles,

leading spokesman for

a

Republican foreign policy positions from the
internationalist perspective, had recently been the
chief
negotiator for the Japanese peace treaty which was
signed in
San Francisco on September 8, 1951. He would now
take

on the

assignment from President Truman of securing ratification of
the treaty in the Senate.

[20]

Dulles was quite familiar with the political

infighting of the Senate where the President was now asking
him to secure confirmation of
of a shooting war.

a

peace treaty in the middle

He was also aware of the importance in

many states of securing the Catholic vote

in order

to get to

the Senate. He had served briefly in the Senate when Dewey,

still Governor of New York

[after his defeat for the

Presidency in 1948], appointed him to fill the unexpired
term of Robert

F.

Wagner, who resigned in the summer of 1949

because of ill health. In the critical 1950 off-year
election Dulles faced

a

particularly tough Democratic Party

candidate out to recapture Wagner's old seat. Former
Governor Herbert

H.

Lehman with his connections to "the

tight state and city machine" he formerly headed would be

difficult to beat. The Republicans put together

a

team

headed by Herbert Brownell [later Attorney General under
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Eisenhower] and James

H.

Hagerty [later Eisenhower's press

secretary] and "a young lawyer

...

named Roderick

L.

O'Connor,

who was drafted to get out the Roman
Catholic vote." [21]
The campaign in New York was as hard hitting
as

elsewhere in the country that year. In an effort
to attract
the big city ethnic Catholic voter the Republicans
charged

Lehman "was 'soft on Communism' and approved what the
Soviets were doing to the Czechs and other satellite
peoples
in eastern Europe." Democrats in turn
suggested that Dulles
"was against popery and had disinherited his son...
for

becoming

a

Roman Catholic priest." The son of

a

Presbyterian

minister and theology professor, Dulles had been taken aback
by the decision of his youngest son, Avery, to convert to

Catholicism
entering

a

in

1941. Avery then took matters further by

Jesuit seminary and taking the initial vows of

the Catholic priesthood. The charges seemed to be sticking,

and O'Connor, with Dulles' approval'

sought to bring father

and son together to discredit the claims. Avery, however,

under the strict rules of the Jesuit Order, was confined to
his seminary in Woodstock, New Jersey. O'Connor sought the

help of Father Robert Gannon, former head of Fordham

University, to see if "there [was] any way Avery could be

brought to New York?" to which Gannon responded "Tell the
senator I'm sure we can work something out." Indeed,

something was worked out and Avery appeared at the family's
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New York home for

a

photo session with his father. Hagerty

later claimed the photos were intended
only for use in the

metropolitan areas with "the idea being to
appeal to the
Italian and other Catholic voters in the
city." But the

pictures were distributed upstate as well and,
according to
Hagerty, "probably didn't gain us anything.
Because I
think

there was a certain feeling upstate about the
Catholic

connection." [22]
Dulles, then, was clearly aware of the importance
of

both the Catholic periphery's electoral importance
and its

central role in the development of the culture of

anti-Communism. The Dulles/Eisenhower team would lay out

a

strategy of "liberation" rather than "containment" which was
"motivated in fact more by determination to lure East

European voting blocs away from the Democrats than from any
realistic expectations of 'rolling back' Moscow's sphere of
influence." Dulles elaborated on this theme of liberation in
an article entitled "A Policy of Boldness" which appeared in

the May 19,

1952 issue of Life magazine.

"Our policies have

largely involved emergency action to try to 'contain' Soviet

communism by checking

it here

or blocking it there," he

wrote, but "we are not working, sacrificing and spending in

order to be able to live without this peril -- but to live
with it, presumably forever." Such a policy was clearly

unacceptable to the people of the United States, according

353

to Dulles,

and just as unacceptable to the people in
the

enslaved nations. The task of liberation would not
be quick
and easy,

but the people in the captive nations must be
made

aware that America was on their side. "Liberation
from the
yoke of Moscow will not occur for

a

very long time, and

courage in neighboring lands will not be sustained, unless
the United States makes it publicly known that it wants and

expects liberation to occur." The transition to liberation
from Moscow's domination should be on the model of Tito's

Yugoslavia and
wrote,

a

"peaceful separation" because, Dulles

"We do not want a series of bloody uprisings and

reprisals." [23]
Dulles

's

thinking dominated the Republican platform

hammered out in Chicago in July of 1952. The platform
attacked the Democrats because "they profess to be following
a

defensive policy of 'containment' of Russian communism

which has not contained it," but rather "abandons countless
human beings to a despotism and godless terrorism which in
turn enables the rulers to forge the captives into
for our des tr uct i on

.

"

[

a

weapon

emphas is added] The phrase "godless

terrorism" would of course remind all Americans of the

activity in the satellite states against organized religion,

particularly Catholicism. The platform went on to state:
"The Government of the United States, under Republican

leadership, will repudiate all commitments contained in
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secret understandings such as those at
Yalta which aid
Communist enslavements." Further, "it will
be made clear, on
the highest authority of the President
and the Congress,
that United States policy, as one of its
peaceful purposes,
looks happily forward to the genuine
independence of those

captive peoples." [24]

Eisenhower in particular was not thinking of
liberation in the sense that the United States was going
to
confront the Soviet Union over the control of its sphere
of
influence in Eastern Europe and liberate the satellite
countries. Rather, both he and Dulles would lend America's
moral support to indigenous democratic forces that by

peaceful means were attempting to throw off Soviet

domination.

In reality they were speaking of

liberation by

containment. The public, however, heard much more strident
rhetoric. The Eisenhower/Dulles doctrine mirrored that put

forward by Senator Brien McMahon, Democrat of Connecticut
and a Catholic, as early as 1951 during the debates over the

MacArthur proposals for widening the war in Korea. McMahon
argued that Korea was in reality only

a

holding action while

the United States built up the economic and military power
of the free world.

He regarded

internal revolution in the

communist countries as inevitable and that America could
facilitate this with

a

well planned propaganda effort "a

kind of intellectual invasion which will do more to weaken
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the Kremlin than any other thing we
could possibly do in the

military field." Containment was to be

a

pro-active policy

according to McMahon. This argument came under
attack in the
Senate from both Robert Taft and Richard Nixon
but is

strongly reflected in Dulles'
The era of

a

Li_fe.

article.

[25]

bipartisan foreign policy was over. Not

only did the Republican platform reflect this change,
the

convention itself was

a

virtual nonstop attack on

Roosevelt/Truman policies from start to finish. The keynote
speaker was none other than General Douglas MacArthur
was followed by House Minority Leader Joseph Martin,

.

He

Senator

Joseph McCarthy with his charge that the Democrats had

presided over "twenty years of treason" and former

Ambassador to China Patrick Hurley. Not only was

bipartisanship

a

thing of the past, now there was open talk

of "treason." The lineup of speakers -- Martin,

McCarthy,

Hurley -- and their message, was an obvious tipoff of an
all-out Republican effort to capture the ethnic. Catholic,
big city voters that formed the core of the Roosevelt

coalition. The realities of domestic politics, which

prompted FDR to send Edward J. Flynn on his mission to

Moscow and Rome following the Yalta conference hoping to
forestall a confrontation between the Vatican and the

Kremlin in Eastern Europe was being played out in the

campaign speeches of the 1952 presidential election.

356

Perhaps the most dramatic incident
of the 1952
presidential campaign occurred not between
the presidential
candidates, but between Eisenhower and
Senator Joseph R.
McCarthy of Wisconsin. It is generally
conceded among

historians that Eisenhower detested McCarthy
and all that he
stood for, especially following McCarthy's
attack on General
George Marshall, Ike's mentor and colleague. It
was an

article of political faith at the time that McCarthy
carried
great weight with Catholic voters in big cities, the
very
voters the Republicans wanted to peel away from the

Democratic Party. There had been criticism from the right
wing of the party following the convention when Eisenhower
made a decision not to campaign in either Wisconsin for

McCarthy or Indiana for Senator William Jenner. But
following McCarthy's overwhelming showing in the Wisconsin

primary in September, Eisenhower aides insisted the campaign
train visit Wisconsin. Ike was prepared to use the

opportunity of

a

speech in Milwaukee, where he would share

the same stage with McCarthy, to defend Marshall and his

career. Eisenhower was prepared to say he had known Marshall
for 35-years "as a man and as a soldier." Marshall was

"dedicated with a singular selflessness and the profoundest

patriotism to the service of America." The recent "charges
of disloyalty" were "a sobering lesson in the way freedom

must not defend itself." [26]
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But as the campaign train moved into
Wisconsin both

Eisenhower's aides and prominent Republicans
began to doubt'
the wisdom of attacking McCarthy on
his home
turf.

Republican Governor of Wisconsin Walter Kohler
and national
committeeman Henry Ringling urged the candidate to
delete
the reference to Marshall. McCarthy himself
boarded the

train and warned Eisenhower that if he disagreed
with him

publicly in Wisconsin he would be booed. Eisenhower replied
that he had been booed before and didn't mind. Kohler
then

approached Eisenhower aide Sherman Adams, arguing that to
attack McCarthy could jeopardize both local and national

Republican candidates. Adams again approached Eisenhower
over the critical passage, noting that he agreed with

Kohler's position. Ike, described as "purple with rage,"

finally succumbed to the political realities and ordered the
passage on Marshall taken out of the Milwaukee speech. In as
much as the speech had already been released to the press
the fact that Eisenhower did not mention Marshall when he

delivered the speech caused an even greater embarrassment to
the candidate who was now portrayed as being intimidated by

McCarthy. The speech itself was a ringing endorsement of

McCarthy's themes. "Two whole decades our national life" had
been "poisoned" by

a

national tolerance for Communism,

Eisenhower said. Just as McCarthy and Catholic doctrine had
been saying, this evil doctrine had worked its way into
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schools,

labor unions, news organizations
"and

—

terrifyingly-- into our government." This
resulted

most
in

"contamination in some degree of virtually
every department,
every agency, every bureau, every section
of
our

government," Eisenhower declared, and "it
meant

a

government

by men whose very brains were confused by
the opiate of this
deceit." The fall of China, he asserted, and the
"surrender
of whole nations"

in Eastern Europe could be laid at the

feet of Communists working in Washington. Eisenhower
seemed
to be quoting from McCarthy himself when he
proclaimed both

domestic and foreign policy of the previous administrations
"meant -- in its most ugly triumph -- treason itself." [27]

Whatever the reaction of the press and the Democrats
the political strategy appears to have paid off. The

domestic political reaction that FDR attempted to forestall
by sending Flynn to Moscow and Rome in 1945 and that Truman

managed to overcome with his efforts to promote
foreign policy and

a

in 1948 materialized

a

bipartisan

hard line approach to the Soviet Union
in 1952.

Ethnic Catholic voters in

large numbers deserted the Democratic Party and joined

Protestants in putting

a

Republican in the White House for

the first time since 1932. Pollster Louis Harris identified

the issue succinctly when he wrote,
a

"There is no doubt that

foreign policy issue -- the war in Korea -- dominated all

other issues in the election." The stalemated war in Korea
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"grated and gnawed" declared Harris and
fused the public's
frustration with the administrations
apparent failure to
deal with the Soviet Union since the end
of the war.

"Somehow,

it

summed up all the impatience and protest
the

people felt," he claimed, "It was easily the
Achilles heel
of the Democratic campaign.

It

was the. issue on which an^

Democratic answer had little chance from the start."
[28]
Korea managed to focus the attention of the
electorate
while at the same time highlighting the issue
of Communists
in government.

The perception of

a

failed Far Eastern

policy, perhaps undermined by Communist agents working

within the State Department, resulted
Americans "believing the issue

a

in a

majority of

major one, and by an

overwhelming four to one count, that only the Republicans
could clean the Reds out of Washington." More importantly,
the Eisenhower/Dulles rhetoric of liberation rather than

containment, while not appreciably different from what some
Democrats such as Brien McMahon were saying, conveyed to
large numbers of Catholic ethnic voters the belief the

Republicans were prepared to liberate their homelands. The
trend was across the board among Catholic voters and

reversed "an identification of their economic self-interest
with the New Deal." FDR's pro-British foreign policy had

resulted in

a

drop off of German,

Irish and Italian voting

strength in both the 1940 and 1944 elections. Truman had

360

managed to bring these voters back in
1948. German voters
present an interesting example because
they
were not

overwhelmingly Catholic as were the Irish,
Polish and
Italians. Both Catholic and Protestant
German-Americans had
a long tradition of voting Democratic.
In 1952 both
groups

came over to the Republicans in large numbers.
However, 55
per cent of German Catholics "bolted from their
past

political affiliation and voted Republican" as opposed to

roughly one-third of German Protestants. That

22

percent

more German American Catholics switched voting patterns

is

a

statistically significant margin and suggests something
other than etnicity was at work. Catholic anti-Communism,

would seem, provides the answer to the difference.

it

[29]

The movement among Irish voters was just as dramatic.

Early indications seemed to indicate Irish voters would
maintain their loyalty to the Democratic candidate, but
there were reservations. A September poll taken at the

traditional kickoff of the campaign season showed 43 per
cent of Irish voters favoring Stevenson, 24 per cent

favoring Eisenhower but

a

large 33 per cent in conflict or

undecided. By October the shift had taken place with

a

majority, 51 per cent favoring Eisenhower. Most of this

shift came from the previously undecided as Stevenson's
total dipped to only 42 per cent, but the undecided dropped
to seven per cent from 33 per cent.
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The Irish had made up

their minds and decided on Eisenhower.
This movement of the
Irish away from the Democratic Party
held particular

significance in terms of the impact of McCarthy
on the
election and the decision of Eisenhower
not to confront
McCarthy over the Marshall issue. This is not
meant to
convey the idea that the Irish, or any other
ethnic group or
Catholics as a whole, moved in lockstep with
McCarthy
or

followed his political advice. But enough of them
did to be

considered decisive in any given election. The real
issue
for these groups was ant i -Communism,

tactics he employed.

not McCarthy or the

[30]

This Catholic ant i -Commun ism was perhaps best

illustrated in Massachusetts where young Congressman John

F.

Kennedy was seeking the Senate seat held by Henry Cabot
Lodge, Jr. Here was a virtual direct confrontation between
the core and the periphery. An Irish Catholic politician

whose grandfather had been

a

ward boss in Boston against

a

Boston brahmin whose grandfather had been the architect of

defeat for the Treaty of Versailles. Kennedy's father

represented new Irish wealth and power. Lodge's father
represented old Yankee wealth and power. Lodge himself was
one of the movers behind the Eisenhower candidacy. But with

some 750,000 Irish voters in the state, and

a

majority of

the state's voters being Catholic, Lodge felt the need to

have fellow Senator Joe McCarthy endorse his candidacy for
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reelection. But McCarthy had developed

a

close relationship

with the Kennedy family, particularly with
Joseph Kennedy,
who frequently invited the Wisconsin Senator
to the family

compound at Cape Cod for Kennedy style weekends.
The elder
Kennedy also sought to keep the Wisconsin Senator
out of

Massachusetts by contributing $10,000 to his reelection
campaign. Jesuit historian Donald Crosby asserts that
Lodge

avoided calling on McCarthy for help in Massachusetts

"probably because he disliked McCarthy." Thomas
however, writing at

a

C.

Reeves,

later date and with more information

available, asserts that "Lodge strongly desired McCarthy's

assistance, he telephoned the McCarthy office almost daily

appealing for the senator's aid." McCarthy's asking price
for his assistance,

that Lodge "introduce him personally

wherever he appeared and wholly endorse his fight against
the Reds," was too high for Lodge, as McCarthy knew it would
be.

[31]

Measuring McCarthy's impact on the overall Irish move
to the Republicans

in

1952 is of course impossible. Crosby

tends to downplay McCarthy's influence among the Irish and

particularly among Catholics. Instead he focuses on the fact
that

a

narrow majority of Catholics remained Democratic

voters. Harris, more accurately, emphasizes the dramatic

shift from the historically high Catholic vote of up to 80
per cent for FDR in 1936 and the traditional two-to-one
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margin among Catholic voters for
the Democratic Party as the
basis for a potentially permanent new
Republican majority.
The Irish and Germans were essentially
part of the old

stock immigrant groups. The new groups,
the Poles, Italians,
Hungarians, Lithuanians, Czechs and Russians
had come into
their own politically as part of the New
Deal. Al Smith had
been the first Democratic candidate to benefit
from these

groups, and FDR had seemingly solidified their
alligence to
the Democratic party. A quick look at the above
list

indicates that with the exception of Italy, the
homelands of
all these groups were under the domination of the
Soviet

Union. These were the groups FDR feared might bolt the party

and in the process bring along their co-religionists. He

even raised the political implications of the Polish and

Lithuanian vote with Stalin at Teheran. His great fear at
the moment, of course, was for the "six or seven million

Polish voters" in the United States.
During the war years the Poles had remained solidly
Democratic, while the Italians had shown signs of moving

away as had the Germans and Irish. The postwar years brought
the Italians back as they began to make progress within the

party, even challenging the Irish for leadership of Tammany

Hall in New York. Italian-Americans were also less concerned

with the outcome of the Roosevelt/Truman foreign policy
since their homeland, while having
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a

large Communist party.

was not under the direct influence
of Moscow.

groups," according to Harris,

"The Polish

"were torn between the avowed

anti-Communist foreign policy program of Truman
and Acheson,
and the stories they were to hear with
increasing

anger that

the Democrats had sold their homeland down
the river at

Yalta and in the years that followed." They
expressed this
anger in the polling booth. The Polish vote that
FDR had

struggled so mightily to keep in the Democratic column
by

avoiding the issue of Poland as much as possible in 1944
"broke heavily over to Eisenhower as the campaign moved
into

high gear early in October." The final vote in November 1952

showed voters of Polish descent splitting evenly between the

candidates. This, of course, was

a

disaster for the

Democrats. Eisenhower had neutralized

a

huge ethnic voting

block that traditionally voted over 70 per cent Democratic.

More importantly they were concentrated in big industrial
cities: Chicago, Milwaukee, Buffalo, Detroit; and in states

with large electoral vote counts: Illinois, Michigan, New
York, Pennsylvania.

In the final analysis

"three out of

every ten voters of Polish descent who had always voted

Democratic in the past broke ranks and voted Republican for
the first time in 19 52

.

"

f

emphas is added] And the issue that

separated the Poles from the Democratic Party was Communism.
At the outset,

in early September,

polls indicated that

while Korea and the issue of Communists in government were
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important to Polish voters economic
issues such as high
prices were their primary concern. By
mid-October this had

changed dramatically with two out of
three Polish voters
citing "Reds in government" as the key
issue.
[32]

The results of the 1952 election seem
to confirm the

fears of FDR expressed as early as 1942
through Myron Taylor
to Pius XII.

The fate of Eastern Europe,

largely Catholic

Eastern Europe, would have political
repercussions within
the United States. This fear, expressed
again to Archbishop
Spellman in 1943 prior to the Teheran Conference,
that this

Russian domination would not be "too harsh" had
indeed
proven to be, as FDR phrased it,

"wishful thinking." The

religious conflict FDR had foreseen developing between the
Vatican and the Kremlin had burst forth in

a

series of show

trials in virtually every country of Eastern Europe. While
this conflict was not exclusively directed at Catholics they

were the most prominent targets, and attracted the most

publicity. FDR's fear that the fate of Poland would develop

beyond simply

a

Polish issue into

a

broader Catholic issue

had taken place. Catholics had deserted the Democratic party
in large enough numbers to swing the 1952 election

decisively to Eisenhower. The key issue was foreign policy
as conducted by the Roosevelt/Truman administrations in the

face of an increasingly assertive Soviet Union. The Catholic

periphery was dominating this discussion through the church
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hierarchy's call for concerted American reaction
against the
threat of Soviet expansion, the efforts of
Catholic

politicians to alter the course of policy decisions
such as
in Spain,

and Catholic involvement in the increasingly

divisive campaign to identify
policy with traitors

in

a

seemingly failed foreign

government.

The ability of the Republican Party to cast the

stridently ant i -Commun is t foreign policy of the Truman
administration as being "soft on communism" becomes clearer
when viewed from the perspective of the Catholic periphery
and its domestic political implications rather than from the

theories of postwar American economic imperialism. The

ability of the Republican Party to maintain the new majority
achieved in the 1952 election would now rest with the
success or failure of the Eisenhower/Dulles conception of

"liberation" versus the Truman/Acheson concept of

"containment

.
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EPILOGUE
"I'D LOVE TO RUN WITH A CATHOLIC"
The partisan divergence of opinion on foreign policy

questions that emerged during the 1952 election campaign

continued to dominate any discussion of foreign affairs. The
era of bipartisanship had ended. Henceforth questions

dealing with foreign policy had to be answered with the
potential reaction of a shifting electorate in mind. And as
indicated above, the most important shift had come among

Catholic Democrats. Would they remain in the Republican
column? The importance of the Catholic vote to the

Democratic Party which we have seen so dramatically
illustrated during the Roosevelt/Truman presidencies was now
the concern of the Republican Party. That is a story which

remains to be told in detail. A brief recounting of

international events affecting Catholic political loyalties

during the Eisenhower administration coupled with the
emergence of a national Catholic candidate for the

presidency suggests that the overall theme of religion as

a

paradigm of the Cold War continued unabated.
Eisenhower's relationship with the Catholic hierarchy
was no less intimate than his Democratic predecessors.

Cardinal Spellman, presidential aide Sherman Adams later
recalled, was frequently a guest at the famous stag dinners

Eisenhower gave at the White House and indeed might be seen
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leading the guests into dinner on the
President's arm. The
President was well aware of the influence
Spellman carried
not only in New York, but within the
Catholic hierarchy
across the country. In his diary the President
related an
incident which occurred during the annual meeting
of the

Catholic Bishops in Washington in November 1954. A
group of
bishops approached Spellman with a resolution they

intended

to bring before the assembly dealing with a
controversy on

the Supreme Court. According to Eisenhower's account,

"Spellman 'emphatically objected' to the matter and that 'he

thought the matter was sufficiently serious that he should
bring it to my attention." Spellman reportedly assured the

bishops "their concerns were unjustified." Eisenhower went
on to say the incident "does show the acute sensitiveness of

particular groups in the U.S.

in this matter of what they

consider to be proper and equitable representation on all
important governmental bodies, especially the Supreme
Court." While the language of Eisenhower's entry clearly

suggests the resolution dealt with an appointment to the
Court, Robert Ferrell, who edited the diary for publication,

noted the copy of the resolution referred to by Eisenhower
was not found among the President's papers. Nevertheless,

the incident clearly demonstrates the relationship between

Eisenhower and Spellman and the fact that Spellman would go
out of his way to prevent embarrassment to his friend.

372

[1]

A dazzling array of problems faced the
new

administration. While efforts to bring the Korean
situati on
to a resolution took priority,
negotiations dealing

with the

European Defense Community [EDC] were again in
trouble.
Italy and Yugoslavia were still contending over
Trieste and
in the midst of all the turmoil

the Italians were again

holding elections. Once aga^in the fear of an outright

Communist Party victory in Italy, and what that might mean
for NATO or the prospect of EDC,

produced

a

desire to

influence the election outcome just as in 1947. The new

administration barely had time to settle into office when

Italian-American Catholics were called upon to write to
their relatives "back home" and urge "them to vote with the
best interests of Italy in mind." Walter Faraday, Chancellor
of the Archdiocese of Boston,

wrote to pastors in late May

that "an Air Mail letter sent promptly would doubtless help
to influence many to exercise their franchise with

conscientious purpose." The elections, held on June
resulted in

a

7,

narrow victory for the Christian Democrats and

their smaller coalition party members. Catholic
ant i -Communism, so clearly influencing the culture of

American ant i -Communism, was again playing
in Italian politics with American help.

a

decisive role

In addition to the

efforts of Italian-Americans to influence votes the American

Ambassador Claire Booth Luce

[a
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convert to Catholicism] and

the AFL-CIO under George Meany worked
"massively"

against

the Confederazione Generale Italiana del
Lavoro [CGIL] a

union federation run by the Italian Communist
Party to

undermine their effect on the election. Ten days
later
Soviet tanks rolled through East Berlin in the
first

demonstration that Soviet military power would be used
to
control discontent among dissatisfied workers.

[2]

In the Far East the situation in French
Indochina was

on the verge of total collapse.

With French forces under

siege at Dien Bien Phu an international conference opened
at

Geneva to settle the issue. In something of

reversal of

a

positions congressional Democrats were now calling for

assurances from the administration that its policy of
"united action" in Indochina would generate adequate Allied
support. The Democrats seemed to have quickly learned the

lessons of being in the opposition. On April

7

the New York

Times carried a two-column front-page story dealing with
what it termed "a grave foreign policy debate" in the
Senate. Senator John F. Kennedy, Democrat of Massachusetts,

according to the Times

"precipitated the debate" and

"called on the Administration to tell the people of the

United States

'The blunt truth about Indo-China'

"

while at

the same time declaring he backed the policy of united

action "in principle." Yet, paradoxically, he also claimed
that "so long as the French withheld the promise of
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independence from the Indo-Chinese, no amount
of military
intervention by the United States could win the
war against
the Communist-led rebels." [3]

Kennedy asserted that
would result in

a

a

guarantee of independence

"reliable and crusading native army" that

would "deserve and get the military support of this
and
other free countries" and might "lead to United States

involvement in the war." He drew immediate responses from

Everett Dirksen of Illinois and William Knowland of
California. Dirksen declared he could "give reassurance that
the President had no intention of cutting across the power

held by Congress alone to declare war." Already the

Republicans saw the constitutional argument they raised
against Truman's introduction of U.S. troops into Korea
without prior congressional approval being used against

Eisenhower in Indochina. Knowland was preparing

a

defense

against unreliable allies, another major issue raised by the

Republicans in Korea. Knowland demanded to know "how far
they would go in

a

common effort in the Indo-China theatre"

and that if United States forces ever had to go to Indochina

"others must march with them." It was Kennedy, however,

in a

speech "saluted by several of his colleagues," who was

defining the Democrats' position. Kennedy charged,
ironically given later similar charges against his
administration, that the Administration "had persistently
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been over-optimistic and less than candid"
on both the

military situation and the political question
of the French
granting independence. Without this grant of
independence
"the hard truth" was that the people of
Indochina would not

"give adequate support to the fight against the

Communist-led rebels." And without their support "no

military victory could be won. United States intervention
or
no United States

declaring:

intervention." Kennedy concluded by

"The battle against communism should be a battle

not for economic or political gain but

.

.

.

f

or

those values

and institutions which are held dear in France and

throughout the non-communist world." While not spelling out
what those values and institutions were,
a

it does not require

great leap to conclude Kennedy was referring to both

democratic and Christian values that atheistic Communism was
attacking in Eastern Europe and threatening to overrun
As i a

.

[

4

in

]

Kennedy was quick to capitalize on the attention his
Senate speech produced. On August

8,

1954,

only two weeks

after the conclusion of the Geneva Conference, Kennedy

authored an article entitled "Foreign Policy Is the People's

Business" which appeared in the New York Times Magazine

.

Senator was concerned with the impact of "myths" which

distorted the hard realities of foreign policy decisions.
The French,

for example,

were more concerned with "the
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The

ancient fear of

a

rearmed Germany" than with the "menace of

Soviet aggression." The Senator's mail
convinced him that
similar attitudes were influential in America
and "are

frequently more influenced by ethnic and cultural
ties with
the problem areas involved, or with ancient
hostilities

than

by the necessities of world security." The
Senator had his

finger on the periphery's pulse and was seeking to use
that
in

a

partisan manner without seeming to do so. "The present

crisis," according to Kennedy,

"requires greater

participation of American public opinion in the foreign

policy-making process." This public opinion, however, "needs
enlightenment on the United States new role as leader of the
free world... the sheer fact of our physical and economic

strength, and our position as the only real counter to the
forces of communism in the world today." Kennedy needed no

convincing that NSC-68 should be the policy of the United
States.

[5]

Hinting at where his true future aspirations lay,

Kennedy told his readers this new enlightened and

participatory public opinion "requires firm, candid and
responsible leadership." That leadership had to come from
the President because "in the last analysis" it was "to the

President, with his constitutional role of foreign policy

spokesman that we look for our initial information and
guidance." Kennedy's views on presidential leadership were
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evolving with his own aspirations. On election eve 1960 he
would remark that the presidency had become "the center of

action." Public opinion would "flounder and drift"
Pres ident

'

s

statements on foreign pol icy lacked

the

if

"f irmness

and consistency." Kennedy suggested such leadership was now

lacking in dealing with the Far East. "If the public is

unable to determine what our policy is in Indochina, that
is,

the policy of the United States, not the policy of the

Vice-President or the Majority Leader or the Chiefs of
Staff, then whatever our policy may be,

cannot succeed

it

.

The Amer ican "foreign pol icy mythology" was the "subject of

gross oversimplification" in terms of "how we
or why we are

'

lost

'

China

in Korea." The same tendency was evident

our dealings with Indochina.

in

"It is apparent to all,"

Kennedy wrote, "that the very foundation of American
assistance in Indochina rested upon

a

miscalculation of the

military program of the French Union forces," and that the
State Department "under both Democratic and Republican

leadership failed to recognize the nature and significance
of the

independence movement in Indochina

.

"

[

6

The Junior Senator from Massachusetts was of course

playing partisan politics to

a

large degree. With the

Republicans in control of the White House

it was

easier to

urge that public opinion influence foreign policy decisions
and to decry the lack of presidential leadership. Such was
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the case with "the use of beguiling
slogans,

including most

recently 'the new look' and 'massive retaliation.'"
While
acknowledging that "the science of opinion
research has made
gigantic strides in recent years," Kennedy admitted
"even
some of the more reputable polling agencies fall

far short

of necessary standards of validity and reliability."
in

calling for public opinion to carry greater weight with

policy makers Kennedy proposed "new and better techniques
for gauging that opinion." He could not help but be

aware

that public opinion "influenced by ethnic and cultural ties
to the problem area involved,"

in this case the cultural

ties of American Catholics with Vietnamese Catholics, was

about to take on added significance. In fact these cultural
ties were already being noted in the press. On August

6,

only two days before Kennedy's article appeared, the Times

carried

a

story announcing the Archdiocese of New York was

already sending aid to Vietnam's refugees. The article noted
that "Cardinal Spellman had received information from his
•brother bishops'

in

Vietnam of the massed flight of

civilians from North to South Vietnam to escape from the

Communist-led Vietminh." The announcement of the aid came in
the form of a pastoral letter to be read at all masses that

Sunday, the same day Kennedy's article appeared in the

Sunday Times

.

on to declare:

According to the Times

Spellman's letter went

"Happily, our Government which has so
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generously come to the aid of other afflicted peoples
has
taken swift steps to assist in the evacuation and
resettlement of the Vietnamese by providing them with
transportation, clothing and food." The Cardinal then
thanked all those who had made such

a

"generous response" to

the recent Bishops Appeal which enabled the Archdiocese "to

supplement American governmental subsidies by shipments of
food and clothing which are already on the high seas." On
the same page with the article on Spellman the Times carried
a

picture of refugees sleeping on mats in the streets of

Hanoi awaiting transportation south.

[7]

The next week, on August 16, the Archdiocese utilized
the celebration of the Feast of the Assumption to again warn

that "the death sentence" of the United States had "been

pronounced in Moscow" and that Americans and "other free
men... cannot live in peace with atheistic communism." This

declaration was made by Bishop Joseph

F.

Flannelly,

administrator of St. Patrick's Cathedral, at the mass of the
assumption welcoming Mile. Genevieve de Galard-Terraube
young French Army nurse known as the "angel of

D

In a politically-charged sermon Flannelly said

it was

i

,

enb i enphu

"unfortunate" that "many of our blind leaders are leading
the blind to the conclusion that atheistic communism and

Christian civilization can exist together." The Bishop

acknowledged Mile, de Galard from the pulpit, telling her
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a
.

that "Catholics were proud of her as

a

fellow communicant

because her care of the wounded during the Indochina
siege
was a practical demonstration of the Christian
religion." In

addition, he hoped her visit "would awaken Americans to
to
power of the
then said,

'destructive force of communism.'" Flannelly

"We must turn from indifference and indecision

and convince ourselves that we cannot live in peace with

atheistic communism. It

is

simply and solely

a

force of

destruction. It is the enemy of liberty, of peace and of
God." Following mass. Cardinal Spellman presided at

a

lunch

at his residence for Mile, de Galard at which he presented

her with a medal "imprinted with his motto and coat of

arms." To complete the circle of Catholic attention, vespers
in

the cathedral that day saw "Hungarians and Americans of

Hungarian descent honored St. Stephen, the first

constitutional monarch of Hungary." A picture of Spellman

presenting the medal to Mile, de Galard accompanied the
story

.

[

8

By mid-December 1955 Eisenhower was considering the

possibility of seeking

a

second term and in the process was

reflecting on the large numbers of Democrats that had
deserted their traditional party to vote for him. As we have
seen, a great proportion of these Democrats were Catholic.

Eisenhower was concerned with keeping these voters

in the

Republican camp. He first raised the issue with Press
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Secretary Jim Hagerty in discussing the prospect
of turning
the country back "into the hands of people
like Stevenson,
Harriman, and Kefauver." Ike noted that two of
the potential

Democratic candidates had been divorced and "up until

recently there has been

a

political axiom that no divorced

man could ever be elected President of the United
States."
If

it

were possible for

a

divorced man to be elected, was

it

not also possible for a Catholic to be nominated and

elected? Ike queried Hagerty on the prospects of Ohio

Governor Frank Lausche, and Hagerty responded that he "did
not know whether a Catholic could be nominated or not,

let

alone elected." While Eisenhower was often characterized as

politically inept, in this case he demonstrated

a

wide

understanding of both the electorate and the internal
politics of Washington. Declaring that "Sam Rayburn and

Lyndon Johnson are going to be politically important," he
told Hagerty "they don't care much for Stevenson or Harriman
and,

of course,

despise Kefauver." Eisenhower believed "it

might be possible that they might get behind someone like

Lausche." [9]
Hagerty, warming to the topic, told the President
that he thought Lausche "as a Catholic" would be hurt in the

South as Al Smith was. He told Ike that Jim Farley was the

only Catholic he knew in politics who believed he could get
the Democratic nomination and not be hurt in the South due
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to his close relationship with the party
district leaders.
Ike still believed Lausche the natural
candidate for Rayburn

and Johnson to support. Moreover,

he added that "in 1952

many Democrats voted for me because they didn't like

Stevenson and the Truman Fair Deal-New Deal boys

[And]

I'm the only Republican that the young folks will support."
The politics of the situation was clear to Ike,

"Lausche

would appeal to the youth and hundreds of thousands of

Democrats who left their party to vote for me...." [10]
By February 1956 Eisenhower had firmly decided to
seek a second term,

but the question of his running mate was

still open. Now Ike put the question of Lausche running not
as the nominee of the Democratic Party but as his own

running mate. This time Ike and Len Hall, Republican

National Chairman, "found themselves speculating on running
Ike with Lausche,

Democrat and Catholic, of Ohio." Hall

seemed so enthusiastic about an Eisenhower/Lausche ticket
that Ike had to remind him "that labor hated Lausche." That
did not matter to Hall, who reminded the President:

leaders don't like

"Labor

you, but the laboring people vote for

him and vote for you." In addition, putting Lausche on the
ticket would help relieve the Republican image of
still party.

a

stand

"The Republicans seldom do something

different," Hall told Eisenhower:

"here you would break the

bugaboo of a Catholic." The potential existed for
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a

new

alignment of parties, the very thing Eisenhower sought,
just
as FDR had in the mid-thirties, "it would just
knock
the

props out of the opposition," Ike said, and Hall agreed
it
would be

a

"shocker." The fact that millions of Catholics

had left the Democratic Party to vote for Eisenhower and
now

could be permanently locked into the Republican Party by

such

a

move was critical to the underlying dynamics of

presidential politics, as Harris suggested. "I'd love to run
with

a

Catholic,

if only to test

it

out," the President

remarked. Hall thought it was, perhaps, more crucial, noting
that "if the Republicans didn't run a Catholic this time the

Democrats would next time." At this point Hall mentioned the
future prospects of the young Catholic Senator from

Massachusetts John

F.

Kennedy, whom he described as an

"attractive guy." [11]

Eisenhower directed Hall to approach Vice-President
Nixon about the possibility of stepping aside and being
named to

a

cabinet post and at the same time to poll the

Republican County Chairmen about the prospect of having
Lausche on the ticket. He later mentioned several Catholics
whom he considered to be good vice-presidential material

besides Lausche. These included Connecticut Judge John

A.

Danaher, whom he appointed to the U.S. Court of Appeals;

Secretary of Labor Jim Mitchell; and NATO Commander Al
Gruenther. He also asked Fred Seaton to prepare
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a

list of

Republican Catholics but without mentioning what the
purpose
of such a list would be.

The politics and the importance of

the Catholic vote continued to occupy the attention
of

presidents and presidential advisors.

[12]

Events in the summer and fall of 1956 brought the

attention of America's Catholics, and most of the rest of
the world, back on the fate of Eastern Europe.

In late June

workers in Poznan, Poland rioted following demonstrations

against "bad rations, low pay and unsympathetic management."
Polish Communist troops had "faded away" rather than

confront and disperse their fellow countrymen. According to
Adolf

A.

Berle, Jr.,

former Assistant Secretary of State,

the Poznan riots showed three things about the Communist

regimes of Eastern Europe; "First, that demonstrations were

possible and widely known; second, that satellite troops
were more likely to side with their own people than with

Russian policy; third, that the capt ive countries had not
lost their national identity during the ten years of

Russ i an-Commun ist occupation..." The riots indeed resulted
in dramatic change

in Poland

.

Wladyslaw Gomulka,

Tito ist , emerged as Chief of State and named

a

a Pol ish

Tito- type

Central Committee. Gomulka even opened negotiations for the

possible withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland.
In October

[13]

the demonstrations moved to Hungary, where

students in the name of "ant i -Stal ini sm" demanded "liberty
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of criticism,

instruction beyond the Marxist dogma, land]

communication with the West." According to Berle, "this was
not a call for autonomy:

it was a call for

freedom." Soon

appeals for a free economy and freedom of religion were

sweeping the country. As in Poland the Communist Party of

Hungary turned to a Titoist, Imre Nagy, in an attempt to
restore order and confidence in the regime. Also as in
Poland Hungarian Communist troops called on to restore order

refused to shoot at their own countrymen. Dramatically, as

Hungarians battled Russian troops, Joseph Cardinal

Mindszenty "was rescued by

a

band of freedom fighters and

brought to Budapest." Leo Cherne, Chairman of the

International Rescue Committee, met with Mindszenty as he
prepared to broadcast

a

message to France and Germany.

According to Cherne, the Cardinal was surrounded not only by
young priests and aides, but "with Hungarian leaders from

many political parties," seeking the Cardinal's advice "as
to whether to associate themselves with the Nagy Government,

which on this day was forming along anti-Communist lines."
Thus, after eight years imprisonment, Joseph Cardinal

Mindszenty, however briefly, was back at the center of

Hungarian affairs. "Obviously," Cherne said, "the Primate
had assumed his role of leadership almost in the hour of his

liberation." 114]
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Mindszenty was also back as the focus of American
Catholic perceptions of Communist persecution. His
freedom,
"however short lived, put

a

seal of accomplishment on the

Hungarian revolt." The Russian crackdown, when

it came,

was

all the more shocking in light of statements that
generated

hope of

a

peaceful settlement. Marshall Georgi Zhukov, who

had developed a close wartime friendship with Eisenhower,

told a Moscow press conference the Russians were willing to

discuss "revision of the Warsaw Pact." An official Soviet

statement followed Zhukov's:

"The Soviet Union is ready to

examine with the other Socialist states which are

participants in the Warsaw treaty the question of Soviet
troops stationed in the
[

and

]

in

...

Hungarian and Rumanian Republics

the Polish Rep ub lie."

Eisenhower expressed the

be lief that if the Soviets meant what they said the world

might be on the brink of "the greatest forward stride toward
justice, trust and understanding among nations in our

generation." Indeed, the concept of "liberation" generated
from within as outlined by the Eisenhower/Dulles foreign

policy seemed on the threshold of realization.

[15]

When reinforced Red Army units reversed themselves and

headed back into Budapest, Nagy called on the United Nations

Secretary General to "put on the agenda of the General

Assembly the question of Hungary's neutrality and defense of
this neutrality by the four great powers." The Soviet
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representative denied reports that tanks were moving back
into Hungary. Nagy broadcast from Budapest that Soviet

troops had indeed attacked "with the clear intention to

overthrow the lawful, democratic Government of the Hungarian
people." With Russian tanks crushing the revolt Nagy and his

Cabinet were arrested. Cardinal Mindszenty sought asylum in
the U.S.

ligation. A final message delivered over

a

Hungarian radio station appealed to the "People of Europe,

civilized people of the world,

in the name of

solidarity, we are asking you to help

liberty and

Listen to our cry.

Start Moving. Extend to us brotherly hands." Clearly, at
least some within the Hungar ian movement were hopeful that

their efforts at "liberation" would bring assistance from

outside Hungary. Even the editors of the Jesuit weekly,
Amer ica

^

recognized the dangers inherent in such

a

move

"To have answered the Hungar ian appeal with armed legions of

free men would have precipitated World War III." They also

recognized that the announcement of the formation of

a

new

Hungarian government of "peasants and workers" came
"fittingly" from "Radio Moscow." [16]
All of this, of course, was taking place in the midst
of a presidential election

in the United States and was

compounded and confused by the

s

imultaneous conflict between

the United States and its principal allies Britain and

France over the Suez Crisis. The crushing of the Hungarian
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revolution left

a

hallow ring to the policy of "liberation"

minds of the very Catholic ethnic voters to whom it

in the

was first designed to appeal. However, the denouement
came

after the votes were cast and the Catholic voters that had

switched to Eisenhower in 1952 (whom he considered so
important he discussed the possibility of placing
on the ticket with him in 1956),

Republ ican

.

a

Catholic

remained solidly

However, doubts about "1 iberat ion" and just

exactly what it meant surfaced almost immediately in both
the secular and religious press. The editors of Amer ica

questioned the "U.S. Policy of Liberation" in the December
1,

1956 issue. At a November press conference "a deadly

ser ious Pr es ident " was asked about "charges that the

Government, after having encouraged the captive satellite

nations to revolt, had failed the Hungarian people in their
tragic hour of heroism and agony." Eisenhower, after

expressing sympathy for the Hungarians and their cause
declared:

doesn

'

t

"I

must make one thing clear: the United States

now, and never has, advocated open rebellion by an

undefended populace against force over which they could not

possibly prevail." Rather, the policy of the administration
"always urged that the spirit of freedom be kept al i ve; that

people do not lose hope." [17]
The President was then asked to explain comments by

Vice President Nixon in which he claimed events in Poland
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and Hungary proved the liberation policy
correct and "in

view of the latest developments, could you
explain, sir,
what the liberation position of the Administration
is?"

Again Eisenhower stated we "never asked for

a

people to rise

up against a ruthless military force," and "we
simply insist

upon the right of all people to be free to live under

governments of their own choosing." Conceding that the
"President's words might sound singularly uninspiring," the
editorial in America went on to cite
Krock in the New York Times

a

column by Arthur

calling on the public to be

realistic: "unless this Government and this people go to war
with Russia," there was no possibility of "quick rescue...
for the oppressed inhabitants of the satellites." The

editors of Amer ica
of

were forced to agree with Krock in spite

"the almost guilty knowledge that the only foreigners who

struck

a

blow for the savagely oppressed Hungarians were

deserters from the Soviet army." Still, the editors claimed
"There must be something more -- something more that the

most powerful nation on earth can do." They then quoted from
a

Life magazine editorial that stated "future fights for

freedom on the part of enslaved peoples will find us somehow
prepared to come to their aid," and called on the President
"with his tremendous new mandate," to "develop

a

'liberation' policy which is more than words." They then

concluded:

"We make that demand our own."
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[18]

As usual

it was

not just the Catholic press that was

reminding Catholics of the terrors of Communism.
On the same
day America was editorializing on the inadequacies
of
the

"liberation" policy. Archbishop Cushing of Boston sent

a

letter to all his pastors with instructions that it be
read
"at all the Masses

in your

Church on Sunday, December

9

and

recall it again on December 16 when the collection for the

people of Hungary will be taken up." The letter stated that
the Bishops of the United States had organized a relief

effort for the people of Hungary "who have been the victims
of the most savage and inhuman massacre of modern times."

The nature of events in Hungary meant that "at the moment
our help must be extended to the refugees who have escaped
to our country from the scene of Communist brutality and

terror in their own homeland." According to Cushing,

it was

not necessary "for me to describe the tragic plight of the

oppressed and persecuted Hungarian people." The annual
appeals for funds to help relief efforts in Poland was

temporarily replaced by this broad appeal on behalf of
Hungary. Both Poland and Hungary, however, served to keep
the fate of Eastern Europe before American Catholics. These

efforts of the hierarchy in turn spilled over into the

secular press to compliment the already heavy press coverage
being given events in Eastern Europe.
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[19]

Within two weeks Gushing was again writing
to his
pastors, this time with an appeal from the
Bishops

designating December 30 as "A Day of Prayer for
the
Persecuted." Gushing left it to each pastor "to make
suitable arrangements in his own parish," but the
faithful
"should be exhorted to receive Holy Gommunion

intention," and some special service "such as

.

.

a

.

f

this

or

Holy Hour,

or Benediction with Rosary and Sermon" was encouraged.

Enclosed with the letter was
Reverend Francis

P.

a

statement issued by the Most

Keough, Ghairman of the Administrative

Board of the National Gatholic Welfare Gonference. If there
was any doubt about just who the "persecuted" were, about

who were being prayed for. Rev. Keough clarified matters in
the first sentence of his statement.

"With the sound of the

Hungarian tragedy still ringing in our ears, there

is

little

likelihood that we of the free world will forget the

sufferings of our fellow Ghristians of that nation as they
end the year

formula

-

in the darkness

of renewed slavery." Again the

Ghristianity equals freedom and Gommunism equals

slavery, was at the forefront. The Hungarian revolt was

simply the most recent example. "Their truly noble
uprising," Keough continued,

repression serve as

a

"and the

fr

ight fulness of their

vivid reminder of all those who for so

long have borne the yoke of atheistic communism." [20]
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According to Keough, Communism was the most
unrelenting foe Christianity ever faced. "Never

in

history

has any body of Christians borne such widespread
and

unrelenting persecution," he wrote: "Even

in the pagan days

of the Caesars there were intervals of quiet
and places

where the poor and obscure were left unmolested." Not
so

in

1956 when "throughout the whole vast territory under Red

domination,

in

Eastern Europe and in Asia,

a

constant,

grinding terror has everywhere and at all times made itself
felt." The modern totalitarian state was thus far more

efficient than its ancient predecessors, and "modern tyrants
have learned the lesson that, as long as even

a

few of the

faithful are left, they are certain to raise up from the
seed of their martyred brothers

a

Christian Church which

in

the end will prevail." The story of Poland and Hungary,

therefore, "bespeaks

a

still large body of Christians whose

faith has been but deepened by their trials." The tyrants,
for all their modern methods and constant attempts to crush

any and all opposition, were faced by the "Church of

Silence" which in the end "will prevail." [21]
As Eisenhower prepared to take office for a second

term Communism continued to seem on the march against
freedom, particularly religious freedom,

in both Europe and

Asia. The focus of this religious crackdown continued to be

Roman Catholicism, both in terms of those whom the
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Communists appeared to be cracking down on, and
those most
visible and vocal in the struggle against
Communism.

Yet as

Eisenhower prepared to take the oath of office the
editors
of America were just as concerned about the
prospects for

religious freedom in the United States. "It
occasion of

a

editorialized,

is

on the

Presidential Inauguration," the magazine
"that Catholics in America feel most vividly

the heritage of bigotry that has so long hung over them."

The editors pointed, almost despairingly, at "the old

prejudices come to life again" that past summer when Senator

Kennedy had made

a brief run at the

on the Democratic Party ticket.

Vice-Presidential spot

At that point,

representative Protestants protested that

a

"fairly

Catholic, as

a

Catholic, did not have the right to be chosen for the high

office of President." That Catholics could still be denied
the highest office in the land seemed incongruous in the

face of the evidence. Thousands of Catholic officers had

faithfully fulfilled their oath in the war and Catholic
legislators on both the State and Federal level had proven
their loyalty. Catholics had even sat on the highest court
in the land and interpreted the very Constitution many

Protestants claimed

a

Catholic President could only

undermine. "That only the Presidency should be barred to

Catholic

is

a

a

striking inconsistency, attributable only to

ill-considered ant i -Cathol icism.
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"

So,

as Dwight D.

Eisenhower took the oath of office on Inauguration
Day,
"despite the shadow over them. Catholic Americans

have some

reason for hoping that
future date

a

a

better time may come. At some

Catholic President-elect may appear on that

same spot before the Capital, take the same oath and
win the
same confidence of all America." The editors of America,
of
course, were unaware that Eisenhower had actively considered
the possibility of running with a Catholic. The larger

question, given Kennedy's failed attempt to get the

Vice-Presidential nomination, was Len Hall's prediction that
the Democrats would turn to

a

Catholic, perhaps even that

"attractive" Senator Kennedy, to lure the Catholic Democrats
back to the party they saw as selling out their native lands
to Communism.

[22]

The politics of religion and the culture of
ant i -Commun i sm continued to converge during the second

Eisenhower administration. The Eisenhower/Dulles rhetoric of
liberation was badly damaged by Hungary. Senator Kennedy

apparently benefited by losing the Vice-Presidential
nomination. The Eisenhower landslide could not be blamed on
the presence of a Catholic on the ticket. Kennedy was free
to pursue the nomination without a national party defeat

being attributed to his religion.
Meanwhile, would-be presidential candidate Kennedy was
in the process of establishing his credentials
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in the

foreign policy field. On August 21, 1957, as
negotiations on
the test ban were breaking down, Kennedy made
a major

foreign policy speech in the Senate calling for

a

new

approach to Poland and Eastern Europe. Kennedy said
he was

"strongly persuaded" of "the inadequacies of current
American foreign policies and programs concerning Poland
and

Eastern Europe." It was "baffling beyond words," he declared
to look at

"that so-called

'liberation' policy" upon which

the administration had "taken patent rights." In a style

that was to become increasingly familiar he spoke of the

need to "take the hard decisions" and the "real risks"

necessary to

a

resolution of the problems of Eastern Europe.

Kennedy was particularly critical of the administrations
"liberation" policy as restated earlier

Secretary Dulles. Labeling it

a

in

the year by

status quo policy, he noted

that it provided for an American response "only" when the

satellite states "gain more freedom" and not "before." [23]

Notwithstanding its own rhetoric, the administration
had been singularly slow in responding to a Polish loan

request. There was ample evidence that gains had been

registered in Poland; the very type of "steps ...made toward
independence" from Moscow which, according to Secretary
Dulles, would result in American "readiness to respond with

friendly acts." Not the least of this evidence, especially
from Kennedy's perspective concerning the potential
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t

political reaction of his fellow American Catholics,
was the
fact that "at least a precarious working
accommodation has

been reached with the Catholic Church in Poland under

Cardinal Wyszynski." Kennedy here was relying on logic
similar to FDR's at the end of the war.

If

the Polish Church

could make an arrangement to work with the Communist

government, then American Poles, Catholics in general, and
the hierarchy in particular, might be willing to accept

a

less hard-line approach to the question of the United States

dealing with the satellite governments. The loan agreement
was "too little and too late," according to Kennedy, and had

come only after "months of haggling,

indecision and delay."

All this in spite of the fact that "Mr. Khrushchev has

indicated that he

is

not happy about

it."

If

Khrushchev was

troubled over this meager loan, what might his reaction be
to

"a bolder,

more imaginative American foreign policy" that

more closely related to the actual needs and realities of
the Polish situation? Such vacillation on the part of the

administration only strengthened "the Polish Stalinists"

in

their conflict with the more moderate Wladyslav Gomulka.

If,

on the other hand," Kennedy continued,

through

a

"we take these risks,

more adequate program of loans and other

ass i stance ... we can obtain an invaluable reservoir of good

will among the Polish people, strengthen their will to
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resist, and drive still a further wedge between
the Polish

Government and the Kremlin." [24]

Kennedy was particularly critical of Secretary Dulles'
"extreme position" at the time of the Hungarian crisis
when
he "wrote off completely any possibility of the use
of

American military means in Eastern Europe, thus inviting
Soviet intervention." Dulles and the Republican Party
condemned Dean Acheson for his defense perimeter
speech

regarding Korea, Kennedy noted, and "might usefully
ponder
Mr.

Dulles' much more sweeping remarks of last October in

regard to East Europe." Thus, the threat of possible U.S.

military intervention should not be withdrawn. Kennedy's
speech certainly reinforced what the editors of America had

pronounced the previous December, namely that the people of
the United States and of the satellite countries had not

heard the last word on the policy of liberation in the wake
of Hungary.

Kennedy, along with Senator George Aiken,

Republican, Vermont, proposed an amendment to the Battle Act

designed to provide "a more flexible set of economic tools
to promote peaceful change behind the Iron Curtain." The

amendment was defeated by one vote in the Senate, but would
be revived and passed two years

later. [25]

In his efforts to marshal bipartisan congressional

support for the administrations pending Mutual Security
bill, Eisenhower again demonstrated his political acumen.
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He now sponsored a conference at the White
House with former

President Truman and Archbishop Fulton

Sheen of

J.

Rochester, New York among the more prominent supporters.
Sheen,

of course,

personalities

in

had been the most popular television

the nation,

having driven "Mr. Television,"

comedian Milton Berle, off the air.
If Eisenhower was

taken aback by officials of State

not fully comprehending his views,

he must have been equally

surprised by reactions to the announcement of Khrushchev's
visit made at an August 5th press conference.

would be an

It

exchange ot visits; Khrushchev coming to the United States
and the President visiting Russia later

in

the year. The

announcement came at the cone 1 us ion ot Vice-President
Nixon's trip to the Soviet Union and his famed

k

i

tchen

debate with Khrushchev. Even be fore Nixon's trip and during
it

Khrushchev repeatedly criticized

Congress declaring

.\

Joint Resolution of

a

"Captive Nations Week 1959" issued by

Eisenhower just before Nixon's went abroad. The resolution
called for

a

"week of prayer dedicated to the peoples held

captive under Communist dominat ion

.

"

Khrushchev,

criticized Eisenhower for signing such

a

resolution and

questioned the advisability of the Nixon visit.
The negative react ion to Khrushchev

in Warsaw,

's

[26]

visit came

largely from the Catholic periphery. Both the hierarchy and

many lay leaders opposed the visit by the "Butcher of
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Budapest," as William Buckley's National Revipw Hnhh^H
him.
More importantly, those opposing the visit saw the
conflict
in terms of a "spiritual struggle." Buckley,

addressing an

anti-Khrushchev audience in New York City's Carnegie Hall
also placed the contest in religious terms: "Khrushchev

cannot take permanent advantage of our temporary

disadvantage,

for

it

is

the West he is fighting. And in the

West there lie, however encysted, the ultimate resources,

which are moral in nature. Khrushchev is not aware that the
gates of Hell shall not prevail against us." Archbishop

Joseph Hurley of St. Augustine, Florida, recalling events in
Hungary, denounced the visit and declared he would not

welcome "one whose hands are crimson with the blood of our

fellow Christians." Brent Bozell, Buckley's colleague and

fellow Catholic, placed the apparent willingness to appease

Khrushchev in the context of the horrors of modern warfare,
concluding the West had the advantage over "atheist
materialism" by providing the comfort of an afterlife not
available to the Communists. Garry Wills,
seminarian,

a

former Jesuit

"joined the chorus against Khrushchev in

National Review ." The invitation to Khrushchev by Eisenhower
and his advisors was indicative of the "cowardice" that

allowed "the cry of Hungary" to go "unanswered" and could
not "see in Chiang Kai-shek's little garrison a desperate

romance of courage." "The morbidity of the modern soul,"
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according to Wills, "reflects

paralysis in the face of

a

evil" among those advocating "coexistence"
[27]

Eisenhower seemed taken aback by the ferocity of the
attack on Khrushchev's visit.

"Many Americans nursed serious

misgivings about the forthcoming Khrushchev visit," he noted
in his memoirs,

and "some of the more vociferous

(possibly

thinking of the editors and writers of the National Review

)

were those who opposed any kind of contact with the

Soviets..," There were others, however, "persons of
standing" from among the nations business, labor and

religious leaders that also opposed the visit. "One
outs t and ing leader who expressed some misgivings ,

"

the

President wrote, "was Francis Cardinal Spellman." Eisenhower
was so concerned about Spellman

'

s

opposition that he

"telephoned to assure him we would stand firm on Berlin" and
that "the exchange of visits implied no hint of a

surrender." The President was reassured when "the cardinal,
always my great friend, promised he would continue to pray
for the successful outcome of my endeavors." There is no way
to measure the

impact of Spellman's decision not to

embarrass his friend. The crowds protesting Khrushchev's
visit to New York were substantial, but the active and

enthusiastic support of the Cardinal, who had repeatedly

demonstrated the ability to produce thousands in the war
against "atheistic Communism,

"
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most certainly would have led

to greater protest.

He had,

however, received private

assurances directly from the President that
governmental
actions were not going to be detrimental to
the interests of
the Cardinal or his church. [28]
The off-year congressional elections in 1958
which

produced a Democratic landslide also produced
landslide.

In all

in the House and

a

Catholic

102 Catholics were elected to Congress,
12

in the Senate.

90

For the first time

Catholic representation in Congress was roughly equivalent
to their numbers

in the country.

Catholics were the largest

single religious body in the Congress; and with

a

potential

Catholic President emerging as well "interest and concern on
the part of the public, the press, and the academic world"
was focusing on "whether Catholic Congressmen would vote as
a

bloc." Democratic party leaders such as Bill Green and Jim

Finnegan in Philadelphia, Richard Daley
Wagner in New

Yor]<

in Chicago,

Robert

and Dan O'Connell in Albany represented

crucial urban areas. More important were the Governors of
key states; Pat Brown of California, David Lawrence of

Pennsylvania, Mike DiSalle of Ohio and Steve McNichols of
Colorado. In Massachusetts Senator Kennedy boosted his

presidential hopes with

a

landslide reelection victory. The

work of Kennedy's pastor, the Archbishop of Boston, was also

recognized as Cushing was raised to the Card inalate

402

.

[

29

The political situation seemed ripe for

a

return of

the presidency to the Democrats in 1960. The
emergence of

Kennedy as

a

national candidate and the seemingly increased

acceptance of Catholic candidates by the electorate
suggested to many that

a

Catholic could indeed be elected

President. Catholic politicians, however, mostly Democrats,
feared

a

Catholic at the top of the Democratic ticket would

only revive the underlying American ant i -Cathol ic ism so
evident in the 1928 campaign. They worried that he might
drag other Catholic candidates down to defeat eliminating
the hard fought gains of a generation. Generally, the church

hierarchy was also anxious about the potential for resurgent

anti-Catholicism that

a

Catholic presidential nominee might

generate. On a practical level, they had come to expect

a

sympathet ic hearing on issues important to the church from

Protestant politicians sensitive to the Cathol ic vote, as
the Eisenhower example illustrates.

Specifically, many

members of the hierarchy viewed Kennedy as too liberal and
would have preferred
if

a

more conservative Catholic candidate

there had to be one at all. Even the presence of the

candidate's conservative father in the background and the
longstand ing relat ions hip between Joseph Kennedy and

Cardinal Spellman could not sway the Cardinal to support the
his son

.

[

30
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While prominent members of the Catholic hierarchy may
have believed Kennedy was too liberal their flock, the

"Catholic vote," would have been hard pressed to identify
just what it was they objected to. The differences were a

question of degree, and on foreign policy issues both

Kennedy and prelates such as Cushing were calling for

a

more

active anti-Communism. Candidate Kennedy, after all, was

criticizing the Eisenhower/Nixon team for permitting the
extension of the Communist menace into the Western

hemisphere in Cuba, the continuing Soviet challenge to
Berlin, the failure to take

a

sufficiently tough position on

the defense of the Chinese Nationalist islands of Quemoy and

Matzu and, perhaps most tellingly, allowing the Soviet Union
to take the lead

"missi le gap

."

in

missile technology thus producing the

In terms of campaign rhetor ic,

this last was

allegedly the most serious threat to American security.
It

is

interesting to note the similarities between

candidate Kennedy's campaign rhetoric and that of his pastor
Card inal Cushing,

in attempt ing to sort out religion and the

Cold War. Cushing later recalled "Whenever he was home he

never failed to contact me by

a

telephone call or

a

personal

visit. Our conversations covered many subjects: for example,

the trends of the times,

legislation in which the Catholic

Church and other churches were interested." The

Kennedy/Cushing relationship has been "the subject of much
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speculation," according to historian James
of that speculation,

M.

O'Toole. Much

however, has centered around the depth

of Kennedy's commitment to Catholicism. Many
writers have

emphasized his secular Harvard education, others his

divergent views on parochial education and the conflicts
with the Catholic hierarchy that position engendered, still
others his lack of moral commitment to the teachings of the

church due to his sexual promiscuity and frequent
adulteries. Even Cushing has been quoted as saying: "He wore
his religion lightly." Perhaps a more accurate description
is

presented by Francis Russell who writes that while

"Catholicism was of course

a

Boston Irish trademark," the

Jansenist strain which dominated Irish and American Irish

Catholicism was muted, and "Kennedy's Catholicism was Latin
rather than Celtic

-

to accede to the church, accept it,

but

not to let it interfere too much with one's private habits
or one's daily life." While this may explain much about

Kennedy's personal life, more research needs to be done on
the question of Kennedy

'

ant i -Commun ism, both as

s

Catholicism as

a

candidate and as

relates to his

it
a

President.

[31]

The evidence seems to suggest that the ant i -Communist

position of the Catholic periphery which had been defined in
the decade of the 1930s,

led to FDR's initiative to reach an

accommodation between the Vatican and the Kremlin, defined
the postwar confrontation over Eastern Europe and the call
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for internal security at home and,

re invigorated in the

streets of Budapest, would reach its logical
conclusion in
October 1962 when John and Robert Kennedy realized
their
options in the Cuban Missile Crisis were limited by
the

domestic political realities. The inability to achieve

a

permanent peace, foreseen by FDR in his conversation with Ed
Flynn prior to Yalta,

is

echoed in

the Kennedy brothers.

"I

just don't think there was any

a

conversation between

choice," Robert Kennedy told JFK, "and not only that,

if

you

hadn't acted, you would have been impeached." The President

reflected for

a

moment and replied,

"That's what

I

think

-

would have been impeached." [32]
The 1960 election marks the culmination of thirty

years of effort on the part of the Catholic periphery to

dominate the Protestant center/core by means of the culture
of ant i -Communism. This trend was particularly prominent in

the postwar era when Catholic anti-Communism governed the

discussion of both domestic and international affairs.
Thomas Garvin of University College, Dublin, Ireland,

building on the earlier work of Seymour Martin Lipsit, has

demonstrated the case for

a

periphery-dominated center.

According to him, the political party organization of the
early Irish Republic saw Fianna Fail, the political arm of
Eamon De Valera's revolutionary republican movement

"inheriting

a

core of west coast ultra-nationalist rural
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I

Republican support." Political developments

Ireland

in

hinged on "the polarization within Ireland on the
question
of relations with Britain," and the political
culture of

radical republicanism espoused by De Valera came to
dominate
the discussion. This polarization continued into the
1930s
and 1940s as "the stormy character of Anglo-Irish

governmental relations" was kept alive by De Valera's
efforts to establish

a

truly independent Irish Republic-

This ultra-nationalist republicanism is perhaps best

illustrated by the fact that Ireland, alone among the

English speaking nations of the world, did not declare war
on Germany during WWII.

[33]

The parallels between the Irish situation, driven by
the ideology of radical republicanism, and the American

situation, driven by the ideology of ant i -Communism which in
turn was largely driven by Catholic ant i -Commun ism are

striking. Foreign policy as an issue in the 1960 election
was dominated by the no compromise att i tude toward the

Soviet Union being expressed so candidly in the speeches of
both candidates. As historian and Kennedy biographer Herbert
S

.

"The issue was not whether the cold war

Par met has noted ,

could be mitigated, not which man was best equipped to

search for peace, but who would face the
with greater resolve

.

"

'

Communist threat

Nixon attacked Kennedy

'

s

*

seeming

willingness to give up the Nationalist Chinese held islands
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of Quemoy and Matsu off the China
coast,

which Kennedy

denied. Kennedy in turn attacked Nixon's part
in the loss of
Cuba into the Soviet orbit, charges which Nixon
denied. With
both candidates struggling to outdo the other
in

demonstrating their ant i -Communism, members of the Catholic
hierarchy did not need to fear that their no compromise
attitude toward Communism was in jeapordy. "Cold war issues
raised the most passion" in the campaign, according to
Parmet. There simply was no center politically when it came
to anti-Communism.

The Vital Center, as described by Arthur

Schlesinger Jr., was just as dominated by anti-Communism as
the extreme right.

It

is

small wonder then that as President

JFK could fear the prospect of impeachment should he be

perceived as giving in to the Soviets on so vital an issue
as missiles

in Cuba.

[34]

The focus of this work has been the driving force of

religion, more specifically American Catholicism, as

a

motivator of the Cold War. The emergence of American
Catholics as a potentially decisive factor in American
politics during the 1930s coincided with the emergence of
the United States and the Soviet Union as the world's

superpowers. Scholars have argued that American Catholic
ant i -Communism was an expression of Catholic nationalism

-

an effort to be accepted as true and faithful Americans.

That view places American anti-Communism at the very center

408

of American nationalism.

This work takes the opposite

position. The importance of Catholicism to politics
and in

turn the importance of Catholic ant i -Communism to American

Catholicism influenced and shaped foreign policy filtered
through domestic politics, beginning with FDR and continuing
until the end of the Cold War. The significance of FDR's

attempted
in

reconciliation between Joseph Stalin and Pius XII

1945 and is fully realized in the dramatic meeting

between Mikhail Gorbachev and John Paul

II

which symbolized

for Catholics everywhere the end of the Cold War.

If FDR had

succeeded, would the Cold War have been fought? The evidence
seems clear that he at least thought so, and attempted to

forestall it.
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